Schneider v. StateSchneider v. State
John Schneider was on community control as a youthful offender when he committed several new offenses. He filed a motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) challenging the sentence imposed upon him following the revocation of his community control and the sentences imposed for the new offenses. He appeals from the trial court‘s order which denies his motion. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Schneider committed an attempted sexual battery in December 1984. In that case, number 85-426, the trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him as a youthful offender to four years in state prison followed by two years of community control. In April 1990, Schneider violated his community control by committing several new offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years in state prison for the attempted sexual battery.
As for the new offenses, the trial court sentenced Schneider in case number 90-998 as follows: count I, sexual battery, life to run concurrently with case number 85-426; count II, armed burglary, life as a habitual violent felony offender to be served consecutively to count I; count III,
Schneider argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual violent felony offender in case numbers 90-998 and 90-250. He argues that under
Schneider also argues that upon the revocation of his community control in case number 85-426, he should have been sentenced to no more than six years in prison as a youthful offender under
A sentence which patently fails to comply with statutory or constitutional limits is illegal and can be challenged under rule 3.800(a) if the error is discernable from the face of the record. See Kelly v. State, 739 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Whether Schneider received a legal sentence is discernable from the record; therefore, the issue can be raised under rule 3.800(a).
Before 1985 and after 1990, a trial court could impose an adult sanction on a youthful offender who violated community control by committing new substantive offenses. See
Schneider also correctly argues that his guidelines scoresheet was improperly calculated for the attempted sexual battery because it was scored as a first-degree felony, rather than as a second-degree felony. Attempted sexual battery by a person under eighteen years old on a person less than twelve years old is a second-degree felony. See
Schneider also argues that points for victim injury were erroneously included on his scoresheet. However, this issue requires a factual inquiry and is not properly raised on a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Holland v. State, 672 So.2d 566 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
Finally, Schneider argues that, although the trial court granted him jail credit for counts I and III of case number 90-998, the trial court erred in failing to grant him jail credit for counts II and IV. However, a defendant is not entitled to jail time on consecutive sentences. See Daniels v. State, 491 So.2d 543 (Fla.1986). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying relief on this issue.
In sum, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court‘s order and remand for reconsideration of Schneider‘s sentences. In case number 85-426, Schneider must be sentenced as a youthful offender to no more than six years. In case number case 90-998, Schneider must be resentenced under a revised scoresheet for counts I and III. We find no error in the sentences imposed in case number 90-250 and the sentences imposed for counts II and IV in case number 90-998.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
BLUE and FULMER, JJ., Concur.