207 N.W. 621 | Minn. | 1926
The defendants make two interrelated claims:
(1) That under the contract created by the bid and acceptance Patrick Schullo was an independent contractor; and that the relation of employer and employe did not arise so as to make applicable the Workmen's Compensation Act.
(2) That in any event there was no contractual relation between the village and the deceased, Emil Schullo, so as to make applicable the compensation act.
The controlling facts are not in dispute; and the question of liability becomes one of law.
1. On April 14, 1924, Patrick Schullo submitted to the common council of Nashwauk a bid for the work of collecting and hauling garbage, at $110 a month, and it was accepted. He intended that his father would do the work. For this purpose he gave him the use of a team without charge. The village furnished the wagon and designated the dump ground. It was not contemplated that the time of a man and team would be required each day. The work was done on Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays. It was done under the immediate and actual supervision of the street commissioner who was responsible to the council. The contention of the defendants is that the contract made Patrick Schullo an independent contractor; and that if he had done the work personally, and met accidental injury, there would have been no right of compensation.
In Waters v. Pioneer Fuel Co.
Counsel for the dependents direct our attention to Warner v. Fullerton-Powell Hardwood Lbr. Co.
The doctrine of the Waters case applies and the relationship created was that of employer and employe and not that of an independent contractor.
2. The remaining question is whether, the decedent having done the work instead of the son whose bid was accepted, there can be compensation. *189
The son intended that his father, who was an elderly man of 72, should do the work and have the reward, and to that end furnished him the team without charge. He had furnished him a team before for other work. After the son submitted the bid to the common council he seems to have done nothing. He was not directed when to commence work. The father commenced some time in the early part of May and in some way notice to commence must have been communicated to him. The street commissioner knew that the decedent was doing the work and that the son never did it. It was generally known that the deceased was collecting the garbage, though it does not appear that the precise relation between father and son was known. The street commissioner supervised him and at least some of the officers of the village knew that he was doing the work. The warrant for the work done in May was made to him, before his death, and afterwards changed by inserting the name of the son. The explanation made is that the name of the deceased was inserted by mistake and the error thus corrected. This was accepted by the commission and we do not attach importance to the fact that the warrant was made first to the decedent. Taking the evidence as a whole it should be held that there was a substitution of the father for the son, the village acquiescing in it, so that the former was under the compensation act, as the son would have been had he done the work.
The case of Arterburn v. County of Redwood,
In Benson v. County of Marshall,
In Herron v. Coolsaet Bros.
The case is remanded with directions to proceed with an award of compensation. An attorney's fee of $50 in this court is allowed.
Remanded.