160 Pa. 602 | Pa. | 1894
Opinion by
Ellen Devine, the mother of Mary Schnatz, Maggie Krise and Ellen Devine, in whose right as daughters this suit is brought, on the 24th of October, 1892, while being carried as a passenger, was killed on defendant’s road in a collision near Flat Rock Tunnel. The action is for damages for the pecuni
The mother for thirty years had lived at Phoenix Park in Schuylkill county, where she owned a small property consisting of a house and four acres of ground. At her death she was fifty-nine years old and in good health. All three daughters had left home, and for some years had resided in Philadelphia; the two married ones, Mrs. Sehnatz and Mrs. Krise, lived with their husbands ; Ellen, who was single, worked at wages from $4.00 to $6.00 per week, and lived alone. There was testimony tending to show that she generally went to her mother’s home about three months during the summer, and while there paid no board; that her mother at times gave her money when she needed it, once as much as twenty dollars, and sometimes clothing. As to Mrs. Krise, there was evidence that for some years she had suffered from a pulmonary disease and had each summer gone to the mother, whose home was in a mountainous region, for the benefit of her health, and remained there for two or three months; that at times in the winter, when ill, her mother had come to Philadelphia and staj'ed with her, doing such household work as was required for her sick daughter; further, that she charged nothing for boarding this daughter at Phoenix Park, or for the service rendered her in Philadelphia.
As to Mrs. Sehnatz, there was testimony tending to show that, for sixteen years before her death, the mother in autumn and spring had given her potatoes for consumption in the house, and nursed her at times during illness, and had made no charge for either.
There was also testimony showing that both Ellen and Mrs. Krise were improved in health by their summer residence with their mother.
'On the other hand, it appeared very clearly that the actual residence of all three daughters was in Philadelphia; they were not members of the mother’s family in Schuylkill county; their homes, in the sense of domicile or place of abode, were in Philadelphia.
The positive terms of this act eliminate all evidence of damage in cases of death, other than a loss of money to those entitled to recover. If these- plaintiffs have lost money by the death of their mother, then the express terms of the 4th section of act of April 26,1855, give them a right to recovery from this defendant. That act says: “ The persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death, shall be the husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased, and no other relative.”
The act itself makes no distinction between children over age and those under, between those married or single, between those having homes and families of their own and those still members of the parents’ household. Such distinctions may have significance in determining the amount of damage pecuniarily suffered, as limited by the act of 1868, but they do not affect the statutory right on the part of children to a standing in court as claimants or suitors.
Having shown the existence of the parental relation, that the deceased was their mother, then the plaintiffs had a right to submit proof of what they had lost in money by her death, just as the parents in Pa. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. 499, had the right to prove that, although their deceased son was over age, he had continued to contribute to their support, had given them his bounty money, and had declared he would continue to support them while they lived. True, in that case the son still continued to live with the parents, but the case is not decided on that fact alone, but is put on that and other facts in evidence, as furnishing a probable ground for expectation of
All of the adjudicated cases in this state either proceed upon or are reconcilable with that principle. In Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. 95, the rule is repeated, and an illustration is given of a case where there can be no recovery: “ If the child was free by age or emancipation and living apart from his parents, and in no way contributed to their support, they could not maintain au action, for they suffered no pecuniary loss.”
It may be assumed, then, that the mere existence of the parental relation, while it would give the children a standing in court as parties, without more, would not sustain this judgment ; but if there was evidence from which the jury could find a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage from the continued life of the mother, they might assess as damages the actual money loss of the children.
To show the pecuniary loss they had sustained by her death, plaintiffs offered evidence as to what pecuniary benefit they had derived from her life. This mother was not wealthy, but she
Of course, all these benefits were gifts, as distinguished from payments made or services rendered because of a legal obligation ; and perhaps it jars somewhat rudely on sentiment to affix a value in dollars, after the mother’s death, to gifts prompted solely from maternal love ; but these statutes were not enacted to nurture sentiment; they are essentially sordid, and must be so construed. They were passed to compensate, in dollars, those who had lost by death those pecuniary beuefits which have their origin in the purest sentiment.
The learned counsel for appellant is clearly right when he argues that occasional gifts made or services rendered by a parent to the daughters who had long before her death left her home and established homes of their own, are not sufficient proof on which to found a pecuniary loss. The trouble here, however, is with this evidence, which went much further than occasional gifts and services; it tended to show a persistent
Appellant’s whole fourteen assignments of error embrace, in substance, but three complaints: 1. That no such relation as intended by the statute existed between the mother and these plaintiffs. 2. That there was no actual contribution toward the support and maintenance of the children by the mother. 3. That the evidence showed only occasional gifts and favors, and therefore there could be no reasonable expectation on part of the children of pecuniary advantage.
What we have said disposes of them all, and the judgment is affirmed.
Me. Justice Williams : I dissent from this judgment. I do not think Mary Schnatz or Maggie Krise entitled to recover.