4 Colo. App. 493 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1894
delivered the opinion of the court.
Mary Ross sued School District No. 1, of San Juan county, to recover three hundred dollars as damages for the breach of a contract with the school district, whereby she was employed as a teacher for the school year between September, 1891, and the following June. In her complaint she set up the .contract, stated a breach committed by a wrongful discharge by the board three months prior to the expiration of her school year, a readiness on her part to perform, and prayed a judgment of three hundred dollars, which would be the equivalent of the three months’ stipulated salary. The district set up several matters in defense. It denied the complaint; it set up that the teacher had no certificate, and alleged a payment of her wages during the time she taught from September to April, without knowledge of the want of a certificate and by mistake. These matters were set up in various ways, but this is a substantial statement of the defense as presented in its different forms. The same matters were likewise pleaded by way of counterclaim to recover the money which had been paid the teacher during the time she taught. The case was tried to a jury who found for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages at three hundred dollars. On motion for a new trial the plaintiff was required to remit eighty-five dollars and interest, and thereupon judgment was entered for the balance. The defenses compel a statement of what the record contains relating to the qualification of the teacher. The statute (General Statutes of 1883, §§ 3011-3055) contains sundry provisions concerning the evidence of qualification which a teacher must possess to be entitled to teach, and provides sundry penalties when the duty is performed without it. At the time of the various matters stated, Mary Ross held a first grade certificate issued by the county superintendent of La Plata county on the 30th of November, 1889. According to the statute, this was good for a period of two years, and its possession entitled the holder to apply to the superintendent of another county for a certificate of like grade,
The sufficiency of the complaint has been made the subject-matter of a good deal of argument. It was vulnerable to a demurrer since it contained no averment of the resulting damages. It is undoubtedly true under the authorities, that where the action is brought to redress a wrong committed by the breach of a contract, and the plaintiff- only seeks to recover the general damages which have resulted, he states a good cause of action when he sets up the contract, states the facts which constitute the breach, and alleges generally that he has been damaged in a specific sum. City of Pueblo v. Griffin, 10 Colo. 366; The Saxonia M. & R. Co. v. Cook, 7 Colo. 569.
If the pleader had added a simple clause “ to her damage in so much money,” the complaint would have been good under these decisions, and the only question here is whether this omission renders the complaint so fatally defective that it may be attacked on appeal as not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Whatever might be the rule under some circumstances, and in a case where the appellant had sought to take advantage of it below, it is not available on the present hearing. The complaint was never attacked nor was any objection offered to the introduction of testimony
The whole matter was litigated on the theory that if the plaintiff had a right to recover at all, she could recover her wages for the balance of her period of hiring. The defendants made no attempt to defeat the recovery or reduce the damages bjr proof, either of her obtainment of other employment or any neglect on her part in that direction. The damage was shown without objection; it was essential to the verdict, and by reasonably fair intendment the amount of the damage may be held to be included within the four corners of the complaint.
The remaining matters concerning the certificates present very little difficulty. The statute undoubtedly provides that
We are not compelled, however, to go to the extent which these cases would seem to warrant. As we view it during the entire period for which the wages were paid, as well as for which wages are claimed, the teacher was possessed of this statutory evidence of her qualification. The temporary certificate may be dismissed from our consideration. If some evidence of the right to teach furnished by the superintendent of the county in which the contract was made was at all essential, this temporary evidence was all that was required; but at the time of the agreement, as well as at the time the school commenced, the teacher had a first grade certificate, which was in full force in La Plata county, and we are of the opinion that the action of the superintendent of San Juan concerning it would in any event be operative to relieve the teacher from the statutory disqualification. Brown was advised of the existence of this certificate, instructed the teacher that an examination was totally unnecessary, and that he would indorse and continue the certificate within his juris
The case was fairly tried. The plaintiff was entitled to her verdict, and the record discloses no' errors which would warrant us to disturb it. The judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.