Schroeder v. StateSchroeder v. State
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- Before:
- Barnes
Dаle Lee Schroeder appeals his conviction of obstruction of an officer in violation of
Considered in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence shows that late one evening, Schroeder had a party for his daughter. After a neighbor, who lived across a lake from Schroeder, complained about loud music from thе party, Deputy Skinner responded to the complaint. Deputy Skinner could hear the music from the party at the neighbor’s house and throughout the neighborhood, and thus proceeded to the party to control the noise.
Upon arriving at the party, the music was so loud that he could not communicate with anyone. Deputy Skinnеr approached the rear deck of the house and told the band to stop playing. When Deputy Skinner located Schroeder, the homeowner, Schrоeder was intoxicated, and bumped into the deputy. Then, despite repeated warnings to back up, Schroeder continued to bump into- the deputy. At this point Sсhroeder’s daughter started yelling obscenities at the deputy, preventing him from talking to Schroeder. Deputy Skinner then turned his attention to the daughter, who ran away. As the deputy followed the daughter, another partygoer stepped in his way, preventing his pursuit. Then a crowd of people encircled the deputy and proceeded to yell obscenities at him.
*880When the crowd became unruly, additional officers were called to the scene to maintain control, among them Dеputy Bowen and Deputy Sanders. Deputy Skinner informed the other deputies that he was looking for Schroeder’s daughter, and the three deputies approached the back deck. Mr. and Mrs. Schroeder acknowledged that they were the homeowners. When Deputy Bowen explained that they needed to talk to their daughter, the Schroeders invited the deputies inside to look for her. The deputies found the Schroeders’ daughter in the house, but as’ Deputy Bowen attempted to arrеst her, another partygoer interfered by jumping on his back. While Deputy Bowen struggled to arrest the partygoer, Schroeder grabbed his hand. Deputy Sanders then arrestеd Schroeder for obstruction of justice for interfering with the arrest, and he was later charged with maintaining a disorderly house.
The jury found Schroeder guilty of the obstruction of an officer charge, but not guilty of maintaining a disorderly house. This appeal followed.
.1. Schroeder alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the disorderly house charge. This contention is moot, however, as the record shows that the jury found him not guilty for the charge of maintaining a disorderly house. Moore v. State, 242 Ga. App. 208, 211 (2) (529 SE2d 210) (2000).
2. Sсhroeder also alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the obstruction of an officer charge. Schroeder contends that the initial officer, Deputy Skinner, did not have the legal authority to be on the premises so that any subsequent actions by the officers were illegal; thus, hе had the right to interfere with any illegal arrest. We find no merit to this argument. Although
[w]e recognize, of course, that the Fourth Amendment extends beyond the paradigmatic entry intо a private dwelling by a law enforcement officer in search of the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. But it does not extend so far as to prevent the policе from making any contact with the citizenry and to hold that the police may not, upon request, although exigent circumstances do not appear, apрroach the outer doors of a dwelling absent a warrant or consent of an owner or occupant would work that result.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Lyons, 167 Ga. App. 747, 748 (307 SE2d 285) (1983). This is true even when the officer entеred the backyard of the property. Id. In any event, the record shows that after the deputy entered the property, Schroeder consented to the deputies’ entry into his home to look for his daughter. This consent *881not only operated as a consent to the search of the house, “but it amounts to a waiver of the warrant requirement with respect to the search previously conducted.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Sutton, 258 Ga. 382 (2) (369 SE2d 249) (1988).
Pursuant to
Under
Deputy Bowen testified that upon arriving at the party, Deputy Skinner informed him that he needed assistance in apprehending Schroeder’s dаughter. Once Deputy Bowen located Schroeder’s daughter, a woman at the party jumped on his back, stopping him from reaching the daughter. In response, Deputy Bowen subdued the woman and was attempting to arrest her when Schroeder intentionally grabbed his arm. Therefore, in this case, the evidence shows that Schroeder knowingly and wilfully grabbed Deputy Bowen’s arm to stop him from arresting a woman at the party while the deputy was in the lawful discharge of his duties.
3. Schroeder further alleges the triаl court erred in not admitting a videotape of the party into evidence. He contends that the tape should have been admitted because it is the only tape of the party and it can be used to impeach Deputy Skinner’s testimony. As a general rule, admission of evidence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts will not disturb the exercise of that discretion absent evidence of its abuse. Whisnant v. State, 178 Ga. App. 742, 743 (1) (344 SE2d 536) (1986). Here, the videotape does not dеpict the encounter between Deputy Bowen and Schroeder; it shows only events that took place prior to Deputy Bowen’s arrival. Evidence admitted at trial must be relevant to the present charge.
Judgment affirmed.
Andrews, P. J., and Adams, J., concur.