Lead Opinion
OPINION
This is а negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle case. The trial court rendered judgement for Schneider for actual and exemplary damages. The court of appeals reversed the trial court judgment and rendеred judgment that Schneider take nothing.
Esperanza Transmission Company, an oil field pipeline service company, provided a pick-up truck for business and personal use of its employee, Havelka. Havеlka and Steven Schroeder went to a dance in the pick-up. Upon leaving the dance, Havelka stated he had too much to drink and asked his companion, Schroeder, to drive. Schroeder collided intо the rear of a vehicle occupied by Schneider.
Schneider sued Esperanza alleging Esperanza was negligent and grossly negli
The jury found Esрeranza and Havelka liable for negligence and gross negligence on the theory of negligent entrustment. Based on the jury’s verdict, the trial court awarded Schneider actual and punitive damages. Following rendition оf the judgment, the actual damages were settled. Esperanza appealed the trial court’s award of punitive damages. The court of appeals reversed the trial court judgment and rendered judgment that Schneider take nothing. That court held there was no proximate cause between the entrustment of the vehicle from Esperanza to Havelka and the accident because Havelka was not driving the vehiclе.
To establish the automobile owner’s liability, there must be a showing of (1) entrustment of a vehicle by the owner; (2) to an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) that the owner knew or should have known to be unlicensed, (4) that the driver was negligent on the occasion in question and (5) that the driver’s negligence proximately caused the accident. Williams v. Steve’s Industries, Inc.,
For entrustment to be a proximate cause, the defendant entrustor should be shown to be reasonаbly able to anticipate that an injury would result as a natural and probable consequence of the en-trustment. Sturtevant v. Pagel,
Schneider contends therе is no requirement that Havelka be driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He argues the operation of a vehicle includes more than the actual driving of the vehicle; it includes any and all conduct of the entrustee done with the permission of or at the direction of the entrustor that in any way affects the operation of the vehicle. Schneider asserts that when the owner of a vehicle permits an incompetent or reckless driver to use his vehicle, he creates a dangerous instrumentality and his action sets in motion the chain of events that follow. Accordingly, Schneider submits by proving Havelka was negligent in turning the vehicle over to Schroeder, he proved that Havelka was negligent in the operation of the truck and proximately caused the accident.
Schneider cites several joint venture cases for the proposition that two persons involved in the operation of a motor vehicle are both considered drivers because their negligence is imputable to each other. See, Fuller v. Flanagan,
Schneider also relies on Sturtevant v. Pagel,
Foreseeability and causation are necessary elements of proximate cause. The cause of the accident was Havelka’s failure to use sound discretion in allowing someone else to drive. The risk that caused the entrustment to be negligent did not cause the collision.
We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
From the disposition and analysis of this negligent entrustment case, I respectfully dissent.
Two points of error are before this court, the first, whether Esperanza Transmission Company’s entrustment of a company truck to Havelka was a proximate cause of Barry Schneider’s injuries, and the second, whether there was sufficient evidence in the trial court to support a judgment of punitive damages against Esperanza. I would hold Esperanza’s actions in entrusting the vehicle to Havelka as a proximate cause of Schneider’s injuries for two reasons. Having found that Esperanza’s actions were a proximatе cause of the injuries to Schneider, I would then hold there is evidence to support a judgment for punitive damages in this case.
Regardless of how neatly the elements of negligent entrustment are set forth in the majority oрinion, the theory of negligent entrustment is premised on the combined negligence of two parties, the owner’s negligent entrustment of the vehicle and the entrustee’s negligent actions causing an injury. To hold otherwise would be to elevate form over substance. The theory of a cause of action for negligent en-trustment is a theory of direct or immediate liability of the entrustor undisturbed by subsequent intervening tortfeasors. The entrustee’s negligencе does not excuse or break the chain of causation set in motion by the entrustor’s original negligent en-trustment. Hence, the entrustor, owner of the vehicle, does not become vicariously liable for the entrustee’s negligence, but remains directly liable for his own negligence. Therefore, I see no reason why the subsequent entrustment, by Havelka, to the second entrustee, Schroeder, should break a causal chain set in motion by Esperanza. It is a well settled principle of law that if an intervening cause was foreseeable by the initial wrongdoer, then the initial wrongdoer’s negligence may be considered a proximate cause of the injury, notwithstanding the intervening cause. See Bonner v. Wingate,
The evidence at trial clearly showed that Esperanza had foreseen the possibility that Havelka might get drunk and entrust the company vehicle to another. Therefore, Esperanza’s original negligent entrustment remains a proximate cause, unbroken by the independent and intervening cause of Havelka’s entrustment, of Schneider’s injuries.
The second reason why I would hold Esperanza’s entrustment as a prоximate cause of Schneider’s injuries would be because the jury found so in special issues.
Special Issue No. 5 stated:
Was Esperanza Transmission Company’s entrustment of the truck in question to Alfred Havelka a heedless and reckless disregard of the rights оf others affected by it?
Answer "Yes” or “No.”
*598 ANSWER: Yes.
Special Issue No. 6a stated:
Was such entrustment a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
Answer “Yes” or “No.”
ANSWER: Yes.
These findings would remove the analysis of the case from a negligent entrustment theory to a regular negligence theory. Under this type of analysis, the issue would be whether Esperanza’s actions were the proximate cause of Schneider’s injuries. Undoubtedly, Esperanza could have foreseen that Havelka would have entrusted thе vehicle to a third party and there is no question that such entrustment by Havelka was the cause in fact of the injuries. There is testimony that Esperanza gave Havelka complete discretion in deciding when, how and who сould drive the truck. In letting Havelka have such broad discretion, Esperanza could foresee that Havelka might entrust the vehicle to an intoxicated driver. Esperanza testified through its vice president that Esperanza had anticipated that Havelka would use the truck to drive to bars.
Once having established that Esperanza’s entrustment of the vehicle was a proximate cause of Schneider’s injuries, the issue of whether there is evidence to support a claim for punitive damages is, in my opinion, easily answered in the positive.
In general, punitive damages can be awarded to punish the grossly tortious conduct of a wrongdoer. Specifiсally, the wrongdoer must have acted with an “entire want of care” which results in a knowingly indifferent attitude towards the hazards he has created as a result of the entrustment. See Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls,
Esperanza had no policy of checking employees’ past driving records before entrusting vehicles to them. Before Havelka was employed, he had eleven citations for speeding. While employed by Esperanza, Havelka received four more speeding citations which culminated in the State’s intent to suspend Havelka’s license. Esperanza was aware of the proposed suspension. Esperanza, through its vice president, additionally testified that it cоuld have anticipated that Havelka would probably use the vehicle to drive to bars. Combining the two, reckless driving and anticipated drinking, Esperanza should have been aware that Havelka was unable to maturely make responsible decisions as to the operation of the vehicle to which he was entrusted, and he represented a substantial risk to others.
To hold that this evidence, which was before the jury, was no evidence to support punitive damages would be to deny the constitutional right of the plaintiff to have the jury decide the issues and the credibility of the witnesses before them. See TEX.CONST, art. I, § 15 (Vernon 1984).
For these reasons, I would affirm in all respects the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court.
RAY, KILGARLIN and MAUZY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.