26 N.W.2d 260 | Wis. | 1947
Action begun March 20, 1945, by Frank J. Schultz against Milwaukee county to recover salary for services as coroner. Judgment entered May 9, 1946, in favor of plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
In 1925, but to be effective January, 1927, the salary for the coroner of Milwaukee county was fixed at $5,000 per year. On May 26, 1942, in anticipation of a legislative change by which a new official would be authorized to perform most of the duties of the coroner, the board of supervisors of Milwaukee county attempted by an ordinance to fix the salary of the coroner at $50 per month and at the same time to eliminate the position of deputy coroner by refusing to allow any salary whatever to such official. This ordinance was to take effect the first Monday of January, 1943, which was the beginning of a new term.
The plaintiff was duly elected to the office of coroner November 3, 1942. He entered upon the duties of that office on January 4, 1943. After plaintiff's election and after the beginning of his term, the legislature enacted ch. 247, Laws of 1943, under which provision was made for the appointment of a medical examiner whose duties were to include many of those performed by the coroner. This act applied to counties having a population of 500,000 or more, of which Milwaukee is one. In accordance with the terms of this act, a medical *20 examiner was duly appointed for Milwaukee county on May 15, 1944.
Milwaukee county offered payment to plaintiff at the rate of $50 per month. Plaintiff claims that the ordinance of May 26, 1942, was void and that he, having performed the duties of coroner, is entitled to be paid on the salary schedule prevailing before the ordinance was passed. The defendant denies liability, basing its contention upon the ordinance referred to, although conceding the reduced salary to be inadequate and unreasonable compensation for the performance of the coroner's usual duties. The plaintiff demurred to the answer of the defendant. The demurrer was sustained and damages were awarded in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $10,935.90, principal and interest. The question upon this appeal is whether the county board may, in anticipation of expected statutory amendments justifying such action, fix a nominal salary for the office of coroner, although the coroner would perform the full duties of the office until the coming into effect of changes provided for by the proposed statutory amendments.
Sec.
The county board, intending to act under secs.
The evident purpose of the May, 1942, ordinance, reducing the salary to $50 per month, was to make a financial adjustment which might be warranted in the event of and if the proposed legislation creating the position of medical examiner became law. But until the duties of the coroner were lawfully changed, the coroner would be bound to perform the duties which merited the fixed salary of $5,000 per year. It follows that, because the state constitution and statutes provided for the choosing by the people of such an official to perform the duties then attached to the office, such an election was bound to occur if the orderly processes of government were to continue. *22 The salary for such an official was already fixed at $5,000 per year and it would continue at that figure for the term for which he was duly elected. Respondent was elected and entered upon the discharge of the burdens of office for the term beginning January 4, 1943, and ending on the first Monday of January, 1945.
The statutes then existing, excluding of course the ordinance of May, 1942, furnished the authoritative rule fixing the terms governing the respondent's position and relation to the office. They protected him against being deprived of the salany [salary] incident to his office during the term for which he was elected. 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers, p. 145, sec. 353; 46 C.J., Officers, p. 1025, sec. 263; Schuh v. Waukesha,
The fact is the salary of $50 per month under the then existing state of the law is so inadequate, whether viewed from the possibility of a full-time official living on the salary, or from the viewpoint of the relation of the salary to the importance and responsibility of the duties of the office, that it represents an unlawful effort to abolish the office in advance of any legislative authority for that course of action. The county concedes that as the law stood at the time of the respondent's election and the beginning of his term a salary of $50 per month was unreasonably low, inadequate, in fact, to pay for the services expected to be rendered. It is no answer to this to plead that pending but unenacted legislation was expected to make the duties of the office correspond in their exactions to the newly established and greatly lessened compensation.
A county's ordinance involving election of a constitutional officer, so far as reducing his compensation is concerned, ought not be founded on an anticipation of future legislation, necessarily leaving in the meantime very important work to be done by the officer for which the county for years has been paying at *23
the rate of $5,000 per year with provision for a deputy coroner at a salary of $325 per month. Of course, had ch. 247, Laws of 1943, been passed before the ordinance was, we would have a different problem. However, the functions of the office were important, existing, and positive at the time of the election. Judged by the actual conditions then present, the ordinance was void as held by the learned trial court. He said: "Sec.
By the Court. — The order sustaining the demurrer and the judgment are affirmed.
RECTOR, J., dissents.