Action to foreclose a lien for street work in the city of San Rafael. Plaintiff had judgment, from which this appeal is taken on the judgment-roll alone. The resolution of intention described the work to be done as follows: “That First street, from the westerly line of B street westerly to the easterly line of D street, .... be graded to the oficial grade and macadamized, and that rock gutterways be constructed therein, and that culverts he constructed therein, and that curbing be constructed therein, and that the sidewalks on both sides of sаid street he graded to the official grade.”
It is claimed by appellant that as to the culverts and curbing
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the description in the resolution of the proposed work was insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the board of city trustees to perform the work, bеcause the materials of which the culverts and curbing were to be constructed were not named in the resolution. (Citing
Bolton v. Gilleran,
It appears from the findings of the court that notice of the passage of the resolution of intention was duly posted, and the board duly made and passed a resolution ordering the work to be done, and this order was duly posted and published, as required by law; the order for doing the work directed that it should be done in accordance with the plans and specifications provided therefor by the сity engineer, which were filed by him in the office of the superintendent of streets on the day the order was posted; the order set forth “the nature and character of said work to be done, with specifications in detail, inviting sealed proposals for doing said work.”
For the purposes of this cause it must be assumed in the absence of the evidence, that “the nature and character of the work to be done, with specifications in detail,” set forth in the order and notice thereof, included the materials to be used as well as the character of the curbs and culverts; there could not well be specifications in detail which did not state the materials to be used. If the fact had been otherwise, appellant should have so shown by bringing up the evidence through appropriate proceedings. The question then is, Did the board acquire jurisdiction, notwithstanding it failed to mention in the resolution of intention the materials out of which the curbs and culverts were to have been constructed?
Section 3 of the street assessment аct (Stats. 1891, p. 196) reads: “Before ordering any work done or improvement made, which is authorized by section 3 of this act, the city council shall pass a resolution of intention so to do, and describing the work,” etc. The section requires the street superintendent tо cause to be posted notices of the passage of said resolution, and this notice shall “state the fact of the passage of the resolution, its date, and briefly the work or improvement proposed, and refer to the resolution for further particulars.” The owners of property affected may make written objection to the same, and such
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objections shall be a bar for six months 'to any further proceedings in relation to the doing of said work; but the council may order a hearing of the objеctions when the work is of the kind here mentioned, and its decision shall be conclusive and work a removal of tire bar aforesaid. Undoubtedly, the resolution of intention should sufficiently describe the work contemplated to convey an intelligent idea of the imрrovement and its nature and extent. The resolution is the initial step, and by it alone the board acquired jurisdiction to subsequently order the work done.
(Bolton v. Gilleran, supra.)
Uo amount of particularity in following the statute in the subsequent steps can excuse a noncompliance with the provision requiring the board in its resolution of intention to describe the work. It is by this action that-the board is to be guided and the property owner is to judge whether he will protest against or acquiesce in the proposed improvement. When the owner of property was told by the resolution in the present case that the street was to “be graded to the official grade and macadamized” he was given such description of the work as would intelligently convey the intention of the board as to the work contemplated, and its-character and extent. The words, “grade to the official grade and macadamized,” have well-understood meanings, and their use alone at once conveys to the mind the nature and character of the work and the materials to bе used. So, when it was resolved that the sidewalks on both sides of the street should be graded to the official grade, no one could misunderstand the full extent of the work to be done; and in providing that “rock gutterways be constructed in the street” notice was given of the work and the material to be used. But simply to provide that "culverts be constructed therein” and “curbing be constructed therein” did not indicate whether the culverts were to be built of brick, iron, stone, wood, or other materials; and the same may be said of the curbs. To resolve that “culverts be constructed” is not “describing the work.” The learned trial judge (whose opinion appears in respondent’s brief) referred to certain cases decided by this court in support of his decision,
Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28
Cal. 376, among them. The resolution in that casе was that a certain street in San Francisco “be graded and macadamized.” It was contended that it did not sufficiently describe
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the work, but it was held sufficient, the court saying: “The board are not required to describe the work with any more exactness than it is described by the law itself. When the board .say they intend to grade a certain street, they have said all that is needed by way of description. Bo property holder can be in any doubt as to what is to be done.” We do not question the conclusion reached in that partiсular case, but we do question the rule laid down, to wit: “That the board are not required to -describe the work with any more exactness than it is described in the law itself,” if the rule is to be applied to all cases arising under the statute. Section
2
does not attempt tо describe the work in any one instance; it merely enumerates, in a general way, the classes of improvements which the board is authorized to order made. Some of these convey sufficient description of their character and extent by naming them, whilе others do not. For example, the city council are empowered to order the whole or any portion of the streets, avenues, lanes, etc., “graded or regraded to the official grade.” A resolution of intention to grade a street to the official grade, following the language of section 2 of the act, would be sufficient, for no one can doubt what is to be done. But the next power enumerated in the section is to order a street “paved or repaved.” Section 3, as we have seen, provides that “before ordering any work done or improvement made, which is authorized by section 2 of this act, the city council shall pass a resolution of intention so to do, and describing the work,” etc. Botice of this resolution must be posted and must statе therein “'briefly the work or improvement proposed, and refer to the resolution for further particulars.” Bow, suppose in the present case the work resolved upon had been to pave the street, and the resolution of intention had simply beеn “to j>ave the street,” and the notice had been given referring to the resolution for further particulars, what information would the property owner have obtained? Be would not know whether the ■street was to be paved with cobble-stones, asphalt, woоden blocks, or some of the numerous composite pavement materials now in use. We think the words “and describing the work” were in•troduced into section 3 for the obvious purpose of requiring the resolution of intention to set forth such a substantial description <of the classes of improvements authorized by section 2 as would
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inform those interested not only of the particular improvement resolved upon, as, for example, paving a street, but would also inform them of what material it was to be built. And so of sewers, curbs, culverts, or other similar work, the naming gf which does not of itself convey to the mind its description. It may be true that the description should not be required to contain a plan and specifications in detail, as was held in
Harney
v. Heller,
We advise that the judgment be reversed.
Gray, C., and Haynes, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment is reversed.
Henshaw, J., Temple, J., McFarland, J.
Hearing in Bank denied.