153 N.W. 908 | S.D. | 1915
This action was brought by plaintiff against the defendant corporation to recover damages for personal injury alleged to have been sustained by him by reason' of defendant’s negligence while he was in the employment of' defendant. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff, and defendant appeals, assigning .as error, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient tio warrant or sustain such verdict. It appears that the appellant was the 'owner of a brewery plant; and that one Larson, a brick mason, was also employed by defendant to rebuild a boiler and to tear down and rebuild the brick and concrete surroundings of such boiler. Respondent was employed by defendant as a common laborer, as a helper in the repairing of said boiler and its surroundings; that as such helper respondent •was recpuired to mix mortar, clean off and carry brick and carry lumber and timbers, and such other work as might be directed or ■required of him by those in charge of said repairing- work. A part of said repair work consisted in the tearing down of a brick
“You ought to- have a guard over them; somebody will get all cut to pieces.’ It is an awfully dangerous place.”
And Johnson replied- that they would put a guard -over them when they had time. Respondent also testified that a day or fwo before -the accident Larson, the mason, requested him to 'sharpen the brick chisels, and that respondent said to- Larson that he did not have time. It does- not directly appear from the evidence to whom the brick chisels ¡belonged; but the strong inference therefrom is that they were the property of Larson, the mason. Larson testified that he used a brick-hammer,- chisel, and trowel and level; that respondent sharpened them; but that he (Larson) had no knowledge prior to the accident that respondent
We are of the view that the character of the danger arising-from the use of the emery wheel, with the saw on the- shaft, was. so apparently plain and visible and openly patent to any one of •ordinary intelligence, that respondent assumed the risk, thereby-preventing his recovery, under the circumstances of this case.. The evidence clearly shows that he could not help but and did fully appreciate the character of the danger. This case is clearly within the rule announced in Carlson v. Sioux Falls Water Co., 8 S. D. 47, 65 N. W. 419; Berger v. St. P., M. & M. Ry. Co., 39 Minn. 78, 38 N. W. 814; Atlas Engine Works v. Randall, 100 Ind. 293, 50 Am. Rep. 798; Buckley v. Mfg. Co., 113 N. Y. 540, 21 N. E. 717.
It is contended that a reversal of the judgment in this case on the foregoing grounds will amount to a reversal of the decisions in Perreault v. Wis. Granite Co., 32 S. D. 275, 144 N. W. 110, and Iverson v. Look, 32 S. D. 321, 143 N. W. 332; but we are of the view, however, that the rule announced in those cases is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case present. It was never intended by the decisions in the Perreault and Iverson cases to reverse the rule announced in Carlson v. Sioux Falls Water Co. In the Perreault and Iverson cases the dangers were more latent and were not of such an. open, patent, and visible nature as the danger in this case. The danger in those cases was not readily and easily understood and apperciated like the danger in the present case. There was evidence in those-cases from which the jury might reasonably have found that plaintiff did not appreciate or understand the danger to which he was exposed, while in this case the danger was of such an open, patent, and visible nature that any one of reasonable intelligence, at an instantaneous glance, would fully appreciate and understand the danger. The testimony of plaintiff clearly shows that he fully understood and appreciated the danger. In the Perreault and Iverson pases the defendants knew at the time of the employment, and they must have had in contemplation, where and what tools, and implements the plaintiffs would be required to- use in the-performance of their labors; while in this case, on no reasonable construction of the evidence, could it have been contemplated, or
The judgment and order appealed from'are reversed, and the cause remanded.