34 Iowa 317 | Iowa | 1872
I. The first proposition argued by appellant’s counsel is, “ that a part of the money, at least, found to be missing, passed into the bands of the defendant Fluke, and was unaccounted for by bim.” It does appear from the evidence that a portion of the money unaccounted for by the defendant Fluke at the close of bis term of office, had, directly or indirectly, come to bis bands. But, it also
II. It is next urged “ that the defendant Fluke did not exercise reasonable care and diligence in the preservation of the plaintiff’s money.” This is a question of fact, upon which the finding of the referee stands as the verdict of a jury. ¥e see no controlling reason which should lead us to differ with the referee, and surely there is no such clear weight of evidence against his finding as would justify us in setting it aside.
Upon the trial of Fluke, on the indictment, as upon the trial of this case when last tried before the referee, Rufus Linderman testified, as a witness, that he was formerly county judge of Scott county and was acquainted with Moses Brotherlin ; that for about two years before Brotherlin’s death his acquaintance with him was intimate; that, on the Tuesday preceding the Friday on which Brotherlin died, in May, 1869, after some conversation leading thereto, and after some hesitation, Brotherlin stated that he had taken money from the drawer in the treasurer’s office frequently ; that sometimes parties would pay taxes to him that he would not report; that sometimes he would report and account for a less amount than the sum paid him; that sometimes he doctored the books, by making alterations and erasures in stub books and tax, list'of some one’s tax, corresponding with the amount taken by him from the drawer, etc.; that he sometimes had trouble to conceal these abstractions, etc., but that Fluke knew nothing of it; after these statements were made Brotherlin further stated that the criminal case, against him would probably be continued, and inquired whether his surety on his appearance bond would be holden if he should die in the meantime, and was told that he would not. This testimony was
The respective counselhave ably discussed the question of the competency of this testimony in the light of principle, and the numerous adjudicated cases bearing upon it. The question, however, underwent a careful and elaborate examination by this court in Mahaska Co. v. Ingalls, 16 Iowa, 81, in an able opinion prepared by Dillon J., in which the authorities cited by counsel, and others, were referred to, and some of them reviewed. It was held that such testimony was competent. We say such testimony because there, as here, the declarant was dead; the declaration was against his pecuniary interest, and here it would subject him to penal consequences too, which would add to its weight, as was there said; the declaration was of facts within his immediate personal knowledge ; and it is manifest, from the circumstances of this case, that there was no probable motive to falsify the facts declared. That case must be regarded as decisive of the question here made.
Affirmed.