*1 Bar, Plaintiff- The Island Joseph d/b/a Schultz, Appellant,† Defendant-Respondent. City Cumberland, Appeals Court of 9, 1995. May June argument Oral No. 94-3106. Decided 1995. 192.) (Also reported in 536 N.W.2d to review dismissed. †Petition *4 plaintiff-appellant, sub- the cause was On behalf A. Bell and Matthew of Thomas D. mitted on the brief Biegert Show, of New Richmond Boar, Drill & S.C. argued Biegert. orally by A. Matthew and defendant-respondent, was the cause On behalf orally argued E. Peter of and on the brief submitted of Cumberland. Sickle Van Myse, LaRocque JJ. Cane, P.J., Before operates Joseph LaROCQUE, J. Schultz City a munici- under in the of Cumberland Island Bar challenges city liquor ordinance pal a sexually explicit license, and he other nude, semi-nude and that bans premises by subjecting the viola- performances on the contends a license revocation.1 Schultz tor to stay of the ordi parties stipulated to a of enforcement The validity. judicial its pending a determination nance reads: parties agreed that the ordinance (effective 7/1/94) 12.03(12) Improper Exhibitions: (a) any person perform, or for any It unlawful for shall be any permit manager agent [e] to or of the license or licensee act, patron engage live demon- employee, entertainer stration, premises which: or exhibition on the licensed dance *5 ordinance is an unreasonable interference with his con- stitutional to First Amendment rights expression free protection Fourteenth Amendment equal of the law. We his reject contentions and affirm the circuit court's declaratory judgment.
This court's review of the circuit court's determina-
tion of the
of the
constitutionality
ordinance is de novo.
See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways
DOR,
Corp.
(1991).
2d 764, 771,
Wis.
pubic region; hair or Expose any device, covering gives 2. costume or which hair, appearance genitals, pubic perineum, orof simulates anal region pubic region; or hair or Exposes any portion 3. or female breast at below the areola thereof; or engage 4. To in or simulate sexual and/or intercourse sexual con- tact, touching including any portion breast the female or genitals. the male and/or female (b) any manager agent It shall be unlawful for licensee or or ofthe knowingly permit any prohibited by subpara- licensee exhibition (a) graph exposed viewing by persons for be within the licensed premises. (c) Any person, partnership corporation or who violates provisions subject pre- penalty subsection shall be as Municipal Code, liquor scribed in Section 25.04 of the addition suspension, revocation, provided by license or nonrenewal Sec- 12.03(7) 125.12(1) tion this code and Section Wis. Stats. A separate day offense shall each be deemed committed on on which a violation occurs continues. *6 Baumann, 2d v. 162 Wis. Madison government.
the (1991).2 296, 298 660, 669, 470 N.W.2d to the Cumberland challenge Schultz's Because expres- the element of free to protect ordinance seeks (nude or activities "nonspeech" present sion the well- we start with nude performances), simulated cases are speech test which symbolic established O'Brien, 367 United States 391 U.S. adjudged.3 card burner who a conviction of a draft (1968), upheld 2 prove shift of the burden to constitution note that the We in Madison v. ality applied Amendment cases in First Baumann, (1991), 660, other 2d 470 N.W.2d and 162 Wis. arguably inapplicable in cases the is where Wisconsin decisions Twenty-first Amendment. In a government upon relies the Twenty-first in which First Amendment decisions series of against performances rights interposed Amendment were bars, Supreme Court con liquor the United States in licensed of presumption a sistently expressly accorded Rue, v. La legislation. constitutionality In California 109, 118-19 (1972), for Court said: "Given the example, U.S. regula validity of the state presumption in favor of the added Twenty-first requires, Amendment we tion in this area that regulations face the Fed hold that on their violate cannot Amendment, Twenty-first ratified in The eral Constitution." Eighteenth repealed the and rendered Amend inoperative. Act National Prohibition regulatory power upon the states broad over ment bestowed Joseph Seagram E. & their territories. See liquor sales within Hostetter, (1966). However, Sons v. 35, 42 if the well- 384 U.S. constitutionality exception presumption of to the established liquor cases, that deci inapplicable in license we believe to be Supreme from Court. sion must come the Wisconsin to the States Constitution The First Amendment United "Congress respecting says: shall make no law an establishment thereof; abridging or religion, prohibiting free exercise of press; right people speech, or or the the freedom of symbolic speech protesting asserted that his act was America's involvement the Vietnam war. The Supreme rejected Court O'Brien's contention that he protection: was entitled to full First Amendment This Court has held that "speech" when and "non- speech" elements are combined in the same course conduct, sufficiently important governmental in regulating interest the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment To freedoms. characterize the quality govern- mental interest appear, which must the Court has employed variety descriptive compelling; terms: *7 substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. imprecision Whatever inheres in these terms, we think it government clear that a regula- justified tion is sufficiently if is within the of Government; constitutional if it fur- important governmental thers an substantial interest; if the governmental is interest unrelated suppression to the expression; of free and if the inci- dental alleged restriction First Amendment greater freedoms no than is essential to the fur- therance of that interest. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 376-77 peaceably assemble, petition to and to the Government for a grievances." redress of date, Supreme
To the Wisconsin has Court considered the protection speech free I, under art. 3 of the Wisconsin Con- § stitution to be with co-extensive the First Amendment. Lawson v. Housing Authority, 269, 605, 270 Wis. 70 N.W.2d (1955). question ’Whilethere is no the Wisconsin Constitution interpreted provide protection be broader individual granted by than Constitution, the United States that determi- Supreme nation should come from the Wisconsin Court. O'Brien applied was then analysis Califor- (1972). La Rue Rue, nia v. La upheld 409 U.S. acts prohibited of a state law that facial validity of the including genitals sexuality," display "gross of sexual acts bars or filmed performances and live though not all even dispense liquor, licensed The Court be found obscene. acts would prohibited noted at the outset: regulating law intoxi-
"Consideration of state cating begin Twenty-first must with the beverages Amendment...." they general States, are with vested
While authority power, require specific grant no police legislate respect with in the Federal Constitution traditionally scope within the to matters power, sweep broad police conferring recognized as has been authority something than the normal state more health, public and morals. over welfare Seagram Joseph & Sons Hos Id. at 114 E. (quoting (1966)). tetter, 35, 41 U.S. challenge, the First Amendment response
In Court observed: ..
In O'Brien . suggested the Court extent *8 protected by was the First to which "conduct" presence on the of a "commu- depended element," stated: nicative appar- the view an accept "We cannot variety ently limitless of conduct can be 'speech' person labeled whenever thereby intends engaging in conduct to express an idea." O'Brien, 376).
Id. at 117-18 391 U.S. at (quoting The Court concluded: say
This is not to that all such perform- conduct and are protection ance without the But .... we would poorly serve both the for interests which the State may validly seek vindication and the pro- interests by tected the First and Fourteenth Amendments we were to insist that the sort ofbacchanalian revel- ries that Department sought prevent by to these regulations were the equivalent constitutional aof performance by scantily a clad a troupe ballet in theatre. at
Id. 118.
Several later decisions dealt
issue
directly with the
of Twenty-first Amendment
enactments
restricting
nude
dancing
barrooms
and the
of the
interplay
First Amendment. New York State
Auth. v. Bel
Liquor
lanca,
Newport upheld ordinance nude or city prohibiting nearly dancing in local establishments licensed to sell liquor. Court recognized delegate state's provided: The statute under review premises consumption per-
No for retail licensee on shall suffer or any person appear premises mit such or licensed manner any area, anus, expose portion pubic attire to view of the vulva genitals, any thereof, permit or or simulation nor suffer or shall any premises appear female to on licensed in such manner or attire portion any top expose as to to view the breast below the areola, simulation thereof. *9 under regulate to the broad municipality Id. at 96.5 Amendment. Twenty-first discus- First Amendment upon relies Schultz Theatre, Inc., 560 v. Glen U.S. found in Barnes sion the Cumberland contention to his (1991), support it at conduct and is aimed is invalid because ordinance nudity. not in ques law
Barnes, anti-nudity upheld which decision. tion, was any to applicable statute Barnes an Indiana upheld or knowingly "person who penalized any place; public in a state of ... place appears in a intentionally, public were two The law's challengers nudity_"Id. at 569. dancing," establishments, "go-go a lounge presenting live watched "bookstore" whose customers and an adult ain booth. sitting semi-nude dancers while nude and of the law requiring to the objected requirement They when "G-strings" "pasties" the dancers wear danced. Id. at 563.6 they provided: review ordinance under guilty performing or person nude for and a It shall be unlawful person appears activity on a estab- nearly business when expose premises to view in such a manner or attire as lishment's area, anus, genitals, any any pubic or simu- portion vulva or thereof, appears on a business or when female lation expose premises in such manner or attire as establishment's areola, nipple, or portion referred to as the [a] of the breast
view simulation thereof. "Nudity" showing of as "the The Indiana statute defined area, genitals, buttocks with pubic or
the human male female covering, showing of the female fully opaque less than a any part of the opaque covering fully less than breast with genitals in a discemi- showing of covered male nipple, or the 560, 569 Theatre, Inc., bly 501 U.S. turgid state." Barnes Glen (1991). n.2 *10 plurality opinion
The three-member Chief Jus- Rehnquist tice of and concurrences two other justices decided that the law violate did not the First guarantee expression freedom of even though dancing. acknowledged it banned nude It Id. dancing sought performed that nude of the kind to be expressive parameters was within conduct the outer although only marginally Amendment, the First so. Id. applied four-part It at 566. O'Brien, test oí 391 U.S. justified 376-77, at despite and decided that the statute was expressive its incidental limitations on some activity.
Using
analysis,
justices
the O'Brien
five
reasoned
clearly
that
the law was
within the state's constitu-
power;
tional
that
furthered
substantial
government
governmental
interest; that the
interest in
enacting
banning public nudity
the law
was unrelated
suppression
expression,
to the
of free
whether or not it
expressive activity.
was combined with
The law does
proscribe nudity in
not
these establishments because
convey
message;
contrary,
the dancers
an erotic
to the
performance may
presented
an erotic
be
without
long
performers
state interference as
wear
clothing.
amount
Barnes,
scant
Justice concurrence that Scalia's this subject law was to normal First Amendment scru- tiny specifically expression because it is not directed at practice (Scalia, J., its either or on face. Id. at 572-81 concurring). suggested Souter's Justice concurrence preventing secondary that state's interest establish- entertainment adult effects assaults, other sexual prostitution, ments — the law's justify sufficient activity criminal —was asserted dancing; against enforcement substantial, the state and that plainly was interest aby prohibi- it is furthered have concluded could localized proof even without nude dancing, tion state's Moreover, wrote, he effects. harmful expres- of free the suppression unrelated to interest *11 associated merely effects are the sion, pernicious since the establishments, are not and dancing nude with dancing. in nude inherent of the expression result than was no decided, greater the restriction he Finally, Id. interest. governmental to further was essential (Souter, J., concurring). at 581-87 by authored dissenting opinion, The four-member conclusion that with the White, disagreed Justice dancing because expression not aimed at law was and communica- expression embodies "inherently J., (White, at 587 emotions." Id. tion of ideas and 904 F.2d City, Miller v. Civil dissenting) (quoting (1990)). in noteworthy is especially The Barnes dissent it declared: dispute because relation to the present barrooms, com- as "Furthermore, dancing if nude is the most establishments, other with pared Twenty- its State could invoke problem, worrisome regu- impose appropriate and powers first Amendment (White, J., dissenting). at 594 lation." Id. Amend- Barnes was not a
Because Further, Iacobucci it here. case, dispositive ment is not The in that case city on ordinance directly point. is liquor, licensed to sell to establishments related is person guilty be and a "[i]t shall unlawful declared nude or nearly ... See 5. The performing note Cumberland ordinance here declares a violation to act, in demonstration, live or "engage dance exhibi- tion . . . See 1. note We no perceive distinction "act, demonstration, between and an "performance" Thus, Iacobucci, dance exhibition." was true in though even ordinance is couched in terms con- duct, it is obviously aimed at simulated nudity, nudity and real or simulated sexual intercourse or sexual con- rather tact than speech.
Bellanca
also
on
in that
directly
point
the United
Supreme
States
Court viewed the
issue
the case as
follows: "The question presented in this case is the
power
a State to
in an
prohibit
topless dancing
estab-
lishment
licensed
State to serve liquor." Id. at
714.
Court
"The
power
concluded:
State's
to ban
the sale of
beverages
alcoholic
entirely includes
lesser
ban
sale of
liquor
premises
dancing
where
Id.
707.
topless
occurs."
at
Schultz contended in his
argument
oral
on this
absence of
statement
appeal
legislative
*12
purpose by
City
prevents
Cumberland
Council
courts from
an
reaching
conclusion that
important
governmental
substantial
interest
is furthered by
the ordinance. We conclude that
the case law does not
an
compel
express statement
legislative purpose.
There
not
did
to be
appear
any express legislative
statement
of the
stake
governmental
interest
at
in
(1994).
Thiel,
State v.
183 Wis. 2d
with
in
interest
the well-
independent
and the state's
youth,
Id. at
526,
Next Schultz author- legislative the broader jurisdictions state is not in the found ity of a similar adoption to the states absent applicable This has been the to the state constitution. amendment *13 Minnesota, York, Alaska and view, in New for example,
568
contrary
A
Florida,
Massachusetts.
view is held in
Connecticut,
Dydyn
Montana, New Mexico and
In
(Conn.
Department
Liquor Control,
Indeed, merely restoring rather than to the States pre-existing power their police over the sale alco- beverages by Eighteenth holic repealing Amendment, Twenty-first second section of the expressly reserves the States a power to in regulate liquor: traffic "The transporta- or importation State, tion Territory, into possession delivery of the for United States or use in violation liquors, therein of intoxicating thereof, laws prohibited." is hereby Thus, although "require specific the States no grant authority in legislate the Federal respect Constitution with traditionally matters scope police within the power, the sweep broad Amend- recognized ment has been as conferring something than authority public more the normal state over health, welfare and morals."
Dyden, (quoting Rue, A.2d at 174 La at U.S. (emphasis original)).
The Connecticut court concluded: federally recognized power This on the part states control the commercial distribution of alco- beverages holic within their respective boundaries vacuum; is it does exist nor limited to the confines of the federal constitution. The con- twenty-first ferred amendment does not evaporate analysis simply once the shifts to deter- *14 our expression free under right the to mination of Rather, fed- independent, this state constitution. subsists, in liquor traffic right control the eral to clause, be must supremacy the and, pursuant effect, we con- recognition and even when given full own constitution. provisions our sider omitted.)7 (Footnote Id. traditionally Court has Supreme
The Wisconsin under our con- free interpreted speech protections by with those declared to be co-extensive stitution the federal interpreting Court Supreme United States that this case recognize While we constitution. poten- a case of first impression presents —whether is limited, symbolic speech tial, encroachment albeit any depar- in Amendment broader cases — Supreme of the United States ture from decisions Supreme be the Wisconsin Court should taken this and not court. Court in and, is broad municipality
"The police power only when exer the courts intercede general, CIT clearly unreasonable." of that power cise Fin., Inc. v. Germantown, 2d 163 Wis. Group Equip. / (1991). Further, 610, 613 426, 433, N.W.2d power has broad given "Twenty-first this they may delegate and generally the States Iacobucci, at 96. The Wiscon fit." U.S. see they granted municipalities has legislature sin for the regulations additional authority prescribe Constitution, VI, provides cl. 2 art. The United States supreme be the law of part: "This Constitution... shall relevant thereby, judges every state shall be bound land; and the contrary state to the any thing in the constitution or laws of notwithstanding."
sale of alcoholic not in beverages conflict with ch. STATS.8 Pursuant to this authority, City may pre- scribe forfeitures or license suspension or revocation ordinance. Id. for violations of a municipal legisla- 125.10(1), tive note to indicates § was Stats., adopted clarify municipal regulations may *15 state incorporate provide law additional regulations long as as the do not regulations conflict with state law. of 1981, ch. 79. Laws
Schultz next challenges Cumberland ordi nance's validity grounds overbreadth. He argues the ordinance bars a facially "Wearing t-shirt pic turing buttocks; someone's a couple embracing fully clothed, on a a woman body-to-body, stage; portraying a man by stuffing something down her in a comi pants cally exaggerated way; or a demonstration of breast We The feeding." disagree. discussion of the over- breadth was challenge unanimously rejected by our court when supreme examining provisions 948.11, relating to the dissemination § Stats., Thiel, obscene materials "harmful to children." 183 Wis. 2d at 515 518-23, N.W.2d at 852-54. The Court stated the general rules: "The doctrine of substantial overbreadth establishes an to the exception general rule that 'a person to whom a statute be constitu may cannot tionally applied challenge the statute on the 125.10, STATS.,provides: Section (1) Municipal regulation. Any municipality may Authorization. regulations incorporating any part chapter may enact of this and prescribe regulations beverages, additional for the sale of alcohol chapter. municipality may prescribe conflict with this suspension forfeitures or license or revocation for violations of regulations. Regulations providing such forfeitures or license sus- pension adopted by or revocation must be ordinance. applied unconstitutionally be ground Massa others.1" Id. (quoting at 853 520, 515 at N.W.2d Oakes, (1989)). chusetts v. 576, 491 U.S. Further, doc reviewing must view the overbreadth
A court should be "'strong trine medicine1" which as hesitation, 'only then as a only employed "with Ferber, 458 U.S. New York v. last resort.'" (1981). challenges to statute ... do not ... Facial limiting construction available succeed when integrity. legislation's constitutional maintain Broadrick [v. Oklahoma], 413 U.S. [601] at 613 (1973)]. [the since encom Additionally, statute] conduct, the overbreadth speech and passes both must real and substantial. challenge be both Id. at 521, 515 at 853. N.W.2d
Finally, over- challenged unconstitutionally *16 A statute by judicial be "cured" means of broad can narrowing interpretation, provides for a and which may validating of the law. court construction of portion or the unconstitutional also excise sever statute, legislation rest of in leaving the the Finally, the court strike down the entire force. holding be on its face. statute, it to unconstitutional Id. at at 854. 515 N.W.2d he of conduct contends are examples
Schultz's the ordinance do not withstand scru- by barred facially nudity. on t-shirt do not "simulate" Pictures tiny. (1977) Dictionary Collegiate Webster's New quali- "1: to assume the outward defines "simulate" as of usu. with the intent ties of appearance Dictionary deceive ...." Int'l Webster's Third New 1976) (Unabr. "simulate" with equates "feign" discloses that "imitate." A fair of the ordinance reading those simulations that only give it is intended ban and does not by actor appearance nudity nudity. artistic reproductions to ban purport unless the described embrace Sch- Similarly, sexual were an "simulate" example attempt ultz's contact, the ordinance is not intercourse or sexual to ban a appear per- Nor does ordinance engaged. in a from down her "stuffing something pants former of a "simu- absent use comically exaggerated way," to the final a demonstration example, lated" As penis. it from the fact that would feeding, apart of breast of the female "[e]xpose[] any portion be necessary conduct thereof," pro- at or below the areola breast obvious that this ordinance, seems hibited "real and substantial" chal- fails to example provide aimed at controlling to an ordinance lenge bars. liquor performances the ordinance's on challenges validity
Schultz also He argues language grounds vagueness. one's conceivably gyrating hips the law "could bar (simulated sexual inter- as did Elvis stage, Presley her licking course); performer suggestively a woman (simulated of social fellatio); or even most types lips contact)." (sexual rea- argues "[a] He also dancing of the ordinance would reading prohibit sonable David." Michelangelo's of a t-shirt wearing depicting the con- the ordinance as preventing We do not view rejection for the reasons similar to our duct described the established defini- the overbreadth challenge *17 Further, allegations as to general tion of "simulates." on its face a law that is constitutional vagueness, advance, but may possibly not be condemned should it is adminis way later because be condemned v. Pavers Ass'n. County fact. Milwaukee tered in 1991). (7th 419, 423 Cir. Fiedler, 922 F.2d theBy affirmed. Judgment Court. — that MYSE, (dissenting). concept J. First Amendment to is dancing protected is, some, Constitution for difficult United States Nonetheless, the United States proposition. unsettling clearly Court has established that nude danc- Supreme it is conduct expressive because ing symbolic speech is of the First Amendment. Barnes within the protections Theatre, Inc., v. 560, 565-66, 581, Glen U.S. (1991) Because this is conduct opinion). (plurality it is specific meaning message, intended to convey even if offen- protection entitled to First Amendment See other members community. sive to (A (1949) v. 1, 4 Chicago, Terminiello 337 U.S. princi- free under our speech system "function of pal is invite It indeed best government dispute. a condition of high serve its when induces purpose unrest, they creates dissatisfaction with conditions as are, anger."). people or even stirs has under case, majority In this decided regu- Amendment Twenty-first municipalities may is a late establishments. This liquor licensed speech that, best, for requires conclusion at its valid- dubious very the ordinance meet a number of ity specific requirements.
The United States Court has Supreme interpreted grant extraordinary regulation the states in the licensed police powers Rue, La establishments. 409 U.S. liquor California (1972). notes, However, majority 114-15 authority there a substantial among division *18 grant power is automati- this of as to whether states cally action is to the states or whether state transferred authority required the contained within the before by may Twenty-first the be exercised significant found that number of states have states. A by Twenty-first grant power Amend- afforded the of self-actuating, requires the state to ment is not but extraordinary legislative action before these take by powers may police individual states. be exercised Minnesota have York, Alaska and Massachusetts, New legislative required before these held that action is all by extraordinary powers Wis- be utilized state. any legislative action to not taken consin has authority. grant implement this of majority, other states however, notes that authority grant in contained of have found that self-actuating. Even if we Amendment is grant argument purpose no assume for the necessary legislative these is bestow action major- extraordinary police powers upon state, the any ity that holds that these failed to cite case has governmental any powers unit but are vested only majority Nonetheless, assumes not itself. state powers, but that has these that the State of Wisconsin City need not has them as well. We of Cumberland has these of Wisconsin whether the State determine powers legislative it was action because without question. Our that enacted the ordinance the state granted significant pow- government can and has state municipalities other rule to ers of home power, governmental however, This units within it. municipal only granted in the state and is vested government No inherent units state. government, municipal in individual units exists Claire, 437, 141 Wis. 2d Eau Union No. 487 v. Local (Ct. 1987), and the App. 441, 415 N.W.2d of power demonstrate devise has failed to majority them government permitting units municipal *19 to powers necessary extraordinary police exercise the occurring liquor within a licensed conduct regulate to such grant The state's failure establishment. the of Cumberland extraordinary City repre- to powers in majority's analysis. defect the sents a significant delegation seeks to find a majority 125.10, in municipalities the state to § from STATS., and suspensions authorizes license revocations which the reasons unclear, majority While municipality. by which ordinance, Cumberland because license unlawful, authorizes declares certain conduct to authority had the revocations, municipality in under 125.10. The issue this enact the ordinance § case, may is not whether however, municipality revocation, controlling an ordinance license but enact an that penalizes per- enact ordinance whether protected speech in conduct that is engaging sons for Con- the First Amendment to United States under does provide stitution. Section 125.10 such municipalities power. with merely not regulate speech Municipalities may a licensed establishment. liquor because it occurs in Ben Elson announced his candi- For Edward example, stage office while nude from dacy political for discussions and Legitimate political Madison tavern. on the of licensed establish- premises debates occur halls, taverns and resorts all ments, banquet including It as does the enough say, over this state. is not con- speech expressive that because majority, in a licensed it is premises, subject occurred duct regulation. under cir- appropriate
I do not dispute dancing. may regulate cumstances government however, there must be a power, To exercise police The majority interest issue. government substantial not accompa- notes that the ordinance was correctly However, purpose. statement of by any legislative nied com- even more The record is profound. is problem public substantial identity devoid pletely ordinance by to be achieved sought purpose that no state- majority While I with the agree question. essential, I conclude that ment of legislative purpose interest must be some substantial governmental there I the exercise of police power. to be achieved sought the ordinance purpose as to what speculate decline range because there is such a wide seeks achieve conceivable, some of which may sup- purposes public *20 others that action involved and governmental the port record, of this it is entirely possi- not. On the basis may reflect the was enacted to ble the ordinance ideals, rather than to serve communities' tastes and pros- interest of public regulating the more substantial titution, any or other activities. Without drugs illegal achieved to be public purpose sought indication or evidence of the existence this ordinance sufficient a substantial interest public regulating of of foundation for the exercise necessary dancing, is absent. police United States v.
The
identifies
majority correctly
O'Brien,
within
(1968),
An inherent that arises when a attempts speech, to inhibit free be it mental unit symbolic determining govern- otherwise, is when the gone powers. beyond legitimate has its one ment When upon gov- perilous starts this course sanctions symbolic regulation speech ernment's that seems open to value, little the door have social throws wide including government regulation speech, all public has utmost value to discourse. which regulation subject in this case in a conduct occurred admission is limited to those who exceed tavern where *21 age specified by law. come to the tavern Those who voluntarily If so and attend as a matter of choice. do public regulating legitimate is a interest there lawfully dancing, government may its exercise police power regulate activity. however, must, It this legitimate public demonstrate a stantial and so as to intrude interest that is sub- meaningful regulation and must tailor the
upon speech only to the extent essential to further its interest. Becausethis ordinance counts, I fails both dissent.