Scissom v. StateScissom v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Gunter
Appellee, the State of Arkansas, petitions for review from a court of appeals’ decision to reverse and remand the Pope County Circuit Court’s order that extended appellant’s probation by ordering him to serve twelve months in the Regional Punishment Facility as an additional condition of probation, with credit to be given for time already served. See Scissom v. State, 94 Ark. App. 452, 232 S.W.3d 502 (2006). We granted the State’s petition for review pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4(e) and (f) (2006). We affirm the court of appeals’ decision for resentencing, and we reverse and remand to the circuit court for sentencing under the proper statutes.
In March of 2003, appellant was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class C felony and a violation under
In its order dated March 7, 2005, after finding that appellant had violated the conditions of his probation, the trial court decided not to revoke the probation as requested by the State. Instead, the court ordered appellant to serve twelve months in the Regional Punishment Facility as an additional condition of his probation. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the trial court’s order with an instruction that no additional period of confinement could be imposed. A petition for review was filed in this court on April 3, 2006, and was granted on June 29, 2006.
When we grant petitions for review of a decision by the court of appeals, we review the appeal as if it had been originally filed in this court. Castaneda v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 357 Ark. 345, 166 S.W.3d 556 (2004). At issue here is a question of law in the interpretation of a statute. This court reviews questions of law denovo. Brown v. Pine Bluff Nursing Home, 359 Ark. 471, 199 S.W.3d 45 (2004).
For his sole point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it ordered appellant to serve twelve months
Since the enactment of the criminal code, this court has held that sentencing shall not be other than in accordance with the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime. Sullivan v. State, 366 Ark. 183, 234 S.W.3d 285 (2006) (citing Taylor v. State, 354 Ark. 450, 125 S.W.3d 174 (2003)). Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas. Id. See
In this case, the trial court apparently used the sentencing statute that became effective July 16, 2003, when determining appellant’s probation sentence. The statute provides in part:
(d) (1) (A) The period actually spent in confinement pursuant to this section in a county jail, city jail, or other authorized local detentional, correctional, or rehabilitative facility shall not exceed:
(i) One hundred twenty (120) days in the case of a felony; or
(ii) Thirty (30) days in the case of a misdemeanor.
(B) In the case of confinement to a facility in the Department of Community Correction, the period actually spent in confinement under this section shall not exceed three hundred sixty-five (365) days.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, any part of a twenty-four-hour period spent in confinement shall constitute a day of confinement.
Appellant committed a Class C felony on February 27, 2003. The version of
We reverse and remand for sentencing under the proper statute.
Court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part; circuit court reversed and remanded.