Kеvin Schroeder appeals from a judgment involuntarily dismissing his claim against Curtis Praska and Leroy Barton for failure to prosecute the claim. We affirm.
Schroeder collided with Praska and Barton on June 27, 1978. He sued them for damages in June 1984, one day before the six-yеar limitations period expired. Schroeder filed his complaint and a motion for default judgment on August 21, 1991. A trial was scheduled for August 31, 1993. Six weeks before trial, Praska and Barton movеd to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The trial court granted the motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 41(b) on July 29, 1993. Schroeder appeals.
When deciding whether to dismiss a claim for want of prosecution, the trial court must balance its interest in dockеt management, the public’s interest in prompt resolution of claims, and the risk of prejudice to the defendants from delay, against our preference for resolving сases on their merits. Te
rnes v. Knispel,
After the complaint was served, nothing much happened for seven yеars, until Schroeder finally filed his complaint in 1991. The trial court held that Praska and Barton wеre prejudiced by Schroeder’s failure to prosecute the claim. As in
Temes,
the court was concerned with both the availability and
Schroeder blames his attorneys for the thirteen years it tоok to file his complaint. Of the five consecutive attorneys that represented Schroeder since 1978, several failed to diligently pursue Schroeder’s interests. Howеver, as we said in
Sturdevant,
Schroeder also blames Praskа and Barton for the delay. Without support in the record, Schroeder alleges thаt Barton’s insurance company asked him.in 1984 to refrain from filing his complaint while they tried to settle his claim. Even if Barton’s insurer made this request, Schroeder was not entitled to wait sеven years before filing his complaint. Although Praska and Barton may be responsible fоr the delay after they filed a certificate of non-readiness in September 1992, еight years had already passed since the lawsuit was begun. We cannot concludе the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the complaint. As we said in
Ternes,
Schroeder also argues that the court abused its discretion by dismissing the case four weeks before trial. A trial court’s discretion to dismiss a case for lack of prosecution is not changed simply because a case is scheduled for trial and the plaintiff is ready to proceеd.
Ternes,
In this case, the lack of prosecution was first questioned by Praska and Barton in 1991. A year later, the trial court warned Schroeder that it was going to dismiss the case unless further aсtion was taken. On its own motion, a trial court can dismiss a complaint once it has bеen filed for a year. N.D.R.Civ.P. 40(e). A court should dismiss a complaint on its own rather than wait for a motion by the parties when they dilly-dally. Had Schroeder deposed witnesses or incurrеd more pretrial expense, the dismissal of his complaint four weeks before triаl may have been an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, in light of the prejudice suffеred by Praska and Barton as a result of Schroeder’s inaction, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint, and we affirm.
Schroeder violated N.D.R.App.P. 30(a) by including documents in the appendix that are not found in the record. This violation was aggravаted by counsel’s attempted reliance on the documents during oral argument. Therеfore, under N.D.R.App.P. 13, we award double costs to Barton and Praska.