Schwartz v. EpsteinSchwartz v. Epstein
— In an action, inter alia, for an accounting and to recover damages for conversion, the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Levitt, J.), dated March 30,1988, as denied their cross motion for summary judgment.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff Wallace Schwartz and the defendant Isidore Epstein were each 50% shareholders in the defendant Creation Services, Inc., a corporation that manufactures sound slide projectors. In early 1982, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having liver cancer, and, in March 1982, he commenced outpatient chemotherapy treatment which continued until the end of November 1983.
The plaintiff’s prognosis was poor, however, and in December 1982 the defendant Epstein agreed that the plaintiff should receive 50% of the value of the corporation’s pension plan. Because at that time only $24,645.32 of the plaintiff’s pension benefits had vested for early withdrawal, Epstein paid an additional $75,000 to the plaintiff out of his personal funds. In return, the plaintiff relinquished all of his stock in the corporation and executed a witnessed, handwritten statement to that effect. In addition, the corporation signed over to the plaintiff’s wife, as compensation for the plaintiff’s interest in the business, a life insurance policy that the corporation held on the plaintiff in the amount of $250,000. A month later, the plaintiff executed a resignation as officer and director of Creation Services, Inc., and a notarized general release.
The plaintiff apparently recovered from the normally fatal liver cancer, and in May 1984 he advised Epstein that he wished to resume his position in the business. Epstein refused and this litigation followed. During the course of the litigation, and pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court, a handwriting analysis was conducted in order to determine whether the plaintiff’s signatures on the resignation and general release were authentic, resulting in the examining expert’s conclusion that the signatures were, in fact, genuine.
Summary judgment deprives a litigant of his day in court, and, therefore, is considered a drastic remedy which should be employed only when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues (see, Andre v Pomeroy,
At bar, the record substantiates the plaintiff’s allegations that he was diagnosed as having liver cancer and he underwent chemotherapy treatment at approximately the time when the documents in question were executed. Although the