194 Mo. App. 559 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1916
On November 9, 1912, plaintiff filed his petition for divorce from the bonds of matrimony existing between himself and the defendant. The petition was sworn to by plaintiff November 4, of that year. After setting out that the parties were married July 25, 1906, and lived together thereafter as husband and wife, two children a boy, "Walter E., then five years old, and a girl, Bernice, then sixteen months old, being born of the marriage, and setting out that during the time they lived together plaintiff had demeaned himself properly and had faithfully discharged all his duties as a husband, and setting out the necessary averment as to residence in this State, plaintiff alleges as his cause of divorce that defend; ant was guilty of such indignities as to render his condition intolerable. The acts charged as indignities are lack of neatness and proper attention to her house and children; untidiness about the house; neglect of proper care of the children; failure to keep her kitchen and cooking utensils in a cleanly condition and allowing them to become filthy; spending her time in gossiping with the neighbors and visiting her relatives; refusing to do the laun
To this defendant filed an answer, admitting the marriage, the birth of the children and that she has the care and custody of them but denies all the other allegations in the petition.
By way of cross-bill defendant states that they were married July 25, 1906, and continued to live together as husband and wife from and after that date until November 7,1912. Averring that during that time she had faithfully demeaned herself and discharged her duties as the wife of plaintiff, at all times treating him with kindness, she avers that plaintiff had offered her such indignities
An answer was filed to this cross-bill, denying that plaintiff’s mother had any hatred of defendant; that it was defendant’s desire that she and plaintiff live in the same house in which his mother lived, a double flat, they occupying the upstairs, plaintiff’s mother the downstairs. Averring that plaintiff personally had to buy defendant’s and the children’s clothing because she wa¡# extravagant and bought more than was necessary,' and more costly articles than were necessary, or than he could afford out of his salary, he avers that she would not use the money to buy wearing apparel but for other purposes, for which reason plaintiff asked his mother to buy such articles, he being a city fireman on duty five consecutive days and having only one day out of six in which to attend to his own affairs and hence did not have time to make these purchases; that he was allowed one and a half hours to go home twice a day for meals, which made it necessary that his meals be ready on time, he living five miles, from the engine house in which he was employed and it taking fifty minutes or an hour to go to meals and back on the street car. Plaintiff finally repeats the charge that defendant was slovenly.
■ The cause being heard before the court, plaintiff was granted a decree of divorce from defendant, the defendant’s crossbill was dismissed, she was awarded the general care and custody and control of the children, plaintiff to have the special custody of them on certain days not named in the decree; and $27.50 a month was awarded defendant for the maintenance and support of these children.
Piling a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, defendant has duly perfected her appeal to our court.
Learned counsel for respondent contend that the appeal should be dismissed, calling the case “a double barrelled case;” that we have here two separate actions, one by plaintiff and one by defendant, and that the affidavit for an appeal not being specific and definite “but the general affidavit, ’ ’ does not bring up the two cases. There
A careful and patient reading of all the evidence in the cause compels us to say that we cannot sustain the action of the learned trial court in this case.
It is argued that the evidence being conflicting, we are bound by the finding of the trial court.
We have held in many cases, as has the Supreme Court and the other Courts of Appeals, that in an action for divorce, as in all actions that partake of the nature of suits in equity, we pay great deference to the conclusion arrived at by the trial court where the evidence is conflicting.- In all such cases, however,- it has been uni-formerly held that it is the duty of the appellate court to review the evidence and determine the case on its own conclusions on that evidence, having in mind, however, the. rule above stated. We have always recognized it as a fact that the trial court 'has a great advantage over the appellate court in determining on the weight of evidence when conflicting. But our court, as well as the Supreme Court and the other appellate courts have not felt bound, even in reviewing the evidence, by the view taken of that by the trial court, if that review results in conclusiqn different from that arrived at by the trial court. See, among many like cases, Parker v. Roberts, 116 Mo. 657, 22 S. W. 914; Cherry v. Cherry, 258 Mo. 391, l. c. 403, 167 S. W. 539; (approving the Torlotting and Barth cases, infra); Torlotting v. Torlotting, 82 Mo. App. 192; Barth v. Barth, 168 Mo. App. 423, 151 S. W. 769; Allfree v. Allfree, 175 Mo. App. 344, 162 S. W. 650; Gedwell v. Gedwell, 184 Mo. App. 496, 170 S. W. 421. Briefly, cases of this kind address themselves to the conscience of the court. This applies equally to the appellate as to the trial court.
We have set out practically verbatim the petition, crossbill and answer to the latter. Taking up the mat
“Q. There was nothing particularly wrong then? A. No, sir.
Q. You had nothing but the kindest feelings towards your wife and children? A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long previous to the 7th of November had you contemplated bringing this divorce suit? A. Why, about a week before.”
He swore to his petition November 4, filing it November 9.
So plaintiff gives two causes for his desertion of his wife. First, finding out that his wife squandered his money and ran him in debt; then, that she failed to keep her house and herself and her children clean.
With this distinct limitation of his ground of complaint, made by plaintiff himself, the testimony he produced should have covered the last two years of their married life. But it does not. Thus, his mother, who lived in the same flat but on the lower floor, and who testified very positively as to the wife’s lack of proper care of the cleanliness of herself and children and house, says she was not in the flat of her son and daughter-in-law more than four .or five times, although they hac| lived there from November, 1906, to the first of May, 1912, and on cross-examination she repeated that in the six years she had been in their flat only four or five times. When she had gone there and seen the condition to which she testified, no where appears. So it is with the majority of the
The weight of the testimony for defendant by disinterested witnesses is decidedly against that of plaintiff as tp the personal habits of defendant both as to herself, her house and her children. In point of fact, in our opinion, it entirely overcomes that of plaintiff on these matters.
It may be stated here that while plaintiff charges defendant with neglect and lack of proper attention to her “children,” there is no testimony even by plaintiff or any of his witnesses, that this was so as to Bernice; all that was given on this relates to Walter, the boy.
When we look into the testimony of plaintiff on the charge that defendant wasted his money and run him in debt, we find it rests entirely upon plaintiff’s own testimony, that testimony denied by defendant and not only uncorroborated by any one but contradicted by all the evidence going to show the mode of life of defendant, her scant supply of even the most necessary clothes for herself and children and for the beds; she wearing dresses that lady witnesses said were of the cheapest kind, having but two or three suits of undergarments for her children; two sheets for the bed; wearing a nightgown herself for lack of the usual undergarment.
Nor is there a particle of testimony to show that she squandered her husband’s money or .ran him in debt. In brief, we hold that plaintiff has entirely failed to establish his case on those points upon which he has himself rested it by his testimony.
When we examine that relating to other charges in the petition, we find it unsupported by any corroborated testimony. Particularly so with the charge that in April,
His complaint about insufficient food and poor cooking, and that he was obliged to go to restaurants to procure proper food, is not only not sustained but disproven by the testimony of every disinterested witness who testified. In short every one of the allegations of these so-called indignities are unsustained by substantial testimony, where not flatly contradicted. Passing the question of these being such indignities as the law recognizes and as the courts will consider, we hold, on a careful reading of the testimony that they are not sustained by the weight of the evidence in the case and that plaintiff was not and is not entitled to a divorce. Our reading of the testimony satisfies us that all there is in plaintiff’s case is, that for some reasoif he became tired of his wife and endeavored on trivial charges to divorce her.
On the other hand, our conclusion, upon reading the testimony, is that the wife, appellant here, is the injured and innocent party. This couple were married in 1906, the defendant then a young girl eigteen years of age. A .son was born to them a year or so after their marriage, and at the time of the trial, which was commenced on February 4-, 1913, this sop was something over five years
We have seen that the charges of plaintiff as to his wife’s habits as a housekeeper and mother and wife are not sustained.
As before noted plaintiff testified that his wife had been a good housekeeper and that they got along happily together until 1910, when he found out that his wife had squandered his money and run him into debt, further testifying that the direct cause of the separation was the failure of his wife to keep her house and herself and “children” clean. The plaintiff leaving his wife on November 7, 1912, carries these two years back to the first part of November,-1910. The little girl, Bernice, being sixteen months old when the petition was filed, November 9, 1912, would place her birth at about July, 1911. So that the alleged carelessness and negligence and untidiness of defendant, according to plaintiff’s testimony, must have occurred during the period of her pregnancy and when she was caring for a young baby. Furnishing her with no hired help, knowing that she had no regular help, according to his own testimony, the plaintiff resented the failure of his wife, during, this trying period, to keep herself and her house and her son, then a little over four years of age, in the condition that plaintiff appears to have demanded, and cook and prepare his meals. According to the testimony of outside witnesses — disinterested witnesses — during this critical trying period for the wife about to become a mother, and directly afterwards, plain:
The testimony on defendant’s part tends to show that the extravagant spender was the plaintiff. It is in evidence and uncontradicted, that plaintiff had frequently gone across the river to Granite City or Venice and engaged in ‘ ‘ shooting craps; ’ ’ that he had gone over there for that purpose when he was off duty; on one day he had gone twice. He was convivial, not intemperate nor a drunkard, hut drinking and spending his money with his friends. On one occasion, when a young girl had been staying with the wife all night, as this girl testifies, plaintiff came home about two o ’clock in the morning and when his wife asked him where he had been, .he said: ‘‘ Oh, I can’t tell it. I was in such a filthy place that I had to hide-my diamond ring.” A significant answer; significant as to his habits and significant as to his manner of personal adornment. It is in evidence that he had given quite valuable presents to a number of his acquaintances while all this time the evidence is overwhelming that his wife had the bare necessities of life for herself and children and was dressed so poorly that several of the witnesses, disinterested parties, said that they would not like to go to church in such a dress as she wore. There is evidence from disinterested witnesses that his conduct at home was surly; that he was cross with his wife and the children; that she met him on many occasions with the children at the street car as he was coming home, and when at home she attempted to caress him he repelled her caresses and never returned them. In short, according to the testimony in the case he was one of those men who was “a good fellow among the boys,” but surly, niggardly, exacting and overbearing at home [Allfree v. Allfree,
Even the manner of instituting this action is, to say the least, peculiar and suspicious. Without the slightest intimation to his wife, so far as the testimony shows, of any intention to seek a separation, on November 4, 1912,' plaintiff went to an attorney and had this petition drawn up and swore to it on that day. On the 5th and 6th he lived with his wife as usual, and on the 7th of November he went home, went up to their flat, called in a sister of his wife, having brought her brother along with him, and calling them into the room, looked at his wife, who had the baby in her arms, and said: “This is going to be a surprise to you. Our home is going to be broken up. You can stay here if you want to. I don’t care what you do.” On the 9th of that month he filed the petition in this ease.
This was the conduct of the plaintiff immediately before or a short time before he left his wife.
In brief, the weight of the testimony is that plaintiff was the offender and defendant the victim of Ms ill-temper and ill-usage.
On this testimony we think the learned trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s cross-bill. On the showing here made on the evidence in this record the defendant is entitled to the divorce and to a suitable allowance for maintenance of herself and children.
The'judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to dis