156 Minn. 357 | Minn. | 1923
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written lease whereby plaintiff rented from defendant a farm of about 77 acres bordering on Heron Lake in Jackson county for a term of one year beginning on March 1, 1917, and ending on March 1, 1918, and plaintiff went into possession under the lease. Before the expiration of this lease, plaintiff and defendant made an agreement to extend it on the same terms and conditions for another year beginning March 1, 1918, and ending March 1, 1919. In August, 1918, plaintiff and defendant had a conversation about renting the farm for another year. Plaintiff wanted the barn repaired or a new one built. Defendant was unwilling to do this and suggested that plaintiff buy the place. They came to an agreement by which plaintiff was to-buy the farm at $150 per acre. He gave a check of $500 to apply on the purchase price and was to pay enough more on March 1, 1919, to reduce the unpaid purchase price to the sum of $10,000. The remaining $10,000 was to bear interest at the rate of 5 per centum per annum and be payable in instalments at specified times. The exact acreage of the farm was to be ascertained and they were to meet in about 10 days for the purpose of executing a written contract. According to plaintiff’s witnesses, when he delivered the
Defendant contends that the complaint fails to state and the evidence fails to prove a cause of action.
It is well settled that where a vendee under and in reliance upon an oral contract to purchase makes valuable improvements on the property and the vendor refuses to carry out the oral contract, the vendee may recover for such improvements to the extent that they enhanced the value of the property. Ernst v. Schmidt, 66 Wash. 452, 119 Pac. 828, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 389, and cases, cited in note at page 390, 25 R. C. L. 727, § 375, and cases there cited. We need not stop to inquire whether the contract, unenforceable because not in writing, is sufficiently definite and certain to be specifically enforced if it had been in writing. The right of the vendee to recover for improvements made in good faith in reliance on an oral contract which fails through no fault of his, does not rest on the contract or any right to enforce it, but rests on the ground that the vendor, through whose fault the contract failed, ought not to obtain the enhanced value given to his property by the money and labor of the A'endee AAdthout making compensation therefor.
. 3. Defendant urges that plaintiff did not show a tender of performance on his part. After defendant had refused to make the written contract unless made subject to the deed to the hunting club, and for an increased rate of interest on the deferred payments, a further tender of performánce by plaintiff was unnecessary.
Defendant urges that plaintiff is not entitled to recover for improvements because he was in possession under his lease and not under the contract to purchase. He was rightfully in possession.
At the termination of the lease, defendant obtained a judgment for restitution of the premises in an action brought before a justice of the peace under the unlawful detainer statute. In his answer in that action, plaintiff set forth substantially the same facts set forth in his complaint in the present action, and defendant insists that the judgment in that action is a bar to the prosecution of the present action. The justice had no jurisdiction to determine the matters alleged in the answer and did not assume to do so. This court has ruled consistently and repeatedly that the only question involved in an action under the unlawful detainer statute is the right to the present possession of the property. The justice of the peace determined that question and no other, and the judgment rendered is not a bar to any action involving any other rights of the parties. Dunnell, Minn. Dig. and Supps. §§ 5459, 5460; 112 Am. St. note at page 38.
In the fall of 1918 for the purpose of preparing for a crop the next season, plaintiff plowed about 46 acres of the land and seeded 22 acres of it to rye. Defendant insists that as this was not a permanent improvement the court erred in permitting the jury to take it into consideration in determining the amount to which plaintiff was entitled. It was not a permanent improvement, but defendant had the benefit of it. She farmed the land herself the next season and had the use of the plowing and took the crop of rye. Having had the benefit of plaintiff’s work and plaintiff’s seed, we fail to see why she should not compensate him for it as well as for the so-called permanent improvements.
In the charge, the court in outlining the claims of the parties stated that plaintiff “went ahead and plowed forty-six acres of ground on which he sowed rye in the fall.” Defendant assigns this as error, for the reason that only 22 acres were sown to rye. The
Defendant also insists that the court erred in directing the jury to base their verdict on the amount which the land had been increased in value by plaintiff, on the ground that it did not limit the amount of recovery to the expenditure in money and labor made by plaintiff. We think the charge is not subject to this criticism, although the limitation was not stated in that form. However, the amount allowed was within the cost of the improvements as shown by plaintiff’s evidence. For the rule governing such cases see Lancoure v. Dupre, 53 Minn. 301, 55 N. W. 129.
The remaining assignments of error referred to in the brief do not require special mention. We find no reversible errors and the order is affirmed.