65 Mo. 123 | Mo. | 1877
The points arising in this case are presented by an agreed statement of facts, which is as follows ;
1st. That by an act of the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, entitled an act to incorporate the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railroad Company, approved February 9th, 1857, the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railroad Company became and was duly incorporated, possessed of all the powers, privileges, rights, immunities, exemptions, franchises and properties, and subject to all the liabil-. ities, obligations and restrictions mentioned in said act. 2d. That on the 13th day of September, A. D. 1864, said company was duly organized and directors elected, as required by section four of said act, and immediately said company commenced and proceeded to carry on its- proper business and railroad operations, under the privileges and conditions in said act mentioned. 3d. That by an act of the said General Assembly, entitled “an act to amend an act entitled an act to incorporate the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railroad Company,” approved February 9th, 1857,” which said amendatory act was approved February 19th, 1866, and by the due acceptance of the first section of said amendatory act the corporate name of said railroad company was changed to that of the Alexandria & Nebraska City Railroad Company. 4th. That in pursuance of the general laws of the States of Missouri and Iowa, authorizing the consolidation of railroad companies, owning connecting railroad lines in said States, the
Whereupon the plaintiff moved the Court to make the following declarations of law: 1st. There was no consideration for the grant of the charter of the Alexandria & Bloomfield Railway Company, or for the exemption from taxation claimed under the same, and that therefore there was no contract between the State and said Company as to said exemption. 2d. That by the 7th section of chapter 34, article 1, of the revised statutes of 1855, the Legislature reserved the power to amend, alter, or repeal the exemption from taxation claimed under said charter; and that the Legislature, or a Convention called to form a Constitution for the State of Missouri, by virtue of said reservation had the power to repeal said exemption, without notice to the secretary or president of the company. 3d. That said exemption from taxation claimed in defendant’s charter, was repealed by the Constitution of Missouri, adopted the 4th day of July, in the year 1865, and the act of the Legislature passed in pursuance thereof; and that said company is liable for the tax mentioned in plaintiff’s petition, by virtue of the act approved March 20th, 1871. 4th. That upon the agreed statement of facts in this cause, plaintiff' is entitled to recover the amount of tax with interest, as stated in plaintiff’s petition. 5th. The section in defendant’s charter exempting defendant’s stock from taxation for the period pf twenty years from its completion, is to be strictly construed, and does not thereby exempt the real, personal, or mixed property of defendant, but at most only the stock in the hands of individual stockholders. 6th. That the defendant, by the consolidation of the Alexandria and Nebraska City Railway Company, and the Iowa Southern Railway Company did not succeed to all the rights, privileges and immunities of the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railway -Company. Which motion was by the court overruled, ancf to which order of court the plaintiff at the time excepted.
1st. The charter of the Alerandria and Bloomfield Eailroad Company, after the acceptance by and organization of said company under the same, constituted a contract between the State and said company for exemption from taxation for a period of twenty years from the completion of said Eailroad, of all the property of said company necessary for the operations of said railroad, and the property sought to be taxed in this case is within the said contract and is exempt from taxation by the plaintiff. 2d. That the defendant by the consolidation of the Alexandria and Nebraska City Eailroad Company (the old Alexandria & Bloomfield Eailroad Company) and the Iowa Southern Eailway Company, became entitled to exemption for twenty years, as to all that portion of its railroad in this State, which belonged, or would have belonged to the said Alexandria & Bloomfield Eailroad, and necessary to its operations as a railroad, and as the property in controversy pertaining to that portion of the consolidated company belonged, or would have belonged to said Alexandria & Bloomfield Eailroad Company, the same is exempt from taxation and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. 3d. That the act of the legislature, under which the plaintiff asks to tax the property in controversy is unconstitutional in this, that it impairs the obligation of the contract of the State with the said Alexandria & Bloomfield Eailroad Company as to the rights, privileges and exemptions to which the defendants succeeded by the consolidation, within the meaning of section 10, article 1 of the Constitution of the United States. 4th. The Legislature did not reseiwe the right to alter, amend or repeal the charter of said Alexandria & Bloomfield .Company after the organization of said company. 5th. If the Legislature had reserved the right to alter, amend or repeal the said charter after notice to the president or secretary, then, before any amendment, alteration or repeal could be made, said notice
It was at one time a question of considerable doubt whether a Legislature could divest itself or its successors Powor taxation; but it maybe considered as settled now that legislative bodies have the power by selecting the subjects of taxation and excluding or exempting other subjects which they had the power to tax, to hold out inducements to proposed investment of capital unless there is some constitutional restriction. The subject is referred to and somewhat discussed in the case of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, and Dodge v. Wolsey, 18 Howard 331. It is agreed, on all hands, that the exemption must be clear and unambiguous. The exemption claimed in this case depends on the construction of the ninth section of the defendant’s charter adopted in 1857. That section is as follows :
“ The stock of said company shall be exempt from taxation for the period of twenty years after its completion.” In accordance with the decision of this court in the case of the H. & St. Joe R. R. Co. v Shacklett, 30 Mo. 550, supported as it is by numerous decisions in other states, it is clear that a tax on the property represented by the stock is substantially a tax on the stock. It is simply respectful to the Legislature to assume that a valuable privilege was designed to be confeiued by this section, but if the exemption of the stock did not extend to the property which the stock represented, the section was purely illusory.
It is not now maintained by any judicial tribunal that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical effect of dissolving its moral obligations or impairing contracts previously vested. Constitutional Conventions, which are of frequent occurrence in many of our States, it is believed, have no more power over vested rights than ordinary Legislatures. It must.be remarked, however, that upon well settled rules of construction, this 16th section was evidently designed to be prospective and not retrospective in its operation, and it would be an unjust imputation on the convention which framed that Constitution to infer that they designed that ■section to operate upon existing rights.
It is now insisted, on the part of the plaintiff, that the charter of defendant in 1857 was subject to the 7th section bbe general act, concerning corporations above quoted, and therefore subject to suspension, alteration and repeal, in the discretion of any succeeding Legislature. This position can only be maintained by the assumption that the act of 1857, which constitutes defendant’s charter,is entirely consistent with this provision in the acts of 1845 and 1855, for it will hardly be contended that one Legislature can bind its successors, and if the Legislature of 1857 thought proper to disregard this provision in the acts of 1845 and 1855, there is no principle upon which such power could be questioned. The 13th section of defendant’s charter provides: That “ said company shall commence the construction of said road.
Arrirmed.