80 Neb. 667 | Neb. | 1908
On February 3, 1906, appellee filed in the district court for Brown county the following- petition: “Your petitioner, School District No. 25, complaining of the defendants above named, says: (1) That it is a duly constituted subdivision of the county of Brown, a body politic, corporate, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Nebraska, and has been so organized at all times mentioned in this petition, and C. Langley is its duly elected, qualified and acting treasurer. (2) That the above named T. W. De Long is the duly elected, qualified and acting treasurer of said Brown county, and Edward Moore, Luke M. Bates and Frank Lessif are the duly elected, qualified and acting board of county commissioners of said county. (3) That E. A. Ikenburg, C. E. Ikenburg and W. C. McNamara are each resident freeholders and own personal and other property in said school district subject to taxation in said district. That in the year 1905 the assessor of Smith precinct, of which precinct said School District No. 25 constitutes a part, duly assessed all property for taxation within said school district, and with other property that of the said E. A. Ikenburg, C. E. Ikenburg and W. C. McNamara, but for some unaccountable reason unknown to your petitioner designated the number of said- district as that of 33, and a school tax was duly levied on all of said property, and the said E. A. Ikenburg, C. E. ikenburg and W. 0. McNamara each paid their said school tax under protest, and the said board of county commissioners at a meeting of their body held in Ainsworth on the 29th day of January, 1906, did issue an order, duly signed by their chairman, the said Edward Moore, directed to the treasurer of said Brown county requiring him, the said treasurer of said Brown county, to refund to the said E. A. Ikenburg the school tax so assessed, levied and paid, to wit, the sum -of $2.83, and to refund to the said E. ikenburg the said school tax so levied and paid by him, to wit, the sum of $3.75, and
was filed what is termed an “Order of Injunction.” This paper runs to the defendants, and assumes to enjoin them in the manner prayed in the petition. It is not entitled in any cause or court, nor does it purport to be an order granted by any judge. It is signed “H. S. Jarvis, Clerk District Court.” As counsel for defendants treated this paper as a valid order of injunction by assailing it by motion and demurrer ■ on grounds other than those indicated, we will assume that the clerk omitted both the Alpha and Omega of the paper in copying it in the transcript, and treat it as a temporary injunction issued by the county judge.
a to vacate the order of injunction on three grounds: (1) That the court had no jurisdiction; (2) that several causes of action Avere improperly joined, and different reliefs improperly asked; (3) that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. He also demurred to the petition on four grounds: (1) That plaintiff had not legal capacity to sue; (2) that the court Avas Avithout jurisdiction; (3) that several causes of action Avere improperly joined, and different reliefs improperly asked; (4) that
We dislike the idea of causing appellee any further costs in obtaining the taxes to which we have no doubt it is entitled, but we are compelled to hold that the district court erred in overruling both appellant’s motion and demurrer. Appellants argue in their brief that the Ikenburgs and McNamara paid their taxes and demanded a return of the same under the first provision of section 10561, Ann. St. 1903, while appellee contends that they proceeded under the second provision of that section, and in their brief set out the notices that were served by them. The trouble with all this is that the petition does not contain any allegations which disclose any such state of facts. The petition does not allege any facts which show that the board acted without jurisdiction so as to render their proceedings void, nor does it allege that there is no such school district in Smith precinct as District No. 33. If the protesting taxpayers were proceeding under the first provision of section 10561, then, if the board acted wrongfully, appellee had a right of appeal, and could not maintain this suit. If, on the other hand, they were proceeding under the Second provision of that section, no right of appeal existed, and the remedy by injunction could be resorted to. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nemaha County, 50 Neb. 393; Custer County v.
Plaintiff asks to have De Long enjoined from doing an act which he has already been commanded to do, namely, the repaying to the Ikenburgs and McNamara of the moneys they had paid under protest, and asks to have the other defendants enjoined from making orders in favor of other taxpayers. There is no allegation of conspiracy or confederation betwen De Long and the other defendants, nor is there any allegation that any other taxpayer in District No. 25 has paid his taxes under protest, and that the defendants, members of the board, are threatening or intend to order such taxes refunded. Even if the petiiion contained these allegations, the further fact that plaintiff in its prayer asks a separate, distinct and different relief against De Long from that asked against the other defendants brings the case within the rule laid down in section 88 of the code, and announced by this court, in Barry v. Wachosky, 57 Neb. 534. We think that the lines have been drawn too loosely in the district courts of this state1 in the use of the writ of injunction. Instead of being an extraordinary legal remedy, to be invoked only when there is no adequate' remedy at law, it has degenerated into a common, every-day writ, resorted to too frequently for the purpose of trying to circumvent some plain and adequate remedy .at law. It is time to call a halt, and to deny the writ in all cases where the right to it is not made perfectly clear in the petition of the applicant therefor. It is a fair inference that a pleader can and will allege in his petition all that he can prove on the trial, and, if the petition fails to state facts sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover in any action, the ca.se should not proceed further. We are not unmindful of the rule that under our code pleadings should be construed liberally; but that rule should be applied to ordinary cases only, and not to applications for any extraordinary writ. In all such cases the petition should receive a strict construction. Applying that rule
Ordinarily, in reversing a judgment on these grounds, this court will order a dismissal of the action; but, under the circumstances of this case, we think that the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the cause remanded, Avith leave to appellee to file an amended petition, and we so recommend.
By the Court: For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded, Avith leave to appellee to file an amended petition.
Reversed.