SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PITTSBURGH, Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. PITTSBURGH FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 400, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Albert Fondy, President, Joseph F. Zunic, Executive Secretary, et al., Appellants.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Argued March 5, 1979. Decided Oct. 1, 1979.
406 A.2d 324 | 486 Pa. 365
MANDERINO, J., joins in this opinion in support of reversal.
Louis B. Kushner, Stephen H. Jordan, Rothman, Gordon, Foreman & Groudine, P.A., Pittsburgh, for appellants.
Jerome H. Gerber, James L. Cowden, Harrisburg, amicus curiae оn behalf of Pennsylvania AFL-CIO.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
OPINION
MANDERINO, Justice.
On December 1, 1975, a teachers’ strike began in the School District of Pittsburgh. About three weeks later, on December 22, 1975, appellee, School District of Pittsburgh, filed a complaint in equity requesting that a preliminary injunction be issued enjoining appellants, Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers, Local 400, American Federation of Teach-
When appellants did not report for work on Monday, January 12, and on subsequent days the court imposed fines. The total fines imposed on the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers was $105,000 covering a period of nine scheduled school days which passed before aрpellants returned to work upon the reaching of a settlement by the parties.
Appellants filed two appeals which were later consolidated; one from the order issuing the preliminary injunction and another from the order imposing the fines for failure to return to work. The Commonwealth Court held that the appeal from the issuance of the preliminary injunction was moot because the strike was settled on Monday, January 26, 1976, and a new collective bargaining agreement had been executed. In the appeal from the trial court‘s order imposing fines for contempt, appellants were denied relief; the Commonwealth Court affirming the trial court‘s order imposing thе fines. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh v. Pittsburgh Federation, 31 Pa.Cmwlth. 461, 376 A.2d 1021 (1977). We then granted appellants’ petition for allowance of appeal.
The pivotal factor in the determination of this appeal is the trial court‘s denial, prior to Monday, January 12, of appellants’ request that the trial court hold a final hеaring on the propriety of injunctive relief. On Wednesday, January 7, 1976, at the hearing scheduled to determine whether appellants should be held in contempt, appellants submitted to the trial court a request for a final hearing pursuant to
Under
“(f)(1) When a preliminary or special injunction involving freedom of expression is [used], either without notice or after notice and hearing, the court shall hold a final hearing within three (3) days after demand by the defendant. A final decree shall be filed in the office of the prothonotary within twenty-four (24) hours after the close of thе hearing. If the final hearing is not held within the three (3) day period, or if the final decree is not filed within twenty-four (24) hours after the close of the hearing, the injunction shall be deemed dissolved.” (Emphasis added.)
There is no doubt that the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court involved freedom of expression. It provided:
“AND NOW, to-wit, this 3rd day of January, 1976, plaintiff having presented its Complaint in Equity in open court and having moved for a Preliminary Injunction, upon consideration thereof and after a full and complete hearing thereon wherein all parties have been afforded an
opрortunity to be heard, it is the finding of this Court that the strike of the defendants, and each of them, against the plaintiff creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public, and that the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief including but not limited to an appropriate injunction. Based upon the findings of this Court аs aforesaid, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendants and each of them, and all persons in active concert or participating with them, be, and they hereby are, enjoined from:
1. Acting in concert by way of ordering, directing or taking any action calculated to cause any and all teachers, paraprofessionals, and others еmployed by plaintiff to fail or refuse to report for duty, to be wilfully absent from work, to engage in concert in a work stoppage or a slowdown, or to abstain in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of their duties of employment; or
2. Ordering, directing or taking any action in concert calculated to cаuse any and all of the employees other than teachers or paraprofessional employees of plaintiff to fail or refuse to report for duty, to be wilfully absent from work, to engage in concert in a work stoppage or slowdown, or to abstain in whole or in part from the full, faithful and proper performance of their duties of employment; or
3. Picketing in any manner or by any means at or in the immediate vicinity of any school building wherein classes are conducted, operated or maintained by plaintiff; or
4. In any manner impeding, obstructing, hampering or interfering with the efficient and orderly operation of the public school system operated by plaintiff; or
5. Preventing, or attempting to prevent, in any illegal manner whatsoever any employee or employees, pupil or pupils, or other person or persons having lawful business in any school building administration building, warehouse,
supply depot or any other building, facility or site owned, operated, maintained or being constructed or repаired by plaintiff from entering or leaving the same; or 6. In any manner conspiring, combining, agreeing and arranging with each other or with any other person or persons, organizations or associations to interfere with, impede or hinder the orderly operation of the public school system operated by plaintiff by any conduct whatsoevеr which interferes with, hinders, annoys or otherwise prevents any employee or employees, pupil or pupils, or other person or persons having lawful business in any school building wherein classes are conducted by plaintiff from entering or leaving the same; or
7. In any manner performing any of the acts aforesaid so as to induce others to fail to provide or to assist in providing goods, services, equipment, facilities and supplies to any school building, administration building, warehouse, supply depot or other building, facility or site owned, operated, maintained or being constructed or repaired by plaintiff; or
8. Loitering, or being unnecessarily in the vicinity, of any school building wherein clаsses are conducted by plaintiff; or
9. Advising, encouraging or assisting in the doing of any of the things which are hereinforbidden.
10. All employees shall return to duty under the terms and conditions of employment in the last bilaterally, voluntarily assented-to contract between the parties dated December 1, 1972, to November 30, 1975, and in addition thereto, all mutually agreed upon changes to said contract should be headed by the parties; and
11. The parties are ordered to proceed with negotiations in accordance with the schedule set forth in the Order of Court of December 23, 1975.
Since it appears to the Court that plaintiff is a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, no bond need be filed and approved.
This Court retains jurisdiction of this matter to insure compliance by the parties with the terms herein contained.”
Although certain parts of the trial court‘s decree arguably did not involve freedom of expression, it is clear that the decree prohibits certain communications by and between appellants and prohibits certain picketing. Freedom of expression was therefore restrained by the preliminary injunction. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1940); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); National Treasury Employees Union v. Fasser, 428 F.Supp. 295 (D.C.1976); Altemose Construction Company v. Building Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia, 449 Pa. 194, 296 A.2d 504 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 1901, 35 L.Ed.2d 392 (1973). Since at least part of the decree was a preliminary injunction involving freedom of expression,
Appellee, however, argues that
In the alternative, appellee contends that the injunction issued by the trial court was a final injunction and therefore no final hearing was required under
Preliminary injunctions are not prohibited under the Public Employes’ Relations Act. The complaint filed in this case by the School District requested a preliminary injunction. The decree entered by the trial court was specifically desig-
Since a final hearing was required, upon demand, by
Appellants have also appealed from the Commonwealth Court‘s order dismissing, as moot, appellants’ appeal from the trial court‘s оrder granting a preliminary injunction. Appellants contend that the Commonwealth Court‘s order was in error because even though the parties had settled their differences and entered into a new collective bargaining agreement, the appeal from the grant of the preliminary injunction should not have been considered moot so long as fines for violation of the preliminary injunction remained outstanding. In view of our reversal of the orders of the trial court and the Commonwealth Court as to the fines, appellants’ appeal to this Court challenging the order of the Commonwealth Court is moot.
In the appeal concerning the preliminary injunction, the appeal is dismissed as moot.
LARSEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
LARSEN, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent and in support thereof adopt the majority opinion of the Honorable Genevieve Blatt, which was filed in the Commonwealth Court in this matter.
