7 S.D. 163 | S.D. | 1895
This appeal is from an order denying plaintiff’s motion or application for leave to file a supplemental complaint in an action to foreclose a chattel mortgage, given by defendant to secure the payment of a promissory note which had not matured, according to its terms, at the time the suit was instituted. By the terms of the mortgage which was made a part of the original complaint, the mortgagees were expressly authorized to foreclose at
Section 4942 of the Compiled Laws provides that “the plaintiff * * * may be allowed on motion to make a supplemental complaint, * * * alleging facts material to the case occurring after the former complaint * * * was made.” And thus an exception usually recognized in Code states is made to the rule that a party must rely upon his cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit. While we regard the statute directory, as the word “may” was evidently not employed as a mandatory expression, we ai’e inclined to the belief that an application to file a supplemental complaint should ordinarily be granted when it relates to the same cause of action, and the matter contained therein appears to be material to the plaintiff, and when it is clear that a court, by an abuse of its discretion, has materially prejudiced the rights of the party by a refusal to grant leave to file a supplemental complaint, the action of such court will be reviewed on appeal. Under the allegations of the complaint based upon the stipulation in the mortgage, plaintiffs would be entitled to all the relief demanded in their supplemental pleading, upon proof of a material depreciation in the value of the property occurring since the execution of the mortgage, or of other facts sufficient to justify the mortgagees in deeming themselves insecure. Humpfner v. Osborne, 2 S. D. 310, 50 N. W. 88; Allen v. Vose, 34 Hun. 57; Botsford v. Murphy, 47 Mich. 536, 537, 11 N. W. 375, 376; Roy v. Groings, 96 Ill. 361.