This is аn appeal from the judgment of the United States Court of International Trade in Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States, 587 F.Supp. 69, sustaining the Customs Service’s classification of the appellant’s importеd glass. That court held that a prior decision upholding the identical classification of similar glass the appellant imported was stare decisis, and it refused to allow the аppellant to introduce evidence designed to show that the prior decision was clearly erroneous. We reverse and remand to allow the appellant to produce that evidence.
I
The merchandise consists of seven types of filter glass used in optical instruments such as spectrometers, spеctrophotometers and solar filter simulators. Two of the filters — one nearly colorless and the other colorless — transmit visible light while absorbing specific wavelengths in the ultraviolet or infrared spectrum. The remaining five types are dark glass which absorb most of the visible light, transmitting either the ultraviolet or infrared light.
The Customs Service сlassified the importations as “other optical glass” under item 540.67 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS). The appellant (Schott) contends that six of the sevеn should have been classified as “colored or special glass” under item 542.92 and the remaining type as “ordinary glass” under item 542.42.
There was an earlier case bеtween the same parties in which the courts upheld the Customs Service’s classification as “optical glass” of colored filter glass imported by the apрellant. In
Schott Optical Glass, Inc. v. United States,
During the trial of the present case, the Court of International Trade ruled that Schott I had determined the common meaning of “optical glass” for tariff purposes and that it was bound by that decision. The court excluded аll evidence relating to the common meaning of the tariff term, which Schott wanted to introduce to show that the earlier decision in Schott I was *64 clearly erroneous bеcause it adopted an erroneous meaning for “optical glass.”
The Court of International Trade concluded that under
stare decisis
the common meaning of optical glass as determined in
Schott I
was controlling.
II
In
United States v. Stone & Downer Co.,
Under
Stone & Downer,
the doctrine of
res judicata
— which bars litigation by the same parties of the same issues previously adjudicated,
Commissioner v. Sunnen,
There is a well-recognized exception to stare decisis, however: A court will reexamine and overrule a prior decision that was clearly erroneous. H.W. Robinson Airfreight Corp. v. United States, 48 CCPA 148 (1961); Adolphe Hurst & Co. v. United States, 33 CCPA 96 (1946). In the present case, Schott sought to introduce evidence, much of which it says it did not introduce in the prior case, to shоw that the court’s interpretation of “other optical glass” in Schott I was clearly erroneous.
In refusing to receive that evidence, the Court of International Trade did not rule that the evidenсe added nothing to what was before the court in
Schott I
and therefore could not show that that decision was clearly erroneous. Instead, it apparently applied the principle of
res judicata
—that the parties cannot relitigate an issue resolved in an earlier case — to the different issue whether
stare decisis
is inapplicablе because the prior decision was clearly erroneous. Thus, after refusing to admit evidence relating to the definition of “optical glass,” the court rejected Schott’s arguments designed to show that the prior decision was clearly erroneous because “these same arguments were presented to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals by this same plaintiff in
Schott I
and were rejected.”
If the importer cannot introduce new evidence relating to the correctness of the prior decision, frequently it will be impossible for it ever to build the foundation for the legal argument that that decision was clearly erroneous. In the present case, for example, Schott sought to .introduce additional expert testimony and excerpts from treatises dealing with the meaning of “opti
*65
cal glass” designed to show that the prior decision had misinterpreted that term. In a number of cases, including several that the Court of International Trade cited, the parties wеre permitted to relitigate the common meaning of tariff terms, with or without the introduction of new evidence.
See John C. Rogers & Co. v. United States,
Schott, in effect, made an еxtensive offer of proof of what the new evidence would show. We cannot say whether that evidence, when added to the evidence in the prior cаse and subjected to cross-examination when testimonial, would cause either the Court of International Trade or this court on appeal to conclude that the prior decision was clearly erroneous. Considering all the circumstances of this case, however, we conclude that Schott should have been allowed to offer the additional evidence it believed would undermine the prior decision.
In so ruling, we intimate no opinion on what effect, if any, that evidеnce would have in evaluating- the correctness of Schott I. Nor do we suggest that the Court of International Trade necessarily must admit every item of evidence that Sсhott offers. The admissibility of each item must be determined by that court upon the basis of the usual criteria of relevance, probative force, authenticity, accuracy, etc.
Cumulative evidence may or may not be relevant on particular issues. If, for example, the record in the prior case contained only two or three dictionary or scientific treatise definitions of “optical glass,” the existence of an additional large number of similar definitions, although cumulative to the material in the earlier case, nevertheless by sheer volume might raise doubts about the court’s earlier rejection of those definitions.
Thesе questions of admissibility and weight are for the Court of International Trade to decide in the first instance. We hold only that that court erred in its blanket exclusion of all of Schott’s evidence.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court of International Trade is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.