162 Ga. 565 | Ga. | 1926
This case originated in the city court of Atlanta, where J. T. Pylant filed suit against Schoen Brothers Inc., and alleged, in substance, that the defendant had damaged him in a stated sum, “for that the defendant controlled and operated in the City of Atlanta a licensed abattoir, where it engaged in the business of slaughtering beeves, sheep, and other animals for hire, and in the storage of meats, and the defendant’s abattoir consisted of extensive structures, amply equipped for the handling of the business of slaughtering animals and the treatment and storage of meats for the public in Pulton County, Georgia, and that the defendant furnished offices and headquarters for the wholesale deal
The defendant filed general and special demurrers to the petition. The demurrers were sustained, and the plaintiff’s petition was dismissed. The case was carried to the Court of Appeals, and the decision of that court, rendered on February 26, 1926, is to the effect that the judgment sustaining the general demurrer was erroneous, and that the petition as against the general demurrer set forth a cause of action; the Court of Appeals in- effect holding that the ordinance of the City of Atlanta providing that every licensed slaughter-house shall slaughter for the public without discrimination is valid, and that the City of Atlanta has the charter power to enact such ordinance under the general welfare clause in its charter. The plaintiff in. certiorari excepts to and assigns error upon so much of the decision of the Court of Appeals as holds that the ordinance of the City of Atlanta. which provides that every licensed slaughter-house shall slaughter for the public without discrimination is valid, and that one who operates a licensed slaughter-house for the slaughter of animals, for hire, within the limits of the City of Atlanta, and who arbitrarily and without cause refuses to slaughter for a member of the public, is liable in damages therefor, and that the petition set out a cause of action and
We are of the opinion that the ruling made by the Court of Appeals upon the question now under review was correct and stated sound and established doctrine. The ruling made by that court is not elaborated. Doubtless the judge writing the opinion deemed it unnecessary to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the question involved, because of the large number of adjudicated eases dealing with the same or similar questions. The full decision of the Court of Appeals upon that question, which was rendered by Judge Stephens is as follows: “The general welfare clause in the charter of a municipality authorizes the passage of reasonable ordinances for the protection, comfort, and good government of all the people of the municipality. Crum v. Bray, 121 Ga. 709 (49 S. E. 686, 1 Ann. Cas. 991). Under the authority of the general welfare clause a municipality may, in the interest of the public health, regulate or even perhaps prohibit entirely within its limits the business of slaughtering animals for food. Since a municipality might find it to be. in the interest of the public health to discourage or even prohibit entirely within its limits the private slaughter of animals, it is a reasonable regulation to provide that those slaughtering for the public do so without discrimination. An ordinance of the City of Atlanta which provides that ‘'every licensed slaughter-house shall slaughter for the public without discrimination’ is a reasonable regulation, in the interest óf the comfort and convenience of all the people of the city, and is valid under the general welfare clause in the charter of the city. It follows, therefore, that the owner and proprietor of a licensed slaughter-house operating under the authority of the City of Atlanta, whose business consists in slaughtering animals for their owners for a service charge, can not arbitrarily and without just cause refuse to render such service to any member of the public offering animals for slaughter. This being a suit against the operator of a licensed slaughter-house in the City of Atlanta, by a plaintiff who alleges that he was a butcher and vendor of meat in the community, and that the defendant, arbitrarily and without just cause, refused, to the plaintiff’s damage in the destruction of his business, to slaughter animals offered by the plain
For a learned and authoritative discussion of the principle underlying the decision which we have under review, we turn almost instinctively to the Slaughter-House Cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the year 1872. 16 Wall. 36 (21 L. ed. 394). Those cases grew out of an act of the legislature of the State of Louisiana, entitled “An act to protect the health of the City of New Orleans, to locate the stock landings and slaughter-houses, and to incorporate ‘The Crescent City LiveStock Landing and Slaughter-House Company.’” The first holding in those cases was that “this grant of exclusive right or privilege, guarded by proper limitation of the prices to be charged, and imposing the duty of providing ample conveniences, with permission to all owners of stock to land and of all butchers to slaughter at those places, was a police regulation for the health and comfort of the people (the statute locating them where health and comfort required), within the power of the State legislatures, unaffected by the constitution of the Hnited States previous to the adoption of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of amendment.” And it also said: “It is not necessary to inquire here into the full force of the clause forbidding a State to enforce any law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, for that phrase has been often the subject of judicial construction, and is, under no admissible view of it, applicable to the present case.” In the course of the opinion Mr. Justice Miller said: “It is, however, the slaughter-house privilege, which is mainly relied on to justify the charges of gross injustice to the public, and invasion of private right. It is not and can not be successfully controverted, that it is both the right and the duty of the legislative body — the supreme power of the State or municipality — to prescribe and determine the localities where the business of slaughtering for a great city may be conducted. To do this effectively it is indispensable that all persons who slaughter animals for food shall do it in those places and nowhere else. The statute under consideration defines these localities and forbids slaughtering in any other. It does not, as has been asserted, prevent the butcher from doing his own slaughtering. On the
In the case of State v. Edwards, 86 Me. 102 (29 Atl. 947, 25 L. R. A. 504, 41 Am. St. E. 528), it was said: “Where the defendants operated a public grist-mill erected under the mill act, offering to grind grain for all comers, held, that they have dedicated their mill to public use, and must comply with legislative regulations of its use, so long as they beep their mill public.” This ruling, taken from the syllabus in the case last referred to, indicates the character of the question involved. It appears that the defendants were convicted, first, of refusing to receive grain at their grist-mill there tendered to be ground; second, of taking excessive toll. In discussing the exceptions taken by the defendant to the ruling of the court that they were bound to receive the grist of grain offered, the Supreme Court of Maine said: “It is conceded by all authorities that the public use of property by the individual is within the scope of legislative control. And it matters not whether the use be authorized by express statute or dedicated by the individual proprietor. If it be a public use, it is within the supervision and control of the-legislature. The troublesome question is, whether the use be public. Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648 [8 Am. R. 398], In most branches of business the public has an interest. That interest varies according to the surrounding conditions of the particular business in question. If it be a monopoly, the interest of the public to be fairly and conveniently served is much greater than when the monopoly ends by force of wholesome competition. A distinction must be made between a public use and a use in which the public has an interest. In the former case the public may control, because it is a use within the function of government to establish and maintain. In the latter case it is a private enterprise that serves the public and in which it is interested to the extent of its necessities and convenience. The former is clearly within the control of the legisla
In the case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (24 L. ed. 77), the question to be determined was whether the General Assembly of Illinois could, under the limitations upon the legislative power of the States imposed by the constitution of the Unitéd States, fix by law the maximum of charges for the storage of grain in warehouses at Chicago and other places in the State having not less than one hundred thousand inhabitants, “in which grain is stored in bulk, and in which the grain of different owners is mixed together, or in which grain is stored in such a manner that the identity of different lots or parcels can not be accurately preserved;” and in the discussion of the question the Supreme Court of the United States said: “This brings us to inquire as to the principles upon which this power of regulation rests, in order that we may determine what is within and what without its operative effect. Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the constitution protects, we find that when private property is ‘affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris prvvati only.' This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale more
In the case of Loughbridge v. Harris, 43 Ga. 500, it was distinctly recognized that while the right of eminent domain could not be exercised by a company or individual erecting a mill and a mill-dam, nevertheless a mill had some of the attributes of public use and could be regulated by law for certain defined purposes. The court said, in the opinion: “We do not think a mill, although it has some of the attributes of public use, and is regulated by law for certain defined purposes, can be regarded such public use as the constitution recognizes, to authorize the exercise of this great constitutional power” (the right of eminent domain). Slaughter-houses are subject to sanitary regulation. Civil Code, § 3119 (a-h). In the case of Wartman v. City of Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 303, it was said: “A municipal corporation comprising a town of any considerable magnitude, without a public market subject to the regulation of its own local authorities, would be an anomaly which at present,has no existence among us. The State might undoubtedly withhold from a town or a'city the right to
In view of 'the strong reasons for upholding this ordinance and the decisions of numerous courts upholding similar ordinances, we are of the opinion that the decision of the Court of Appeals in this ease is correct, and must be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.