26 S.E.2d 456 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1943
1. The court did not commit reversible error in sustaining paragraph 4 of the demurrer to paragraph 4 of the answer for the reason that a careful examination of the brief of evidence clearly shows that such ruling was harmless to the complaining party.
2. The verdict was amply authorized, if not demanded, by the evidence, and the denial of a new trial was not error.
Assuming (but not deciding) that the court erred in sustaining paragraph 4 of the demurrer to paragraph 4 of the answer, the error was harmless to the complaining party. "It is well settled that the erroneous overruling of a special demurrer is not harmful error where it affirmatively appears from the evidence in the case *617
that the error did not result in injury to the party interposing the demurrer, and `In determining whether error has resulted in injury, the court may look to the record as a whole.'" CoffeeCounty v. Denton,
2. We come next to consider the only other question that the record presents for our consideration. In the motion for new trial, after setting out the verdict and judgment in the case, "movant contends that the said verdict and judgment are contrary to law and contrary to the evidence, because said verdict and judgment adjudicate that the said administratrix was liable for such amounts expressed in said verdict and judgment, in personam. That according to the undisputed evidence, no property whatever came *618 into her hands as such administratrix. That the evidence demanded a finding that no property came into her hands as such administratrix. That the legal meaning and effect of said judgment is to bind the said movant, individually for such amounts." The verdict was "against the defendant Irene Scott, as administrator upon the estate of Eddie Scott," for the full sum sought to be recovered, and stipulated that it was "to be levied of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, which were of said Eddie Scott, deceased, now in the hands of said Irene Scott, as such administrator of said deceased, or that may hereafter come into her hands as said administrator of said estate." The judgment contained substantially the identical language just quoted. We can not conceive how it could be concluded "that the legal meaning and effect of said judgment is to bind the said movant individually for such amounts," for even if it should be granted, as contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, that "the undisputed evidence" showed that "no property came into her hands as such administratrix," the plain wording of both the verdict and judgment clearly shows that any levy was to be made on property that was, or should come, into "the hands of Irene Scott as said administratrix." We therefore hold that there is no merit in the contention of plaintiff in error that the verdict and judgment adjudicated that "the said administratrix was liable in personam."
Judgment affirmed. MacIntyre and Gardner, JJ., concur.