Schroeder v. NieseSchroeder v. Niese
{¶1} The plaintiff-appellant, Lisa M. Schroeder (“Schroeder”), appeals a decision from the Juvenile Division of the Putnam County Court of Common Pleas. Schroeder alleges that the trial court erred by declining to make child support effeсtive from the date her child was born instead of from the date she filed her complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
{¶2} Schroeder is the mother and natural guardian of CN. Doc. 1. CN was born in December of 2012. Id. On October 8, 2015, Schroeder filed a complaint to determine parentage with the Juvenile Division of the Putnam County Court of Common Pleas that named Dennis V. Niese (“Niesе”) as the defendant. Id. After the genetic testing results were returned, Niese filed an answer that admitted he was the father of CN. Doc. 11, 15. On January 26, 2016, Schroeder and Niese came to the court with an agreemеnt on several child support matters, but the issues of “past due medical expenses and the effective date of the child support to be paid” remained unresolved. Doc. 18. Tr. 9.
{¶3} At this hearing, Schroeder requested the court to award retroactive child support from the date of CN’s birth in December of 2012. Tr. 10. Niese, however, was only willing to pay child support retroactive to the date that the complaint was filed. Tr. 11. The court heard arguments from both parties on this matter. Id.
{¶4} The defense argued that the pleadings did not request retroactive support from the date of birth and, therefore, the effective date of the child support should be the date Schroeder filed the complaint. Tr. 11. Niese took the stand and testified that he did tell Schroeder during her pregnancy that he was going to take care of her and CN. Tr. 32. Niese also asserted that he regularly paid Schroeder $500 per month after CN was born and would occasionally give her a $1,000 payment for months with holidays. Tr. 27. However, he made these payments only in cash and did not keep a record or take a receipt from Schroeder for these payments. Tr. 29.
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to order child support to the mother of the child retroactive to the date of birth of the child in the paternity action where the father failed to affirmatively establish the circumstances that would relieve him of his obligation to pay support from the period of time prior to the commencement of the paternity action.
{¶6} The sole assignment of error arguеs that the trial court erred by declining Schroeder’s request for retroactive child support to the date of birth.
When a court determines whether to require a parent to pay an amount for that parent‘s failure to support a child prior to the date the court issues an order requiring that parеnt to pay an amount for the current support of that child, it shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, any monetary contribution either parent of the child made to the support of the child prior to the court issuing the order requiring the parent to pay an amount for the current support of the child.
{¶8} In her appeal, Schroeder claims that the trial court inappropriately departed from the “general rule, in a paternity action, [that] child support should be awarded from the birthdate of the child.” Aрpellant’s Brief, 7. Schroeder is under the impression that Myers v. Moschella, 112 Ohio App.3d 75, 677 N.E.2d 1243 (1st Dist.1996) supports this general rule. Although Myers states “the [father’s] support obligation commences at birth,” it did not require that formal child support be ordered retroactively to the datе of birth. Id. at 78, quoting Baugh v. Carver, 3 Ohio App.3d 139, 140, 444 N.E.2d 58, (1st Dist.1981).1 In fact, the appeals court in
{¶9} The judgment entry shows that the trial court, in coming to its decision, “consider[ed] all relevant factors” presented by the parties as was required by law.
{¶11} Schroeder also asserts that it is an abuse of discretion to decline to award retroactive child support from the child’s date of birth “absent аn affirmative demonstration by the obligor of circumstances which would relief [sic] him of that obligation.” To support this argument, Schroeder cites Baugh v. Carver, supra. However, Baugh does not advance her argument when quoted in full.
Where damages for support payments for the period from the date of the child‘s birth to the date of adjudication are prayed for and proved, as here, it is an abuse of discretion for the court to make no award of child support for that period in the absence of an affirmative demonstration of some circumstance which ought reasonably to relieve the father of this obligation and the child of this entitlement.
{¶12} Further, under the Baugh analysis, courts have held that “[d]emonstrating that a father voluntarily provided suрport prior to a child support order, and that the child’s financial needs were met during that pre-order period, can be sufficient evidence to relieve a father of retroactivе child support.” Evans, supra at ¶ 16. Both parties agree that Niese voluntarily made payments of child support. Doc. 18. While the parties dispute whether this support was adequate, the trial court found the fact that Schroeder did not initiate an action for a child support order until CN was nearly three to be evidence that the support was generally adequate. Id. Thus, even when taking the Myers and Baugh decisions into consideration, the trial court’s determination was not an abuse of discretion.
While “[u]nder some circumstances, a trial court may abuse its discretion by not ordering child support payments from the birth of the child,” we do not find that to be the case here. Hammon By and Through Hammon v. Hammon, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-90-14, 1991 WL 53747 (April 12, 1991), citing Baugh v. Carver, 3 Ohio App.3d 139, 444 N.E.2d 58 (1st Dist.1981). Ohio law expressly gives the trial court the discretion to determine whether the circumstances of a particular case
{¶13} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Juvenile Division of the Putnam County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
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