Schroth v. Coal Operators Cas. Co.Schroth v. Coal Operators Cas. Co.
This is an appeal from a judgment for plaintiff entered in the Essex County District Court.
In January, 1948, James Duncan, an independent trucking contractor, solicited work from the plaintiff Emil A. Schroth, trading as Emsco Equipment Company. The plaintiff advised that he would require evidence that Duncan carried workmen‘s compensation and public liability and property damage insurance. Thereupon, Duncan applied for such insurance to the defendant, Coal Operators Casualty Company, paid a premium of $50 and was advised that $40 additional premium was due. The defendant applied the $50 premium to workmen‘s compensation policy C-47876 which it delivered and prepared public liability and property damage policy LMC-8747. Although this latter policy was completed and countersigned, it was never delivered but was held by the defendant pending payment of the $40. There is a stipulation in the agreed statement in lieu of record (Rule 1:2-22) that Duncan was not to have any benefit from the public liability and property damage insurance policy until he had paid the additional premium.
It is not disputed that if public liability and property damage policy LMC-8747 had actually been delivered to Duncan it would have afforded no coverage against property damage to the machine which was admittedly in his care, custody or control. And the certificate by the defendant representing to the plaintiff that policy LMC-8747 had been issued to Duncan would not, in any wise, increase the policy coverage or enlarge the defendant‘s liability beyond its terms. See Hart v. Automobile Insurance Co. of Hartford, Connecticut, 140 Misc. 399, 246 N.Y.S. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Conner v. Manchester Assurance Co., 130 Fed. 743 (C.C.A. 9th 1904). See also Home Insurance Co. v. Favorite, 46 Ill. 263, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1867), where the Court, in dealing with an action on a certificate issued by the insurance company certifying that Favorite was insured under policy 12261, held that if such policy was in existence its terms were “part of the contract” and, further, that if the policy had not been prepared a printed form embodying the customary terms contemplated by the parties could be introduced.
Assuming that plaintiff sufficiently established all of the other elements in his asserted action for fraud and deceit (Byard v. Holmes, supra), we are nevertheless satisfied that he has not shown any damage resulting from the wrongful conduct. The defendant‘s representation was that it had issued public liability and property damage policy LMC-8747. Plaintiff knew that this policy, as policies generally, would not insure against all events but would extend coverage in accordance with its terms and conditions. He did not request the policy but chose to rely upon the representation that public liability and property damage policy LMC-8747 had been issued to Duncan. If it had actually been issued it would have afforded no coverage whatever to Duncan or the plaintiff for the damage to the machine while in Duncan‘s possession and control. The plaintiff is no worse off than if the representation upon which he relied had been true in every respect; he cannot be said to have been harmed by its falsity. Cf. Hackner v. Morgan, 130 F.2d 300, 303 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942); cert. den., sub nom. Eastman v. Guaranty Trust Co., 317 U.S. 691, 87 L.Ed. 553 (1942); rehearing den., 317 U.S. 713, 87 L.Ed. 568 (1943); 37 C.J.S., § 41, p. 289.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed.