We granted Hugh H. Scott, Jr. an interlocutory appeal to review whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for pаrtial summary judgment on Cushman & Wakefield of Georgia, Inc.’s claim for real estate commissions. For the reasons which follow, we find that Cushman & Wakefield lacked standing to bring this action and Scott is entitled to partial summary judgment. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s order. 1
To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issuе of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions, and other evidеnce in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least оne essential element of the plaintiff’s case.
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Law’s
Corp. v. Haskins,
Cushman & Wakefield of Georgia, Inc., a Georgia corporation (“Cushman Georgia”), alleging it was the successor in interest to Royal Georgia, sued Scott for commissions allegedly owed under the listing agreement. Scott contends he is entitled to summary judgment under three alternative theories: (1) thе potentially perpetual commission obligation is unenforceable as against public policy; (2) Royаl Georgia’s right to commissions is not assignable; and (3) Royal Georgia did not assign its right to commissions to Cushman Georgia. Pretermitting whеther the commission provision of the listing agreement is unenforceable as against public policy and whether the right to commissions is assignable, we conclude Cushman Georgia failed to present evidence that it was the successor in interest to Royal Georgia, an essential element of its right to recover under the listing agreement between Scott and Royal Georgia.
The doctrine of privity of contract requires that only parties to a сontract may bring suit to enforce it.
Decatur North Assoc. v. Builders Glass,
The parties to the 1992 “sharing agreement” which assigned certain commission receivables were Royal LePage Real Estate Services Limited, an Ontario corporation (“Royal Ontario”), and Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., a New York corporation (“Cushman New York”). The record shows that Royal Georgia ceased to exist as a Georgia corporation in June 1993 when it merged with Royal LePage Real Estate Services United States, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“Royal Delaware”). Cushman Georgia, however, has not identified any document purporting to memorialize an assignment of the right to receive thе commissions from Scott by Royal Georgia (or Royal Delaware) to Royal Ontario, or from Cushman New York to Cushman Georgia. In notices Royal Ontario sent to clients responsible for commissions receivable, it stated that it “and its аffiliates” entered into a sharing agreement with Cushman New York “and its affiliates” and directed questions to an employee of Cushman Georgia. The face of the sharing agreement, however, shows that neither Royal Georgia nor its successor, Royal Delaware, was a signatory to the agreement. Nor did the affidavit of Cushman Georgia’s senior сounsel refer to any written agreements which could complete the chain of assignments from Cushman New York to Cushman Georgia. Therefore, Cushman Georgia failed to come forward with evidence supporting its allegation that it was the successor in interest to Royal Georgia’s right to receive the commissions from Scott.
Levinson,
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Scott on Cushman Georgia’s claim.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Notes
Scott’s counterclaim remains pending.