9 N.J. Misc. 786 | N.J. | 1931
This is the defendant’s rule to show cause why a verdict in favor of the plaintiff at the Atlantic Circuit for $12,500 should not be set aside.
The plaintiff contended and at the trial produced evidence tending to show that he was injured because of the negligent act of the defendant in failing to have any signal or warning upon the highway at the entrance of the bridge giving notice as to the danger to the traveling public.
The defendant denied negligence and contended that plaintiff’s injuries were caused wholly by the negligence of the plaintiff, or in any event contributed to by him, and further now contends that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and that the jury’s verdict for $12,500 is excessive.
We think there was ample evidence of defendant’s negligence and that the verdict in that respect was not against the clear weight of the evidence. While the evidence was contradictory to the extent of presenting a fair jury question, it seems clear that there was ample evidence produced by the plaintiff that the lights which theretofore during the construction had been maintained on the highway at the entrance of the bridge by means of lighted lanterns, were wholly absent on this occasion when the plaintiff approached the bridge about five-thirty A. M., and before daylight on the morning in question. The plaintiff so testified, and so did at least four other apparently disinterested witnesses who likewise approached the bridge along about the same hour.
While the testimony produced by the defendant was for the most part directly to the contrary, yet there are some phases of defendant’s proof which we think tended to corroborate the plaintiff’s case.
We think that it cannot be said that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, nor that the jury’s finding was against the great weight of the evidence. We believe the great weight of the evidence is that plaintiff exercised the degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person would and should use under like circumstances and the conditions with which he was confronted. The evidence was that he had used this highway before on several occasions while the bridge was under construction, and that on past occasions always, lanterns guided him safely across. He relied upon the presence of the lights to warn him of the barricade, and naturally did so, since the visibility was not. good and there was no landmark to indicate to him the presence of the bridge or the barricade. His testimony was to the effect that he was attentive and apprehensive, and was proceeding cautiously and was upon the lookout for lights. He had his headlights on, but his headlights under the conditions at the moment did not disclose to him the barricade, although he was watching carefully, and he testified that the barricade-was not disclosed -to him because “these objects must have blended in with the color of the road, because they were not visible,” and that testimony seems to be somewhat corroborated by the experiences of some of the plaintiff’s witnesses. Plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that he was driving comparatively slowly, being apprehensive, and that when he-struck the barricade his car straddled the rail and thereafter he had no control in steering it, with the result that it went diagonally and crashed through the rail and fell into the-water.
Defendant says that the verdict is excessive. We have not reached that conclusion. Plaintiff suffered considerable loss
The rule to show cause will be discharged, with costs.