Karel R. Schubert (“Husband”) appeals from the trial court’s Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage (“Judgment”) between him and Karen Schubert (“Wife”),
inter alia,
imputing income to Husband, awarding Wife maintenance and child support, classifying certain property as marital or non-marital, valuing and dividing the property, and awarding Wife attorney’s fees. We reverse and remand on the issue of maintenance, and the court shall thereafter
I. Background
Husband and Wife were married on December 26, 1967. Two children were born of the marriage and one child, Daughter, remains un-emancipated at approximately age 20. The parties separated on May 24, 2007, and the dissolution of marriage proceeding commenced on November 21, 2008. The trial court conducted a trial on the petition for dissolution of marriage on February 8-9, 2010, and June 16 and 23, 2010. The trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage on December 13, 2010, inter alia, calculating maintenance and child support, to which Husband was ordered to pay Wife, dividing the parties’ separate and marital property and debts, and ordering Husband to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees. This appeal follows. We will discuss the facts in greater detail as they relate to the issues on appeal.
II. Discussion
Husband raises nine points on appeal, alleging the trial court erred in its Judgment dissolving the marriage between him and Wife. We will discuss each point individually in the order in which it is raised.
Standard of Review
We review a non-jury case under Rule 73.01(c). The trial court’s judgment will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law.
Murphy v. Carron,
Point 1 — Imputation of Husband’s Income
In his first point, Husband alleges the trial court erred in imputing income of $7,300 per month to him because there was no substantial evidence to support the ruling and it was contrary to the evidence that Husband was voluntarily unemployed or that Husband could earn such amount. Husband argues that he was terminated from his previous position, he was a whis-tleblower, and he signed a non-compete, and despite Husband’s best efforts to obtain employment elsewhere, in applying to more than sixty jobs, he had not been offered a position.
“In proper circumstances, a trial court may impute income to a party according to what that party could earn by using best efforts to gain employment suitable to [his] capabilities.”
Sabatino v. Sabatino,
The trial court considered that Husband was last employed by Danforth Center in February 2007, at which time his annual salary was approximately $173,000. Husband had negotiated severance pay representing approximately 1.6 years of his annual compensation, amounting to $288,271, plus his attorney’s fees of approximately $36,750. The trial court also considered that Husband earned a bache
Although Husband presented testimony from an expert psychologist/career coach regarding his earning capacity, the trial court noted that even Husband’s expert found it “strange” that Husband had been unemployed for the last three years, and the expert did not render an opinion regarding the income Husband is capable of earning. The trial court found no credible evidence to support Husband’s theory that he was being “blackballed” by Danforth Center, and that Husband’s separation agreement with the company contradicted Husband in this respect. The trial court found the evidence presented by Wife’s vocational expert, including a report concerning Husband’s employability, was indeed credible and that accordingly, Husband has the capacity to earn a total monthly income of approximately $7,300.
The trial court’s judgment was supported by substantial evidence. Husband and Wife offered separate vocational experts who presented differing opinions about Husband’s ability to obtain employment. The trial court found that Wife’s expert was more persuasive, and even Husband’s expert did not fully support Husband’s position. Given the standard of review, there are not sufficient grounds for reversing the trial court’s factual determinations.
Husband’s first point is denied.
Point II — Wife’s Maintenance Award
In his second point, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Wife $2,500 per month in maintenance because (A) Wife’s reasonable needs could be met through income from the marital and separate property awarded to Wife and through her employment; (B) the trial court erroneously calculated Wife’s reasonable needs in including items not supported by the evidence; and (C) the amount of maintenance was unsupported by the evidence in that Husband could not afford to pay such sums of maintenance while meeting his own reasonable needs because income was improperly imputed, which was not considered by the court.
The trial court can award maintenance only if it finds that the party seeking maintenance: “(1) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and (2) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment.” Section 452.335.1
1
;
D.K.H. v. L.R.G.,
First, Husband argues that the trial court erroneously calculated Wife’s reasonable needs were $4,750 per month, because in fact, only $2,160 per month was supported by the evidence. Therefore, Husband argues Wife’s needs could be met by
Missouri follows the general rule that awards of spousal maintenance and child support are two distinctly separate concepts, and that maintenance does not include child support.
Atchley v. Atchley,
Here, Wife’s Statement of Income and Expense listed $815 per month for health and accident insurance, $151 per month for homeowners insurance, and $250 per month for automobile expenses, for a total of $1,216 per month. Wife testified she was providing insurance for Megan, did not have insurance herself, but was seeking employment with a benefits package to obtain health insurance. The trial court found that the insurance cost attributable to Megan was $446 per month on the Form 14. Additionally, Wife testified that her expenses included $250 per month in automobile insurance for both her and her children. The trial court found that Wife’s reasonable monthly expenses include approximately $1,216 “for various insurance payments, including health insurance coverage for Wife and Megan.” Because “[t]he child’s needs should not be included in the maintenance calculation,”
Buchholz v. Buchholz,
After the court determines the party’s reasonable needs, the Court next determines whether the party “is able to provide for these needs through use of property or appropriate employment.”
D.K.H.,
A spouse is not required to deplete or consume his or her portion of the marital assets before being entitled to maintenance.
Pearson v. Pearson,
In
Hill,
the trial court had valued the $500,000 in IRA and retirement accounts for purposes of division of marital property at their cash value, but refused to impute any significant income from them to meet the nearly 59-year-old wife’s reasonable needs.
Hill,
Here, the trial court awarded to Wife 60% of the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, as well as multiple bank accounts, retirement accounts, and a cash payment from Husband, totaling more than $1 million. The parties have not directed us to and we have not found evidence in the record regarding income from the marital retirement or IRA funds awarded to Wife that the trial court could or did consider when calculating maintenance. Nothing in the Judgment discloses either what income from the funds awarded to Wife was considered by the trial court in calculating the maintenance award, or the underlying information specified in
Hill
to determine what income from those funds the trial court considered in calculating the maintenance award — including the cost to convert the account into cash, the age of the parties, their intent as to investment/consumption/retirement, the relative division of marital property and marital debts, and any equitable adjustment for reasonably certain taxes and penalties.
Id.
Wife argues on appeal that because Husband presented no evidence of a reasonable rate of return on these assets at trial, interest income cannot be supported by the evidence. We disagree.
See N.M.O. v. D.P.O.,
We reverse and remand the maintenance award also based on Wife’s ability to provide for her reasonable needs. The parties may present additional evidence on these issues highlighted in
Hill,
discussed
supra.
After the' trial court determines Wife’s reasonable needs, the trial court shall reconsider this portion of Wife’s abili
Husband’s second point is granted.
Point III — Child Support Award
In his third point, Husband contends the trial court erred in requiring Husband to pay $803 per month in child support because Daughter was emancipated and no longer entitled to support under Section 452.340 in that she was over the age of 18 and she did not qualify for support under Section 452.340.5 because she failed to notify Husband of her enrollment in college, her grades, and her transcripts, and failed to satisfy the minimum credit hour requirements, and there was no sufficient evidence to support a finding that she was physically or mentally incapacitated under Section 452.340.4, or that the incapacitation occurred prior to her eighteenth birthday. Further, Husband argues, even if entitled to support, the support amount was not supported by sufficient evidence in that Daughter’s reasonable needs were less than the “total combined child support costs” on the Form 14 and the court did not make findings as to why the Form 14 should not have been rebutted.
Generally, the obligation of a parent to support a child ends at the age of 18. Section 452.340.3(5);
Sullins v. Knierim,
Upon request for notification of the child’s grades by the noncustodial parent, the child shall produce the required documents to the noncustodial parent within thirty days of receipt of grades from the educational institution. If the child fails to produce the required documents, payment of child support may terminate without the accrual of any child support arrearage and shall not be eligible for reinstatement.
In re Marriage of Noland-Vance,
The first rule of statutory’ interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, by considering the words in their plain and ordinary sense.
S. Metro. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Lee’s Summit,
Because Missouri public policy encourages children to pursue higher education, this Court will liberally construe the continuing-education requirements.
Rozelle v. Rozelle,
Here, the evidence demonstrated, and the trial court found that Daughter
Having established that Daughter’s medical condition extended Husband’s child support obligation while she was enrolled in an institute of vocational or higher education, we next consider whether Daughter met the other requirements of the statute. Husband argues that she did not meet the notice requirements, and thus, his child support obligations should terminate under Section 452.340.5. Husband testified at trial that he was not aware that Daughter was in college until the deposition, and she never provided him any documentation for courses or grades despite his attempt to correspond with her regarding that matter. No evidence was presented to show that Husband made a specific request for notification of Daughter’s grades. Daughter testified at trial that she had not provided a copy of her transcript to her father or told him about how many classes she was taking. Finally, Wife testified that she never advised Husband that Daughter was attending a community college, nor had she provided Husband with Daughter’s transcript of courses or grades.
The evidence showed, and the trial court found, that Husband was not involved in Daughter’s life for the most part before the parties separated, and Daughter had not spoken to Husband since approximately December 2007. Daughter was aware of Husband’s extramarital affairs and did not wish to have visitation with Husband. Daughter was approximately 20 years old at the time of the trial court’s Judgment, in December 2010. The trial court ordered that Husband’s obligation to pay Wife child support is retroactive to January 1, 2010. The trial court found that Daughter “shall continue to be entitled to child support from Husband as long as [Daughter] continues to comply with all other notice provisions of Section 452.340.5.”
Here, it is undisputed that neither Daughter nor Wife provided Husband with documentary proof of Daughter’s enrollment in community college by the beginning of her first semester enrolled there. Although the required documentation was not provided to Husband, the use of the
Furthermore, Husband argues that the support amount ordered by the trial court was not supported by sufficient evidence in that Daughter’s reasonable needs were less than the “total combined child support costs” on the Form 14 and the court did not make findings as to why the Form 14 should not have been rebutted. “To permit a party who did not file a Form 14 with the trial court to appeal child support decisions is akin to pursuing a different theory of recovery on appeal than was pursued at trial.”
Basham v. Williams,
Husband’s third point is denied. Nevertheless, because the calculation of child support is dependent upon the award of maintenance, if any, the trial court is directed to prepare an amended Form 14 and recalculate Husband’s child support obligation. 6
Point IV — Insurance Check: Wife’s Separate Property
In his fourth point, Husband alleges the trial court erred in finding the proceeds of the State Farm insurance check were Wife’s separate property because Wife failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the check was intended to compensate for non-marital losses, in that the check was payable to Husband and Wife, Husband testified the check compensated for the loss of a marital automobile, and Wife testified the check was intended to compensate for her medical care, which is a marital loss.
Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital. Section 452.330. Thus, a spouse claiming separate property must support the claim by clear and convincing evidence.
Blyden
The insurance check for $28,400 issued by State Farm indicates on its face that it is for “Bodily Injury” rather than property damage or medical expenses. The evidence demonstrates that Wife suffered injuries as well as property damage in an automobile accident in 2005. She received medical attention following the accident. Husband was not in the car at the time of the accident. The trial court found that Wife presented credible evidence that the insurance check money “was to compensate Wife for pain and suffering associated with personal injuries sustained by Wife resulting from an automobile accident and these proceeds were not for the value of Wife’s automobile.” From this clear and convincing evidence presented at trial and found on the record, we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that the insurance check compensated Wife for non-economic bodily injuries.
Point four is denied.
Point V—Husband’s Settlement with Danforth Center
In his fifth point, Husband argues the trial court misapplied the law in holding the proceeds from his settlement with the Danforth Center was marital property, in that the credible evidence showed the settlement was Husband’s separate property because the settlement was intended to substitute for future lost earnings, stated that specifically, and thus, was the same as post-dissolution earnings. Husband argues that he entered into a settlement with Danforth Center for a payment of $288,271, in exchange for any claims Husband may have had against Danforth, which represented future lost wages. Because the agreement with Danforth stipulated the proceeds were for future lost wages, Husband argues, it is Husband’s separate property. We disagree.
The trial court found that Husband’s severance payment in March 2009 of approximately $288,271, represented approximately 1.6 years of Husband’s annual compensation, which had been approximately $173,000 per year at the time Husband was terminated from Danforth, in February 2007. In applying the analytic approach, the trial court found that Husband’s severance pay replaced his earnings for a period of more than three years during the parties’ marriage. “[B]ased on the credible evidence adduced,” the trial court found the severance pay at issue is marital property and subject to division by the court.
Again, to classify property, including severance pay, as marital or non-marital, Missouri uses an analytic approach, or a replacement analysis.
Brill v. Brill,
In
Brill,
the Southern District considered the issue of first impression as to whether severance payments constituted marital property.
Distinguished from Brill, here the trial court made no finding that the severance payment was a substitute for future earnings. Instead, the trial court made a finding that the severance payment replaced Husband’s earnings for a period of more than three years during the parties’ marriage. The evidence on the record supports the finding in that the severance payment was given to Husband during the marriage, was based on his termination from Danforth Center during the marriage, and was valued based on work completed at Danforth Center during the marriage. Notably, Wife has spent most of the last 40 years as a homemaker caring for the parties’ two children, which contributed to Husband’s ability to be in such a position at Danforth Center and, thus, able to negotiate and receive the severance pay he did. The severance payment was not contingent on any future events, and was not intended to be future earnings beyond the time the parties were divorced. Husband has not shown by clear and convincing evidence why his severance payment should be separate rather than marital property.
Husband’s fifth point is denied.
Point VI — Husband Dissipated Marital Funds
In his sixth point, Husband contends the trial court erred in holding he had dissipated marital funds and in failing to find that Wife had also dissipated marital funds. Husband argues the court’s holding misapplied the law and was not supported by substantial evidence because (A) there was no restraining order and Husband presented the court with testimony and corroborating bank records regarding his use of the allegedly dissipated funds, and showed that either the funds were used during unemployment for ordinary living expenses including paying the parties’ taxes or was otherwise available for the court to divide, including a Roth and SEP IRA and (B) Wife failed to adequately account for how she spent approximately $161,000 in marital funds, holding her to a different standard than Husband.
The trial court found that Wife presented credible evidence of Husband’s extensive dissipation of marital assets, specifically, spending more than $354,484 in less than two weeks prior to the commencement of trial and without Wife’s knowledge. The court found, from the credible evidence adduced, that Husband’s use of assets on the eve of trial constitutes dissipation, and therefore considered that as a
“ ‘[A]s a general rule, the appropriate date for valuing marital property in a dissolution proceeding is the date of trial.’ ”
Farnsworth v. Farnsworth,
The evidence presented at trial showed that Husband spent at least $354,484 between the time of his deposition on January 25, 2010, and trial on February 8, 2010. The evidence showed that Husband depleted large sums of money from several accounts to pay his attorney fees and litigation expenses, pre-pay taxes, and give to Husband’s elderly parents. The evidence showed that Wife was unaware of these payments and did not authorize Husband to make them. Based on the timing of these expenditures, and the facts that Husband’s expenses were not routine or authorized by Wife, we find there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that Husband was trying to secrete the funds from consideration by the court. If a party secretes property in anticipation of a divorce, the court may order reimbursement.
Calia v. Calia,
Husband’s sixth point is denied.
Point VII — Court’s Reliance on Property Values
In his seventh point, Husband alleges the trial court erred in relying on out-of-date property values and out-of-date evidence regarding the parties’ economic circumstances to divide the marital property, award maintenance and child support, and award attorney’s fees, both trial and appeal, because the valuation of property was not reasonably proximate to the date of division, in violation of Sections 452.330, 452.335, and 452.355. Husband argues the evidence regarding the parties’ economic circumstances did not reflect their current circumstances as of the date of the judgments, in that much of the marital property was market based and thus subject to the volatile market changes, and relying upon stale evidence regarding the parties’ economic circumstances limited the court from considering the changed economic circumstances of the parties between the time the stale evidence was heard and the time the court entered its judgment. Further, Husband argues that said evidence was speculative. We disagree.
In the trial court’s judgment, it listed marital property and debts awarded to Wife and to Husband. The court awarded Wife 60 percent of the following: the net proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, Husband’s Monsanto Pension and Savings Plan, Wife’s TIAA-CREF Roth IRA accounts, Husband’s TD Ameritrade Roth IRA, Wife’s TD Ameritrade Roth IRA accounts, Husband’s TIAA-CREF Retirement Portfolio, Husband’s Teachers Retirement System of Oklahoma funds, and Husband’s Huntington Bank SEP-IRA. The trial court awarded the remaining 40 percent of these assets to Husband. Additionally, the trial court awarded Wife with three other accounts, one of which was an account in the name of Wife and Daughter, having a collective balance of approximately $2,420. The trial court also awarded Husband numerous other accounts in Husband’s individual name, totaling nearly $100,000, an account in the names of Oscar and Phoebe Schubert totaling more than $5,000, and shares of stock totaling at least $18,000, but the exact value unknown. The court further required Husband to pay to Wife an additional sum of $247,608 and the sum of $21,640 to make the overall property division equitable and just.
Husband argues that the lapse of time and potential fluctuation in the valuations show prejudice here. He argues as an example, his TIAA-CREF Portfolio was valued at $866,800 at trial, but this account alone had increased approximately $9,500 in four-and-a-half months. In arguing such, Husband has failed to show how the trial court’s division of marital property based on a 60/40 split would prejudice him in any way. Any change in property value would apply equally to both parties. Further, if the portfolio Husband uses here as an example is demonstrative of the increases in value his numerous other individual accounts have gained, Husband’s assets should have increased significantly. Wife, on the other hand, stands to gain nothing more as her award of $2,420 in bank accounts and set payments from Husband will not yield her significant increases. Thus, we cannot infer from the facts in the record here any potential prejudice to Husband. The trial court did not err in its reliance on the property values and economic circumstances it did to dh vide the marital property, award maintenance and child support, and award attorney’s fees.
Husband’s seventh point is denied.
Point VIII — Property Divided 60/40
In his eighth point, Husband contends the trial court abused its discretion and erroneously applied the law in awarding Wife a vastly disproportionate amount of marital property, because there was no substantial evidence to support a disproportionate division, in that (A) there was insufficient evidence that Husband’s extramarital affairs, occurring 10 to 40 years before dissolution, placed an extra burden on the marriage, and the credible evidence showed it was Wife’s misconduct which led to the breakdown of the marriage; and (B) there was no credible evidence that Husband’s alleged dissipation placed an unrea
As noted in our discussion of Husband’s seventh point, supra, the trial court divided the marital property disproportionately, 60/40, in favor of Wife. The trial court reasoned that Husband’s marital misconduct and dissipation of funds warranted such a division. Husband argues that these reasons were not supported by substantial and credible evidence. We disagree.
The trial court has discretion in dividing marital property, unless the division violates
Murphy v. Carrón,
discussed
supra,
or is so one-sided as to be an abuse of discretion.
In re Marriage of Woodson,
Section 452.330.1 governs the trial court’s division of property in a dissolution and sets forth a two-step process for division of property: (1) the court must first set aside to each spouse his or her non-marital property; and (2) then divide the marital property and debts in such proportions as the court deems just.
In re Marriage of Reese,
(1) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children;
(2) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(3) The value of the nonmarital property set apart to each spouse;
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage; and
(5) Custodial arrangements for minor children.
Section 452.330.1. "While a 60/40 division of property is not equal, the Missouri Supreme Court has held that this division neither violates
Murphy v. Carron,
nor is it so one-sided as to be an abuse of discretion.
See In re Marriage of Woodson,
The evidence here showed that Husband’s economic circumstances are far superior to Wife’s, especially in comparing Husband and Wife’s earning potential. Although Husband alleged Wife committed spousal abuse and was unfaithful, the trial court found Husband’s testimony was not credible. Even if the court had believed Husband, by comparison, Husband’s conduct during the marriage was far more egregious, having multiple extra-marital affairs, including one lasting more than five years. Further, the evidence presented at trial supports the trial court’s conclusion that Husband dissipated marital funds, as discussed in Point VI,
supra.
Based on the evidence in the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 60 percent of the marital property to Wife and 40 percent to Husband. The trial court’s Judgment is supported by substantial evidence, it is not against the weight of the evidence, and it does not erroneously declare or apply the law.
Murphy,
Husband’s eighth point is denied.
Point IV — -Attorney’s Fees
In his ninth and final point, Husband claims the trial court erred in awarding $128,676 in attorney’s fees for the trial and
“Generally speaking, parties to a domestic relations case are responsible for paying their own attorney’s fees.”
Ethridge v. Ethridge,
On appeal, the party seeking attorney’s fees must show the extent of the necessary services to be rendered by counsel and the related expenses.
Potts v. Potts,
Here, the trial court considered the statutory directives in Section 452.355. The trial court noted that Husband had “control of greater marital financial resources than Wife,” and that Husband’s attorneys were paid significantly more than Wife’s attorneys. Further, Husband liquidated marital assets to pay his attorney’s fees without Wife’s approval, dissipated marital funds, and made no efforts to support Wife or Daughter during the pendency of the ease. Moreover, the trial court noted that Husband was not cooperative during discovery, and his unreasonable behavior increased the attorney’s fees and costs. The court charged Husband with $88,676 as Wife’s attorney’s fees. The trial court further awarded Wife an additional $40,000 in attorney’s fees on appeal.
The evidence on the record shows that the trial court properly considered Husband’s superior ability to earn income, Husband was awarded significant marital property even though he was awarded 40 percent, Husband engaged in numerous instances of marital misconduct, and Husband dissipated marital funds by spending $352,484 two weeks prior to trial. Husband here has not met his burden and shown that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay attorney’s fees.
Husband’s ninth point is denied.
We reverse and remand the trial court’s Judgment as to Husband’s second point on appeal. The trial court is instructed to hold a hearing and reconsider its maintenance award based on Wife’s reasonable needs and her ability to provide for such. Accordingly, the trial court shall thereafter re-calculate child support. The trial court’s Judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
Notes
. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as supplemented, unless otherwise indicated.
. Although the trial court failed to consider a significant aspect of Wife’s ability to provide for her reasonable needs here, we acknowledge that the parties failed to present evidence regarding such interest income Wife would earn from the property awarded to her, and thus, the trial court’s findings would have been speculative at best.
. The text of Section 452.340.5 states as follows:
If, when a child reaches age eighteen, the child is enrolled in and attending a secondary school program of instruction, the parental support obligation shall continue, if the child continues to attend and progresses toward completion of said program, until the child completes such program or reaches age twenty-one, whichever first occurs. If the child is enrolled in an institution of vocational or higher education not later than October first following graduation from a secondary school or completion of a graduation equivalence degree program and so long as the child enrolls for and completes at least twelve hours of credit each semester, not including the summer semester, at an institution of vocational or higher education and achieves grades sufficient to reenroll at such institution, the parental support obligation shall continue until the child completes his or her education, or until the child reaches the age of twenty-one, whichever first occurs. To remain eligible for such continued parental support, at the beginning of each semester the child shall submit to each parent a transcript or similar official document provided by the institution of vocational or higher education which includes the courses the child is enrolled in and has completed for each term, the grades and credits received for each such course, and an official document from the institution listing the courses which the child is enrolled in for the upcoming term and the number of credits for each such course.... Upon request for notification of the child’s grades by the noncustodial parent, the child shall produce the required documents to the noncustodial parent within thirty days of receipt of grades from the education institution. If the child fails to produce the required documents, payment of child support may terminate without the accrual of any child support arrearage and shall not be eligible for re-instatement. If circumstances of the child manifestly dictate, thecourt may waive the October first deadline for enrollment required by this subsection. ... A child who has been diagnosed with a developmental disability, as defined in section 630.005, or whose physical disability or diagnosed health problem limits the child’s ability to carry the number of credit hours prescribed in this subsection, shall remain eligible for child support so long as such child is enrolled in and attending an institution of vocational or higher education, and the child continues to meet the other requirements of this subsection. ...
. The exception under Section 452.340.5 allowing a child "whose physical disability or diagnosed health problem limits the child’s ability to carry the number of credit hours prescribed in this subsection” to remain eligible for child support is separate and in addition to the exception for a child "diagnosed with a developmental disability, as defined in section 630.005,” to which Husband argues is not applicable.
. A child is obligated to comply with the notification requirements once the parents’ dissolution proceedings have been commenced, even before there is a judgment of dissolution.
McFadden v. McFadden,
. If Wife is granted maintenance on remand, the court should correct the error by including the amount of maintenance awarded when it recalculates child support on the amended Form 14.