Schuka v. BagociusSchuka v. Bagocius
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Rugg
This is an appeal from an order granting a motion to strike out the appearance of the respondent as a creditor of the estate of Mary Bohack, deceased, intestate, of which the petitioner is administratrix. That appearance was filed in the matter of the allowance of the first and final account of the administratrix. The ground of the motion was that the respondent had not presented any claim within the statutory period provided by law for making claims against the estates of deceased persons, and had not recovered any judgment thereon against the intestate within the statutory period of limitations. The trial judge reported the material facts to be in substance as follows: The petitioner was appointed administratrix of the estate of the deceased on February 16, 1933, and on April 28, 1933, duly filed affidavit that she had given notice of her appointment. In May, 1933, the administratrix filed in the Probate Court a proceeding in equity for the discharge of a mortgage given by the intestate to the respondent. The respondent filed an answer alleging that the mortgage was given as security for a note on which there was a balance due. No counterclaim of other indebtedness was set up in the answer. No cross bill was filed. On October 2, 1933, a decree was entered wherein were a number of findings of fact, among them that the estate of the intestate owed the respondent $1,800 as a bal-*599anee for money lent, but that this indebtedness was not secured by the mortgage. The decree contained no order for the payment of the indebtedness. It concluded in these words: “after hearing and consideration, the court doth order and decree that” the respondent “discharge said mortgage of record and deliver up the mortgage note and mortgage to the petitioner on or before October 16, 1933.” From this decree no appeal appears to have been taken. The main issue raised by the petition in that proceeding in equity was whether there was anything due to the respondent on the mortgage and whether it ought to be discharged. The fact essential to the ordering part of the decree was that no indebtedness was secured by the mortgage. Another finding on that point was that at the time the mortgage was given “said Bagocius and said Mary Bohack and her husband entered into a written agreement reciting that said Bagocius held said mortgage as trustee for said Mary Bohack or her assigns, and agreeing to assign said mortgage to whomsoever the said Mary Bohack “should designate or, at her request, discharge the same at once; the said Bago-cius has been called on by the petitioner to discharge said mortgage but has failed so to do.” The respondent has obtained no judgment against the estate of the intestate. No action is pending in any tribunal for the recovery of the debt alleged to be due to the respondent. No proceedings were instituted at any time by the respondent to recover his alleged debt within the time fixed by the statute of limitations. The trial judge ruled that “only declarations of fact or right contained in the ordering part of the decree are directly adjudicated,” that the finding of fact in the decree that the estate of the intestate was indebted to the respondent was not an essential basis of the relief “contained in the ordering part of the decree, and that the decree left the alleged creditor in the same position as any other creditor of the intestate with the right, not barred by the decree, to pursue his remedy to collect the alleged debt in the manner and within the time prescribed by law. Olsen v. Olsen, ante, 507.
The proceeding in equity was concerned exclusively with *600the removal of the mortgage as a cloud on the title of the real estate of the intestate. It was within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court.
Allowance of motion affirmed.