196 Wis. 211 | Wis. | 1928
The following opinion was filed April 3, 1928:
The learned trial court, in addition to the findings of fact above set forth, filed a very able and comprehensive opinion, which is printed in the margin.
The situation was unusual. Hayward was still in the pioneer stage, largely built from the lumber industry. The municipal officers, no doubt, were not so familiar with their duties as similar officers in older settled communities. Hayward had a national bank, and its officers, Henry E. Rohlf, president, and Ernest E. Rohlf, cashier, took a prominent part in its municipal affairs. Ernest Rohlf wras a director of the plaintiff school district during the period in review here, up to the date of his death, October 28, 1923. He was clerk of the high school district. He was agent for most of the
Larson, the treasurer of the common school district, trusted the bank and its officials to the extent that he permitted them to collect, keep, and pay out the funds of the district without check or control. Larson treated them as his agents to perform his official duties. He had been treasurer for the district one term prior to 1922, and had handled
The bank and its officers proved faithless to their trust; they embezzled the trust funds, forged securities, and falsified the records. It failed in March, 1924. Henry E. Rohlf, its president, became a convict as a result of crime in connection with the bank. Ernest E. Rohlf came to his death in an automobile accident October 28, 1923.
Growing out of these relations, this action was involved in several complex situations. But so far as the facts are concerned, a careful study of the evidence convinces this court that the learned trial judge arrived at correct conclu
We shall not rehearse the evidence here. It is voluminous. It has been exhaustively treated in the opinion of the trial judge, appended. Suffice to say that it amply justifies, in our opinion, the findings of fact made by the trial court.
Most of appellants’ assignments of error are disposed of by our confirmation of the findings of fact. The appellants
“The treasurer shall apply for and receive from the town treasurer all money apportioned to or collected for the district and pay money on the order of the clerk countersigned by the director, and not otherwise. He shall turn over to the county treasurer for the benefit of the school fund all forfeitures accruing under subsection (2) of section 39.IS. He shall keep a book in which he shall enter all the money re*220 ceived and disbursed by him, specifying particularly the sources from which the same has been received, the persons to whom and the object for which the same has been paid, and shall afford the clerk access thereto when desired to enable him to make his annual report. He -shall present to the annual meeting a report in writing containing a statement of all moneys received by him during the preceding year and of each item of disbursement made by him and exhibit the voucher therefor.”
The oath of office of the treasurer is provided for in sub. (1), sec. 19.01, Stats. 1923. The form of bond the treasurer is required to give is provided for in sub. (2),
“The official duties referred to in subsections (1) and (2) include performance to the best of his ability by the officer taking the oath or giving the bond of every official act required, and the nonperformance of every act forbidden, by law to be performed by him; also, similar performance and nonperformance of every act required of or forbidden to him in any other office which he may lawfully hold or exercise by virtue of his incumbency of the office named in his official oath or bond. Except as provided otherwise by sub*222 section (3) of section 59.22 the duties mentioned in any such oath or bond include, further, the faithful performance by all persons appointed or employed by such officer either in his principal or his said subsidiary office, of their respective duties and trusts therein.”
Sub. (5), sec. 19.01, provides:
“Every public officer required to file an official oath or an official bond shall file the same before entering upon the duties of his office; and when both are required, both shall be filed at the same time.”
Sub. (6), sec. 19.01, provides:
“Every such bond continues in force and is applicable to official conduct during the incumbency of the officer filing*223 the same and until his successor is duly qualified and installed.”
In addition to the specific statutory duties of the treasurer, it is the common-law and universal understanding that municipal treasurers are custodians of the treasures or funds of their municipalities. Larson was not only custodian for the district of funds raised by taxes, but he was the custodian of insurance or other funds belonging to the district. If a district should have its property’ insured, in case of loss it clearly would be the duty of the school board to collect the insurance, and the duty of the treasurer to accept and safely keep such funds. And certainly, when the treasurer accepts
The defendant surety company was a paid surety, pre
We may start with the premise that Larson, as treasurer, was required to perform his official obligations, and that his surety was bound equally with him to see that Larson actually conformed to such official duties.
The appellants strenuously contend that the insurance fund was lost before the bond was delivered, and that the bond was not retroactive to cover the whole term. In considering this we must construe the statutes heretofore quoted, with reference to the treasurer’s bond and oath, fixing the duties, of the treasurer and form of the bond.
To begin with, the bond recites that Larson “has been elected for a term of three years commencing on the third day of July, 1922,” and then Larson and his surety undertook that Larson “will faithfully discharge the duties of his said office according to law, and will pay to the parties en
We think the bond, by express language, fairly contemplates that it covers the full term of the treasurer, of three years commencing July 3, 1922. Further, the trial court found that the amount covered by the judgment remained on deposit in the bank until the bank failed, March 7, 1924.
This court, since the decision of the instant case in the circuit court, has tried to make plain the duties and responsibilities of custodians of public funds. Forest County v. Poppy, 193 Wis. 274, 213 N. W. 676. What was there said need not be here repeated: It should be unnecessary to again point out the absolute duties devolved upon such custodians of public funds, and that failure to safely perform such duties is not excused even by a showing of due diligence on the part of the treasurer. Legally, it makes no difference as to the liability of the treasurer and his bondsmen whether the
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
A motion for a rehearing was denied, with $25 costs, on June 18, 1928.
“The plaintiff sued the defendants on the official bond of the defendant Larson, as treasurer of the school district, to recover the sum of $18,899.80, with interest from July 7, 1924. The defendant Larson was elected treasurer of the school district at the annual meeting held in July, 1922, for a term of three years. On November 7, 1923, he executed and delivered his official bond as alleged in the complaint, in the penal sum of $25,000, which bond was executed by the defendant Maryland Casualty Company as surety. Most of the money of the district was deposited in the First Na
“Two defenses are urged and relied upon by both defendants and a third defense by the Casualty Company. These defenses are, in substance, as follows:
“1. That the money lost by the failure of the bank was not the money of the plaintiff.
“2. That the money so lost never came into the possession of the treasurer; and
“3. That said loss occurred before the time of the execution and delivery of the bond.
“The facts bearing on the first and second defenses are so con- ■ nected that they will be considered together. They relate to certain money received by the bank during the school year beginning July 3, 1923, as insurance on the school building that burned June 21, 1923. The questions involved in the third defense are questions of law which will be considered later, The facts are
“Title and occupation of school property.
“The land on which the school building stood was purchased by School Subdistrict No. 1, town of Hayward, by a deed from the North Wisconsin Lumber Company on September 1, 1884. The school was then under the township system of government. A school building was erected upon this land by the subdistrict. The county board of education on and prior to July 20, 1915, pursuant to chapter 751, Laws of 1913, organized the plaintiff district, which succeeded to the rights of the subdistrict, and thereby acquired title to the property. The territory included, in this district is coextensive with the city of Hayward. A high school was also maintained on the property. The Hayward town free high school district was reorganized by chapter 42 of the Laws of 1917. Its territory includes’the city of. Hayward and other adjacent property. For convenience this district will be called the ‘High School District,’ and the plaintiff will be called the ‘Common School District,’ which are the names by which they were designated in the testimony. Several years ago, the exact time not being shown by the testimony, the high school district or its predecessor built an addition to the school building on the plaintiff’s land. From that time until the time of the fire the schoolhouse was occupied and used jointly by both school districts. Adjustments of expenses of maintenance were made from time to time between the districts, including expenses for fuel, light, janitor service and insurance.
“The officers of the school districts and of the First National Bank.
“In the year 1923 and prior thereto, the officers of the common school district were J. C. Davis, clerk; Ernest E. Rohlf, director, and G. A. Larson, treasurer. During the same time the officers of
“Prior to the failure of the bank the Rohlfs had the general confidence of the community. They were the local agents of most of the insurance companies which wrote the insurance on the school building. Ernest E. Rohlf was the city treasurer. The First National Bank, under the management of the Rohlfs, received, handled, and disbursed the money of the school district. Prior to the failure of the bank Dr. Larson never personally received or personally disbursed any money of the district except that he received one item of $92 from the sale of junk, which money he deposited in the bank. During that time he left the receipt and disbursement of school money to the bank and its officers. School orders were not even presented to the treasurer for payment. He kept no books of account as school treasurer during that time. The Rohlfs handled the money of the high school district in much the same manner. They also received and handled money of other municipalities. .
“On October 28, 1923, Ernest E. Rohlf was killed in an automobile accident. 'J. S. McGeorge was appointed his successor as director of the common school district, and Henry E. Rohlf was appointed his successor as city treasurer. Later,'Ella Phalen was elected clerk of the high school district. After the bank failed it was discovered that the Rohlfs were not worthy of the public confidence they had received. The books of the bank had been kept in balance, probably for the purpose of escaping detection by bank examiners. Considerable juggling and manipulation of accounts were afterwards discovered, as well as entries on the bank books as part of'its assets of forged and fictitious notes. Most of the entries on
“The insurance and the proceedings to transfer the interest of the high school district in the school building and insurance to the common school district.
“On June 26, 1922, at an annual meeting of the electors of the high school district, a motion was adopted relating to the sale of its interest in the school building to the common school district. No record of the motion was found or produced. F. R. Nash, the city superintendent of schools, testified that the motion was to the effect that the common school district was requested to' determine at its next meeting what price it would pay for the high school interest
“Proceedings were thereafter taken by the high school district to erect a new school building on other lands and to pay for it by issuing bonds and using the $20,000 to be received from the common school district. On July 22, 1922, a special election was held by the electors of the high school district for this purpose, at which election 751 votes were cast. The election resulted in a majority of 215 votes cast in favor of the proposition. Bonds were thereupon issued and sold. A new site was procured and a new high
“Each school district owned a portion of the contents of the old building, on which contents insurance had been collected amounting to $9,333.45. Op September 8, 1923, this matter was adjusted by the common school district paying the high school district $6,222.30. A school order was drawn for this amount and paid through the bank to the high school district.
“After the annual meeting of the common school district on July 2,1923, the school board proceeded to use the insurance money to erect a new school building on the site of the old building, as directed by the electors. They had no other funds with which to pay
“After the insurance money had been collected neither the high school district, its school board, its treasurer, nor any one else in its behalf ever claimed that the high school district then owned or was entitled to any of the insurance money except the portion that it received from the common school district. The defendants are now making such claim in their own behalf.
“The insurance should have been taken out in the names of both school districts. The school boards and the insurance agents had knowledge of the facts. It is not now necessary to determine if the contracts of insurance could have been reformed on the ground of mutual mistake, whether the insurance companies were estopped from questioning the validity of the policies on account of the title of the insured, whether they had any valid defense to the insurance claims, or whether the contract of sale of the high school interest in the building could have been enforced prior to the fire. After the fire the insurance claims were treated as representing the’building. What was done amounted to an assignment of the insurance claims. The common school district paid $29,222.30 for these claims, of which amount $20,000 was paid before the insurance was collected. If Dr. Larson and the persons he permitted to handle the money of the district had performed their duties, the district would have made a profit on the transaction, although the district ran the risk of losing the $20,000 when it paid it. 'The districts, by the vote of their electors and officers, severed their joint rela
“ ‘Special municipal funds, which are dedicated by express statutory provision or by the act of a municipal council or board, duly authorized, to a special object, may not be diverted directly or indirectly to any other purposes.’ 28 Cyc. 1563.
“This money was in legal effect money received by the school treasurer by virtue of his office and was in his possession. The possession of the persons with whom he had intrusted it was his possession.
“It is argued by defendants’ counsel that neither the bank nor Ernest E. Rohlf were agents of Dr. Larson as treasurer and that he could not legally appoint them as such agents to take charge of this money. The fact is that they acted as his agents with his consent in the care of this money and of all other school funds. They were either his lawful agents or his unlawful agents. In either event, the treasurer, by the terms of the statute, was liable on his
“It is also argued that if Ernest E. Rohlf was the agent for treasurer Larson, he was also agent for treasurer Peterson, the treasurer of the high school district, and that it was his duty to keep the money for treasurer Peterson. If the high school district or its treasurer was now claiming this money or ever had claimed it, or if Rohlf or the bank was holding it for them or had ever expended it as agent for them, then the proposition would be more important.
“The situation is analogous to the case of a tenant who attorns to a new owner by consent of his landlord. Sec. 234.02, Wisconsin Statutes.
“Before such attornment he is estopped from denying the title of his landlord. Winterfield v. Stauss, 24 Wis. 394, 404.
“By such attornment the new owner becomes his landlord and he is likewise estopped from questioning his title. 35 Corp. Jur. 965, 967.
“The situation is also analogous to the case of a bailee who is defending his possession by asserting title in a third person. In order to maintain such defense he must defend by authority of such third person. 6 Corp. Jur. 1110.
“Persons dealing with municipal corporations are usually es-topped from questioning the authority of such corporations in reference to contracts and transactions to which such persons become parties. 21 Corp. Jur. 1215.
“After the electors and school board had appropriated this money for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse and made contracts and expenditures in pursuance thereof, all of which was done by and with the active participation and consent of the school treasurer and of the bank where the money was deposited, and without objection from any one else concerned, then the treasurer became es-topped from denying that this money was the money of the district and in his custody as its treasurer. School District v. Edwards, 46 Wis. 150, 49 N. W. 968.
“A bond given by a surety to secure the faithful performance of the duties of his principal becomes effective at the time of its delivery. There are numerous authorities to the effect that unless it is retroactive by its terms or made so by statute, it does not cover prior defalcations. Note 23 L. R. A. n. s. 131.
“In other cases the rule is stated that a bond given to secure the faithful performance of the duties of a public officer who has been elected or appointed for a definite term is construed as covering defalcations occurring during the term for which the bond was given. Vivian v. Otis, 24 Wis. 518, 520; Board of Supervisors v. Pabst, 70 Wis. 352, 367, 35 N. W. 337.
“Several other authorities to the same effect are cited in the brief of plaintiff’s counsel. '
“This bond was given under sec. 19.01 of the Statutes. The last sentence of sub. (2) implies that the bond is for the ‘official term.’ Sub. (6) of that section provides, ‘Every such bond continues in force and is applicable to official conduct during the incumbency of the officer filing the same and until his successor is duly qualified and installed.’ The words ‘is applicable to official conduct during the incumbency of the officer’ undoubtedly refers to official conduct during the term of the officer. The statute provides that the bond shall be given before the officer enters on the duties of his office. Sec. 19.01 (5), Wisconsin Statutes.
“It cannot be presumed that it was the intention of the statute, nor the intention of the^ parties giving the bond, that a bond given and accepted in statutory form was intended to cover only a portion of the obligations that the statute required, or that the parties giving the bond could take advantage of their own delay, which delay the district had waived by accepting the bond after such delay. The careful wording of the statute indicates that the legislature did not intend that loopholes of this kind were left open for the loss of public money.
“Besides, in this case a breach in the conditions of the bond occurred after the date of its delivery. Every day between November 7, 1923, the time the bond was given, and March 7, 1924, the time the bank closed, there was a continuing breach. If, when" the bond was given, the school treasurer had promptly proceeded to withdraw the money from the bank and care for it as the law required, the loss probably would not have occurred. The burden of proof is upon the defendants to show that the loss occurred before, the time covered by the bond. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the contention that the loss occurred before the time when the bond was given. I am therefore of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as demanded in its complaint, less the amount of the dividend collected,”