Ann T. SCHWARTZ v. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION et al.
2006 ME 41
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
April 26, 2006
Argued: March 25, 2005.
[¶ 77] Further, even if Locke is read more broadly than its language would seem to allow, and a rational relationship test is applied to the equal protection interests of the parents, there is no legitimate rаtionale that should be considered by the Court to justify the discrimination manifested in section 2951(2). The enactment of section 2951(2) was based solely on the conclusion that it was necessary to ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause. That was the only reason advanced by the State in Bagley to justify the discrimination in section 2951(2). Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 56, 728 A.2d at 144. The language of section 5204(4) making reference to the First Amendment remains unchanged. Because section 2951(2) is not required by the Establishment Clause, despite the fact that Bagley made clear the basis for the enactment of section 2951(2) and the issue on which the State relied in seeking to uphold section 2951(2), the State now advances, and the Court accepts, new, after-the-fact reasons to justify the discriminatory language of section 2951(2). Those reasons should be rejected.
[¶ 78] I agree that the State is not required to provide tuition aid to parents who wish to send their children to non-public schools. If it does provide such aid, however, it should not be able to exclude private schools that also happen to have a religious affiliation. In my view, that is blаtant discrimination that reflects not a neutrality toward religion, but rather an animus against religion. As was said in Bagley, “[i]f the State‘s justification [for the disparate treatment] is based on an erroneous understanding of the Establishment Clause, its justification will not withstand any level of scrutiny.” Id. ¶ 32, 728 A.2d at 138. The Establishment Clause is the only rationale that the State should be allowed to advance and that should be considered to justify the disparate treatment reflected in section 2951(2), and it does not.
[¶ 79] I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
G. Steven Rowe, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth J. Wyman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Pamela W. Waite, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendants.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.*
Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, ALEXANDER, and LEVY, JJ.
Dissent: DANA, and CALKINS, JJ.
CLIFFORD, J.
[¶ 1] Ann T. Schwartz appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Hancock County, Mead, J.) affirming the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Commission in which the Commission concluded that Schwartz is not entitled to receive unemployment benefits because her former employer, the Maine Sea Coast Missionary Society (the Mission), is exempt from unemployment taxation pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] The Mission is a nonprofit organization serving coastal communities. Eight of its staff members are ordained members of the clergy who serve as pastors for island congregations. Gary DeLong, an ordained minister, serves as the executive director of the Mission. He describes the Mission‘s programs as being “at the very heart of the essence of the religious enterprise.” DeLong, as well as many of the Mission‘s employees, view their work as a form of ministry and as doing the work of the church.
[¶ 3] The Mission provides programs to coastal communities to demonstrate “God‘s love and compassion to marginalized people in the area [it] serve[s].” The Mission was founded as an inclusive Christian ministry, and, over the years, it has never downplayed its Christian roots. More than fifty percent of its income comes from individual donors, who contribute to the organization because of its Christian nature. The Mission also receives contributions of money and services from ninety-six churches. It is affiliated with both the United Church of Christ and the American Baptist Congregation. The Mission‘s employees are eligible for United Church of Christ benefits, including its pension, healthcare, and retirement plans, except that its Baptist clergy are instead eligible for American Baptist Congregation benеfits.
[¶ 4] The Mission provides various religious and secular services to the coastal communities. One featured program is the telemedicine program, which uses a boat named the “Sunbeam” to bring a nurse to the islands to care for those who cannot afford other health services. The Sunbeam also transports ministers to the islands to lead religiоus services and to provide counseling. Additionally, the Mission sponsors an after-school program in Washington County. The program does not teach religious doctrine directly, but it
[¶ 5] In May of 2000, the Mission hired Schwartz to serve as its director of development. In December of 2002, the Mission terminated Schwartz‘s employment, following which Schwartz sought unemployment benefits from the State.1 Schwartz‘s application was initially approved by a Commission field supervisor. The Mission appealed from this decision, аnd the Tax Section manager overturned the field supervisor‘s determination and found Schwartz to be ineligible for unemployment benefits.2
[¶ 6] Schwartz appealed the decision of the Tax Section manager to the Division of Administrative Hearings. A Division hearing officer issued a decision finding that Schwartz was not eligible for unemployment benefits based on her insufficient wages. Schwartz then appealed to the Commission. See
[¶ 7] Schwartz petitioned for review of the Commission‘s decision in the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The court affirmed the Commission‘s findings that the Mission is both operated for religious purposes and principally supported by an association of churches. The court concluded, however, that the Commission erred as a matter of law in finding that the Mission is a church organization exempt from employer contributions pursuant to the first prong of
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 8] When an appeal is taken from a decision of the Superior Court, acting as an intermediate appellate сourt, we review a final Unemployment Insurance Commission decision “directly to determine whether there exists any competent evidence to support the agency findings and then ascertain whether upon those findings the applicable law has been correctly applied.” Lewiston Daily
[¶ 9] The Commission‘s findings of fact will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Gulick v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (Me. 1982). Moreovеr, “we defer to an agency in those areas within its expertise unless a statute or regulation compels a contrary result.” Green v. Comm‘r of the Dep‘t of Mental Health, Mental Retardation & Substance Abuse Servs., 2001 ME 86, ¶ 9, 776 A.2d 612, 615; see also Imagineering, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991) (“On questions involving the interpretation and application of technical statutes or regulations, this court gives deference to the administrative agеncy unless the statutes or regulations plainly compel a contrary result.“).
[¶ 10] Findings required by statute must be stated with sufficient specificity to permit understanding and meaningful appellate review.
A. Operated Primarily for Religious Purposes
[¶ 11] Schwartz contends that the Commission erred in finding that the Mission is operated рrimarily for religious purposes within the meaning of
[¶ 12] The fact thаt an organization has a charitable purpose and does charitable work does not require the conclusion that its purposes are not primarily religious pursuant to
[¶ 13] The Mission was originally established tо help build congregations on the islands, to bring pastors to the islands, and to provide services to the island communities. Even as the Mission has adopted new ways to meet the needs of the commu-
B. Principally Supported by an Association of Churches
[¶ 14] Schwartz also contends that the Commission‘s finding, pursuant to
[¶ 15] The language of
[¶ 16] Schwartz also challenges the Commission‘s factual finding that the Mission is “principally supported” by an “association of churches,” and argues that there is insufficient evidence in the record that the ninety-six churches that do provide financial support to the Missiоn constitute an “association of churches” within the meaning of the statute. Schwartz also contends that even if support is not limited to financial support, the evidence of support is insufficient. We disagree. The churches providing support can be said to be an association of churches, and because support within the meaning оf
[¶ 17] Nevertheless, the Commission‘s finding on the “principally supported” issue is flawed because it is in reality a restatement in conclusory form of the terms of the governing statute. Following this conclusory statement, the Commission‘s decision cited some of the evidence in the record which indicated that more than fifty percent of the Mission‘s income is derived from endowments given mostly by individuals motivated by the fact that it is a Christian organization,4 that
[¶ 18] Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand to the Superior Court with instructiоns to remand to the Commission in order for the Commission to clarify its decision, and determine anew whether the Mission is “principally supported by . . . [an] association of churches” pursuant to
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to remand to the Unemployment Insurance Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DANA, J., with whom CALKINS, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 19] Although I agree we must vacate, because the record does not and could not support a finding that the Mission is “principally supported by . . . [an] association of churches,” I would remand and direct a judgment for the plaintiff. First, there is no evidence that the ninety-six churches are an association (unless every time multiple churches give money tо an entity they become an “association“) and, there is undisputed evidence that the Mission is principally supported by funds currently contributed by individuals and by income from funds previously contributed by individuals (endowments). Second, there is no evidence in the record from which the Commission, on remand, could value the “goods and services” provided by the ninety-six churсhes or by the two national entities (again assuming that the churches and the entities form an “association“). Finally, there is no evidence from which the Commission could possibly divine the extent to which advocacy by the ninety-six preachers in the ninety-six churches motivated the donors of the current gifts and the endowment funds. For all these reasons, I would not invite the Commission to do the impossible, and would remand with instructions to award the plaintiff her unemployment benefits.
Notes
(21) Service performed in the employ of any organization which is excluded from the term “employment” as defined in the Fedеral Unemployment Tax Act solely by reason of section 3306(c)(7) or (8) if: (a) Service performed in the employ of a church or convention or association of churches, or an organization which is operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches . . . .