57 A.D.2d 707 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1977
Order unanimously affirmed, without costs. Memorandum: Plaintiff was the electrical subcontractor of defendant Wager Construction Corporation in the construction of the Wilson Commons Building, owned by defendant Dormitory Authority, at the University of Rochester. During the construction, Wager assigned its contract to defendant Rouse Construction Company. The remaining defendants are the bonding companies. Plaintiff brings this action to recover for damages for costs incurred as the result of change orders, delays in construction, and alleged interference with the performance of its contract. It alleges causes of action based upon: (1) negligence, (2) the failure of defendant Wager to process plaintiff’s claim for extra work as required by the subcontract (par 14.5 of the subcontract provides that the subcontractor agreed to process any claims for "extra work, delay or changed conditions”, including those occurring by reason of an "act or omission” by the owner, through the contractor), (3) recovery upon the bond and (4) breach of contract. The Dormitory Authority moved to dismiss the complaint as against it and Special Term granted the motion. On the appeal from that order we consider only the first and fourth causes of action. The first cause of action was properly dismissed because of plaintiff’s failure to timely file a notice of claim (see Public Authorities Law, § 1691; General Municipal Law, § 50-e). The correspondence which plaintiff relies upon to support its negligence cause of action was not intended as notice to the Dormitory Authority and does not satisfy the statutory requirements for such notices. Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges that it attempted to perform its contract for electrical work but that the defendants "did breach, abandon and failed to carry out and perform” the terms and conditions of the contract, thereby "delaying and interfering with” plaintiff’s performance. It seeks to recover damages from the defendants for the additional expenses resulting from the delay. The terms of the general contract, which were incorporated into the subcontract by reference, expressly negated any contractual liability between the owner and the subcontractor. In view of the contract’s language, plaintiff may not claim to be a third-party beneficiary or to have any contractual rights against the Dormitory Authority based upon a presumed assent to be responsible for payment to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that it may recover from the Dormitory Authority, however, on the theory of a contract implied in law, or quasi contract. To recover in quasi contract, plaintiff must prove that it performed work or services for defendant which resulted in defendant’s unjust enrichment (see Alko Mfg. Corp. v Neptune Meter Co., 20 AD2d 635, affd 16 NY2d 777; Robbins v Cooper Assoc., 19 AD2d 242, revd on other grounds 14 NY2d 913). A benefit must have passed from plaintiff to