[¶ 1] Dеnnis Buchholz appeals from a district court order imposing a constructive trust in favor of Donald and Evelyn Schroeder. Concluding the elements of a constructive trust were sufficiently established but the district court’s remedy was
I
[¶ 2] In 1981 Dennis and Donna Buch-holz, along with Donna Buchholz’s parents — Dоnald and Evelyn Schroeder, inspected a 23-acre 1 tract of land for sale near Colfax, North Dakota. Prior to closing the purchase, the Schroeders gave the Buchholzes a paper bag containing $19,750 in cash, which, along with the Buchholzes’ assumption of a note, was used to purchase the property for $39,500. The Buchholzes were deeded the property as joint tenants.
[¶ 3] The Buchholzes moved into a house on the property, and the Buchholzes and Schroeders jointly improved the house and property. In 1984 a second house was moved onto the property and has since been occupied by the Schroeders. In 1998 the Buchholzes sought a divorce and separated. Donna Buchholz mоved away, while Dennis Buchholz remained on the property and continued to run his business that is collocated on the property. The Schroeders sued Dennis and Donna Buch-holz, seeking partition of the property and the right to remain on the property and in the home.
[¶ 4] The district court granted the Schroeders a lifetime right to reside in their home and lifetime use of 1.03 acres surrounding the house. The district court’s order provided that upon the death of the Schroeders, the property and house will revert to Dennis and Donna Buchholz. Dennis Buchholz timely appealed. 2 The district court had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const, art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.
II
[¶ 5] “An implied trust is one that is created by operation of law.” N.D.C.C. § 59-01-05. There are two types of implied trusts: rеsulting and constructive.
Loberg v. Alford,
A
[¶ 6] The district court considered only the constructive-trust theory because the court concluded the plaintiffs withdrew their resulting-trust theory. Although a constructive trust must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, whether a relationship of personal confidence exists need be proven only by a preрonderance of the evidence.
Matter of Estate of Bendickson,
[¶ 7] The existence of a confidential relationship and the existence of an implied trust are questions of fact.
Black v. Peterson,
[¶ 9] “A confidential relationship exists whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another, and that such relationship is a fact to be established in the same manner and by the same kind of evidence [as] any other fact is proven.”
Estate of Wenzel-Mosset by Gaukler v. Nickels,
[¶ 10] Among the district court’s 124 findings of fact are numerous findings evidencing a confidential relationship. The Sehroeders provided' one-half of the money to purchase the property. 3 The parties jointly improved the property. Shortly after the purchase, the Schroe-ders, assisting the Buchholzes, spent “nearly every weekend” improving the property, including “trimming and removing brush, trimming and removing trees, general cleanup, remodeling of the house, removal of old out buildings and eventually remodeling of a barn into a shop.” The district court classified Donald Schroeder’s work on the property as extensive.
[¶ 11] Later, the parties collectively prepared the property for addition of a second home. A house was moved onto the property, and the Sehroeders lived in it from 1987 until the trial. The district court found “Donald Schroeder paid for various items that went into maintenance” of the farmstead, including a well and pressure tank system to service both houses. Later, Dennis Buchholz paid for improvements and replacements to those systems. The parties worked together on remodeling projects. The district court found Donald Schroeder “obtained at his expense and effort most of the lumbеr used for raising the barn” that subsequently housed a business for Dennis Buchholz.
[¶ 12] The district court found the parties’ “mutual cooperation was demonstrated by the fact that they hunted together, gardened together, and canned together over the years.” Further, Donald Schroeder assisted in the operation of Dennis Buchholz’s business. The district court found, although the parties exсhanged labor, Donald Schroeder “greatly exceeded the reciprocal work provided by Dennis Buchholz.”
[¶ 13] Although included in the district court’s conclusions of law, the district court found, “During the transactions that are pertinent to these proceedings Dennis Buchholz was in a confidential relationship with the Sehroeders, primarily as a result of the family relationships that existed.” The existence of a confidential relationship is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Black v. Peterson,
B
[¶ 14] The determination of unjust enrichment is a conclusion of law and is fully reviewable on appeal.
Matter of Estate of Zent,
[¶ 15] Five elements must be established to prove unjust enrichment:
1. An enrichment; 2. An impoverishment; 3. A connection between the enrichment and the impoverishment; 4. Absence of a justification for the enrichment and impoverishment; and 5. An absence of a remedy provided by law.
Apache Corp. v. MDU Resources Group, Inc.,
[¶ 16] The value of the Buchholz property has increased, due in large part to the efforts and contributions of the Schroeders. The Sсhroeders assisted Dennis Buchholz with his business, which was operated on the property. The Schroeders shared costs, expenses, and labor for improvements with Buchholz. The Schroeders’ purchase of a well and pressure tank system to service both houses, the jointly installed and serviced heating system, and the Schroeders’ purchase of lumber and materials to convert the barn into a shop are evidence of an impoverishment. The time, labor, and materials provided by the Schroeders for the overall improvement of the whole property are further evidence of an impoverishment. We conclude the district court’s findings and conclusions aptly set forth an enrichment of Dennis Buchholz, an impoverishment of the Schroeders, and a connection between the enrichment and impoverishment.
[¶ 17] Unjust enrichment requires a finding by the court of the absence of a justification for the enrichment. The district court concluded the Schroeders expected a right to reside on the property for life. Although a reasonable interpretation of the facts may suggеst the Schroeders’ efforts and contributions were a token of familial love and affection, the district court’s conclusion, is equally sustainable. In light of the Schroeders’ payment of half the purchase price, their contributions to the improvement of the property, the testimony indicating the Schroeders did not provide substantial gifts to their other children, and all the evidence before the court, we conclude the absence of a justification for the enrichment is supported by the district court’s findings.
[¶ 18] Finally, for unjust enrichment, there must be the absence of a remedy provided by law.
Apache Corp. v. MDU Resources Group, Inc.,
C
[¶ 19] We conclude the district court did not err in holding the elements of a constructive trust were sufficiently proven..
Ill
[¶ 20] Having concluded the elements of a constructive trust exist, we next address the district court’s remedy. The district court held there was “no agreement between the parties to have equal ownership of the 23 acres.” The court held the $19,750 provided by the Schroe-ders was “by law a gift.” The court found if the Schroeders were evicted, Dennis Buchholz would be unjustly enriched, and if the Schroeders were awarded “one-half of the property or even a smаller portion of the 23 acres,” they would be unjustly enriched. The district court imposed a constructive trust, awarding Donald and Evelyn Schroeder “a joint life estate in their home and surrounding areas for each of their respective natural lives.”
A
[¶ 21] The district court imposed a “life estate” in favor of Donald and Evelyn Schroeder. The district court held, “Upon the deаth of the later to die of Donald Schroeder or Evelyn Schroeder the property described by the life estate shall then become the sole property of the defendants, and the constructive trust is automatically terminated and extinguished.” Even though the court imposed a “life estate” in favor of the Schroeders, in stating Dennis Buchholz would “be back in Court bеfore the ink is even dry on his paperwork” if the Schroeders attempted to rent the house, the court implied the Schroeders’ interest was not alienable. It is well-settled, a life estate holder “is entitled to both the possession and the use of the property ... including the right to rents, issues, and profits generated by the parcel during the tenant’s life.” 51 Am. Jur.2d Life Tenants and Remaindermen § 32 (2000). A life tenant “is entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property as long as the estate endures; he or she may convey or lease his or her interest, but may not disregard the rights of those who take when the life estate ends.” Id.
[¶ 22] Discussing whether the Schroe-ders could rent their property, the court stated:
Mr. Bullís has raised some questions about do they have the right to rent it out? You have to remember something here. Mr. and Mrs. Buchholz are trustees of the Life Estate. I mean I’m finding a constructive trust? What does that mean? That means that right now Mr. and Mrs. Buchholz are trustees concerning a Life Estate that’s held by Mr. and Mrs. Schroeder for each of their lives. I mean let’s take some of the examples. I mean I know they’re extreme. I mean they let the house go. They try to rеnt it out. I’m assuming if that happens Mr. Buchholz is going to be back in Court before the ink is even dry on his paperwork saying look, this is a violation of the constructive trust.
[¶ 23] In addition to whether the life estate is alienable, the record reflects a great deal of discussion regarding boundary lines, use of common driveways, sharing of water and electrical services, and overall use and enjoyment of the property. The record demonstrates the district court did not create an actual life estate, but rather attempted to create a constructive trust with the duration to be measured by the lives of the Schroeders.
B
[¶ 24] The interest created by the district court was neither a life estate nor a constructive trust. “When equity imposes a constructive trust upon an asset of the defendant, the plaintiff ultimately gets formal legal title.” Dan B. Dobbs,
Law of Remedies
§ 4.3(2) (2d ed.1993)
[¶ 25] Here, the district court imposed a “constructivе trust” but awarded the Schroeders only a lifetime interest in the property. After concluding a constructive trust existed, the court did not order the Buchholzes to convey legal title to the Schroeders. The district court’s notion that a constructive trust may be imposed with the Buchholzes as constructive trustees and without passing title to the trust beneficiaries, the Schroedеrs, has been described by at least one author as “esoteric metaphysics.” Id. at § 4.3(2) n. 1 (citing I G. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 1.4 (1978 & Supps.; criticizing the Restatement of Restitution)). The notion “that title is ultimately passed when a constructive trust is declared is accurate both factually and theoretically.” Id.
[¶ 26] Although some courts have imposed a “constructive trust” under similar circumstances, at least one author suggests the intention may have been tо create an equitable lien, despite the use of constructive trust terminology.
See Kuhlman v. Cargile,
[¶ 27] Because a constructive trust is founded on the concept that title to property is being wrongfully held, if the district court’s remedy were truly a constructive trust, Dennis and Donna Buch-holz would be required to transfer title to the Schroeders. If the district court’s remedy were truly a life estate, the Schroeders would be able to convey their interest, rent the property, or otherwise partake in full use and enjoyment of the property.
[¶28] The construction of the remedy in this case leaves us unable to determine whether the district court has imposed a constructive trust, an equitable lien, or some other remedy. We therefore reverse and remand this matter to the district cоurt to clarify its order.
C
[¶ 29] District courts have broad authority when fashioning an equitable remedy.
See Baker v. Minot Public School Dist. No. 1,
[¶ 30] Because we conclude the district court did not err in holding the elements of a constructive trust were sufficiently proven, a constructive trust may be imposed. Imposition of a constructive trust, however, would require Dennis and Donna Buch-holz to transfer title of the affected portion of the property to the Schroeders.
[¶ 31] Because a constructive trust was not actually imposed by the district court, on remand the district court may choose to consider other remedies that wоuld not confuse tenets of property law and equity. For example, the court may grant the Schroeders an equitable lien with reason
IV
[¶ 32] Concluding the elements of an implied trust were sufficiently proven, we affirm in part. Because, however, the district court imposed an improper remedy that was neither a life estate nor a constructive trust, we reverse and remand for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Sоme dispute apparently exists as to whether the tract of land is 23 or 24 acres. The district court found it is 23 acres.
. Donna Buchholz did not file a brief or argue on appeal, but advised this Court that she joined the Schroeders’ claim that a constructive trust was properly imposed in their favor.
. The parties disagree about whether the $19,750 was a gift; the district court concluded, as a matter of law, the money was a gift.