16 Kan. 406 | Kan. | 1876
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This was an action on a school-district order. The defense was payment. The facts are these: On March 11th 1874, a school-district order was drawn by the director and clerk of said school district upon its treasurer, and pay
Washington, Washington County, Kas.,
February 18th, 1874.
Treasurer of District No. 10: Please pay to the order of Cullemore & Brothers twenty dollars, and this shall be your recéipt to me for the same as teacher of school in said district.
C. W. Walker.
The other orders were similar. On the 16th of March, Walker, then the holder and owner of the school-district order, presented the same to the treasurer, who tendered him the three orders so accepted and paid as aforesaid, and seven cents in currency, the same making the full amount of the school-district order, but Walker refused to receive this payment, and thereafter indorsed the order to plaintiff Collins, who received the same with full knowledge of all the facts.
Was the district liable? Of course, Collins has no higher rights than Walker; and any defense good against the latter is good against the former. And we think the facts make out a defense as against either. Of course, the district cannot avail itself of any private transactions between the treasurer and the teacher, or offset a debt due from the latter to the former against its own indebtedness. But on the other hand, if Walker has received .out of the funds of the district payment of its indebtedness to him, no matter how irregularly it has been received, he is estopped from denying it to be payment. Supposing he had stolen so much money from the funds of the district in the hands of its treasurer: could not the district set off the amount thus stolen against his claim ? So, if in any way without crime he has received out of the same funds any moneys, such receipt is to that extent payment of its debt. In the case before us, after the indebtedness had
It is scarcely necessary to say that after a question has been once fairly presented and decided on a demurrer, it is unnecessary, if it were proper, to raise it again by the offer of testimony.
The judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the second defense, and for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.