73 Mich. 473 | Mich. | 1889
This action is ejectment for a parcel of land described in the declaration as a part or parcel of the S. £ of the S. E. £ of section 20, town 3 S., of range 11 E., and east of the. Detroit, Monroe & Toledo Lake Shore or Canada Southern Railroad, and more particularly described as bounded on the west by said railroad; on the east by what is designated as “Fifth Street" on a plat dated June l, 1873, and recorded in liber 2, p. 30, of Plats, Wayne County Records; on the north by the north line of the premises as set forth in said plat; and on the south by Woodruff avenue or road, as designated on said plat.
Both parties claim title from a common source, namely, from Alexander EC. Woodruff, who in 1873 was the owner and in possession of the S. £ of the S. E. fractional £,
The original plat was recorded in the office of the register of deeds of Wayne county, in liber 2, p. 30, of Plats, on June 4, 1873. On the same day said Alexander EL Woodruff executed a warranty deed, and duly acknowledged the same, to Helen E. Gowman, of certain premises described as—
“All that certain lot or parcel of land situated, lying, and being in subdivision of the south-easterly part of south-east quarter of sec. 20, town of Ecorse, county of Wayne, State of Michigan, known and described as ‘Block Number Six/ according to a certain plat made and surveyed by John F. Munro, and recorded in the office of the register of deeds in and for said county of Wayne on June 4, 1873, in liber 2 of Plats, on page 30.”
On September 1, 1885, Helen E. Gowman conveyed by warranty deed the same premises to the defendant, Arie Woodruff, who went into possession thereof. The deed of Helen E. Gowman was duly recorded in Wayne county before the conveyance, hereinafter named, from Oarrie E. Eioranger to plaintiffs.
On or about June 30, 1885, Carrie E. Loranger conveyed the premises devised to her to the plaintiffs in this suit. Before purchasing, the plaintiffs procured an abstract of title as it appeared of record in Wayne county register’s office, and such abstract showed the conveyance of block 6 from Alexander H. Woodruff to Helen R. Gowman. No one was in the actual possession of the land at the time the plaintiffs purchased, and no streets or lots were fenced or improved. No actual notice was shown to have been received by the plaintiffs of Helen R. Gowman’s claim, and ’ plaintiffs made no inquiry to ascertain what it was, or what land block 6 covered. They knew Mrs. Helen R. Gowman, but made no effort to see her. Under the directions of the court the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and judgment was entered thereon.
' The only question is whether the record of the plat, and the record of the deed to Helen R. Gowman, were any notice to plaintiffs of Helen R. Gowman’s title. The plat was defective. . A sale, however, by the proprietor, of land according to a plat which is defective under the statute authorizing the recording of town plats, is good and effectual to convey land embraced in such plat. As between Alexander H. Woodruff and Helen R. Gowman,
“Constructive notice is a legal inference from established facts, and, when the facts are not controverted, the question is one for the court.” Claflin v. Lenheim, 66 N. Y. 396.
It is the duty of a purchaser of real estate to investigate the title of his vendor, and to take notice of any adverse rights or equities of third persons which he has the means of discovering, and as to which he is put on inquiry. If he makes all the inquiry which due diligence requires, and still fails to discover the qutstanding right, he is excused, but, if he fails to use due diligence, he is chargeable, as a matter of law, with notice of the facts which the inquiry would have disclosed. Parker v. Conner, 93 N. Y. 124.
The rule is stated by Selden, J., in Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354, at page 362, as follows:
“ The true doctrine on this subject is that, where a purchaser has knowledge of any fact sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the existence of some right or title in conflict with that he is about to purchase, he is presumed either to have made the inquiry, and ascertained*478 tbe extent of such prior right, or to have been guilty of a degree of negligence equally fatal to his claim to be considered as a bona fide purchaser.”
This rule is supported by numerous authorities in that state, and in our own and other states. Ellis v. Horrman, 90 N. Y. 466; Bank v. Delano, 48 Id. 326; Jackson, etc., Railroad Co. v. Davison, 65 Mich. 437 (37 N. W. Rep. 543); Roll v. Rea, 50 N. J. Law, 264 (12 Atl. Rep. 905); Hosley v. Holmes, 27 Mich. 416; Mich. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Conant, 40 Id. 530. The questions in such cases are: First, whether the facts were sufficient to put the party on inquiry; and, second, did he fail to exercise due diligence in making the inquiry?
We think the facts above stated were sufficient to put the. plaintiffs upon inquiry. The record showed that the land they were about to purchase had been platted into blocks and lots. It also showed that Alexander H. Woodruff, through whom their grantor acquired title, had sold a parcel of said land to Helen E. Gowrnan. This was sufficient to throw upon them the necessity of inquiring as to the extent of her prior right, and where she claimed the particular parcel called for in her deed was located. The first question must be answered in the affirmative, as likewise must the second. Mrs. Gowrnan was known to the plaintiffs. She was a sister of their grantor, and, if inquiry had been made, it is presumed they would 'have ascertained the precise facts. At any rate they made no inquiry whatever.
The only reason urged why inquiry was not made is that the description is so uncertain that they were excused from doing so. There are cases where the subsequent purchaser has a right to rely upon the face of the record, and is not bound to make inquiry outside of what the records disclose. Such are errors in recording when the record contains a wrong description of the land conveyed,
Reliance is placed by the plaintiffs upon the case of Stead v. Grosfield, 67 Mich. 289 (34 N. W. Rep. 871), and it was strongly urged upon us at the hearing that this case is ruled by that. The controversy in that case was over lot No. 9, in block 1, of Joseph Bushey’s subdivision of private claim 171, Livernois faivm. Both parties claimed through Joseph Bushey, who on February 17, 1873, executed a mortgage to Michael Darmstadter on
That case is plainly distinguishable from this. Had the Sage mortgage covered the whole plat, she would have known that an attempt had been made to convejr by mortgage a portion of the land covered by the plat. But her mortgage only covered a portion of the plat, and lot 9, block 1, did not appear to have been conveyed or mortgaged to any one; and, as was said in that case, she was not concerned in, and had no occasion to look after, any of the lots or blocks in Bushey's plat, other than the one she received her mortgage ujoon; and there was nothing appearing upon the record to challenge her attention to any conveyance to any person from her grantor of any portion of lot 9, block 1. In this case the record did disclose that the person from whom the plaintiff's grantor derived title had conveyed a portion of the land covered by his plat, the whole of which they were about to purchase, to Helen R. Gowman
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
The other Justices concurred.