*1 SCHNEIDER, Petitioner, ESPERANZA TRANSMISSION
COMPANY, Respondent. Supreme of Texas. Court
Dec. 1987. Rehearing Denied March 1988. Fontaine,
Dаn David Grant Kaiser and Kronzer, Jr., W. James Abraham, Watkins, Nichols, Ballard, Friend, Onstad & Hous- ton, petitioner. Brin, Royal H. Strasburger Price, & Dal- las, respondent. OPINION
CAMPBELL, Justice.
This
entrustment of a mo-
tor vehicle case. The trial court rendered
judgement fоr Schneider for actual and ex-
emplary damages.
The court of
reversed the trial court
and ren-
that Schneider take noth-
ing.
ment of the court of Company, an oil pipeline field comрany, provided service pick-up personal truck for business and employee, Havelka. Havelka and Steven Schroeder went to a dance pick-up. Upon leaving dance, statеd he had too much to drink and asked his companion, drive. Schroeder collided into the rear of a vehicle occupied by Schneider.
Schneider sued alleging Es- peranza *2 Co., 233, 236; struction 186S.W.2d at entrusting to Havelka Han gent the truck for Grеen, v. son 339 (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d 381 acts that were and 1960, ref’d). —Texarkana also writ The occurrence. Schneider basis negligence in negligent and the entrustment of alleged that Havelka was the ve entrusting to by Espеranza in the truck was Havel- grossly negligent hicle Havelka proxi- this was also a and Schroeder and that ka’s record of tickets injure the accident. too and mate cause of he would drive fаst that traveling public. of the some member and found However, driving the ve Havelka was not gross negligence negligence and liable for is time the collision. There hicle at the theory entrustment. on the no evidence that was aware verdict, the court jury’s on the trial Based intox any propensity of Havelka to become punitive actual and awarded Schneider poor judgment in al icatеd to exercise or Following damages. rendition lowing to drive the truck. others ment, settled. were the actual trial court’s award appealed the require- there is no Schneider contends damages. The court of at driving be the vehicle ment that Havelka ren- reversed argues the the time of the accident. He noth- judgment that Schneider take more operation of a vehicle includes than ing. held there was no That court vehicle; driving it of the includes the actual of the cause between the entrustment mate done any and all conduct of entrustee from to Havelka and vehiclе permission or at the direction with the Havelka was not accident because any way that in affects the entrustor the vehicle. asserts operation of vehicle. Schneider permits of а vehicle that when own To establish the automobile to use his incompetent or reckless driver (1) an showing of liability, must be a er’s dangerous instrumen- he creates a owner; (2) by the entrustment of a vehicle mоtion the tality his action sets in unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless to an Accordingly, of events that follow. chain driver; (3) knew should the owner or that by proving Havelka was unlicensed, (4) submits the Schneider hаve known to be turning the vehicle over negligent on the occasion driver proved negli that Havelka was (5) question and the driver’s truck and in the of the gence proximately caused accident. Industries, Inc., proximately caused the accident. 699 Williams v. Steve’s 570, (Tex.1985); 571, Mundy Pi v. S.W.2d joint several venture Schneider cites 587, Co., 206 rie-Slaughter Motor S.W.2d persons proposition that two cases for the im damages can be 591 Punitive operation of motor vehicle involved or knows posed if the owner the vehicle their considered drivers because are both entrusted driv have known that the should See, imputable to other. negligence is each habitually incompetent er was 171, 468 174-5 Flanagan, S.W.2d Fuller v. grossly negligent the owner was 1971, writ ref’d (Tex.Civ.App. Worth — Fort entrusting vehicle to that Fulkerson, n.r.e.); v. Nelson Inc.; Industries, v. Steve’s Williams (1956); Paso Electric 129 El 286 S.W.2d Riggs v. Marvin Montgomery & Co. Ward (Tex.Comm’n. 60 187 Leeper, v. Co. Co., (Tex.Civ.App. 584 — Austin inapposite be- are App.1933). These cases n.r.e.). 1978, writ ref’d liability joint cause unlike ventures, liability under an proxi to be a For entrustment prior rela- not out of the arise does defendant entrustor mate parties, but from the act tionship reasonably able to antic be shown be Nor motor vehicle. natu ipate injury result as а an imput- upon rest consequence of the en- does entrustment probable ral and combined upon negligence; rests Pagel, Tex. ed v. 134 trustment. Sturtevant entrusting the negligence of the owner Russell Con 130 S.W.2d premised the com- gent is on incompetent or reckless driver to an parties, the own- negligence of two bined negligence of the driver. the vehicle negligent entrustment of er’s also relies on Sturtеvant Schneider negligent actions caus- Pagel, 130 S.W.2d To hold otherwise would be injury. an Sturtevant, defec- of a car with the owner over substance. theo- to elevate form to drive the car. allowed his son brakes action for ry of a cause of drive, The son allowed a *3 theory of direct or immedi- trustment Liability against had an accident. by liability of the entrustor undisturbed ate upheld the father was on a intervening subsequent tortfeasors. theory. trustment Stutervant’s negligence does not excuse negligence in en- predicated on his was of causation set in motion break the chain trusting defective brakes to a vehicle with original negligent en- by entrustor’s injuries plain- of his son which caused the Hence, entrustor, trustment. this case is tiff. reliance on Schneider’s vicariously does not become misplaced. negligence, but liable for the entrustee’s Foreseeability neces- and causation are negli- directly liable for his own remains proximate sary elements of cause. Therefore, why I gence. seе no reason of the accident was Havelka’s failure cause Havelka, entrustment, subsequent by allowing to use sound discretion some- entrustee, Schroeder, the second that caused the onе else to drive. The risk by chain set in motion Es- break a causal negligent did not cause entrustment to be principle settled peranza. It is a well the collision. fore- intervening law that if an cause was judgment of the court of wrongdoer, by the initial then the seeable wrongdoer’s negligence may be con- initial proximate injury, cause of the sidered a ROBERTSON, J., dissents with notwithstanding intervening cause. opinion joined by 333, 14 Wingаte, Bonner v. 78 Tex. MAUZY, JJ. Big Texas & P.R. Co. v. S.W. 790 ROBERTSON, Justice, dissenting. ham, (1896); City 90 Tex. 38 S.W. Schmedes, Austin v. disposition analysis From the of this case, respectfully entrustment I dissent. clearly The evidence at trial showed that possibility that Esperanza had foreseen the court, points of error are this Two before might get and entrust drunk first, whether Transmission Therefore, company vehicle to another. Company’s company of a Esperanza’s original negligent entrustment proximate truck to Havelka was a cause of proximate unbroken remains a second, Schneider’s intervening independent cause sufficient whether evidence entrustment, inju- Havelka’s of Schneider’s support ries. punitive damages against Esperanza. Esperanza’s would hold actions in entrust- why I hold The second reason proximate the vehicle to Havelka as a Esperanza’s proximate as a injuries cause of Schneider’s for two rea- injuries would be be- cause of Schneider’s Having Esperanza’s sons. found that ac- special issues. jury cause the found sо proximate inju- tions were a Special No. 5 stated: Issue Schneider, I ries to would then hold there is Company’s Was puni- support evidence to entrustment of the truck damages in this case. a heedlеss and reckless Alfred Havelka rights affected disregard of the of others Regardless neatly of how the elements by it? entrustment are set forth in or “No.” majority Answer "Yes” tionally testified could have Yes. ANSWER: probably that Havelka would use the ted Special Issue No. 6a stated: Combining to drive bars. Was such entrustment a cause two, anticipated drink- question? occurrence in ing, should have been aware “Yes” or “Nо.” Answer maturely that Havelka was unable to make Yes. ANSWER: responsible decisions as to the findings analysis These would remove the entrusted, he the vehicle to which was of the case from representеd a substantial to others. theory. regular negligence to a Un- evidence, To hold that this which was type analysis, der this the issue would jury, no evidence to before the Esperanza’s be whether actions were deny would be to proximate cause Schneider’s right plaintiff to have constitutional Undoubtedly, Esperanza could have fore- issues and the credibili decide the entrusted seen that Havelka would have *4 ty of the before them. TEX. no witnesses See party the vehicle to a third and there is CONST, I, (Vernon 1984). art. such entrustment Havelka § was the cause fact of the reasons, For affirm in all Esperanza testimоny gave There is respects the verdict deciding complete discretion in judgment of the trial court. when, who the truck. how and could drive letting In such Havelka have broad discre- MAUZY,JJ., tion, Esperanza could foresee that Havelka join dissenting opinion. in this might to an intoxicated entrust the vehicle through testified president had vice truck to
ted that Havelka would drive to bars. Esperan- having
Once established that a za’s of the vehicle mate cause of Schneider’s the is- sue of whether there is evidence to parte E. Ex Walter VETTERICK. damages is, my claim for positive. easily answered general, punitive damages can be Supreme Court of Texas. punish tоrtious con- awarded 10, 1988. Feb. wrongdoer. Specifically, duct wrongdoer have with an “entire must acted in knowingly care”
want of which results indifferent the hazards attitude towards result of the entrustment. has created as a Walls, 616 Royalty Burk Co. v. checking policy no em- had ployees’ past en- records before trusting vehicles to them. Before Havelka employed, citations for he had eleven
speeding. employed by Esperanza, While four more cita- Havelka received tions intent which culminated State’s suspend Havelka’s license. suspension. proposed
was aware of the Esperanza, through president, its vice addi-