43 Cal. 617 | Cal. | 1872
By the Court,
Action of ejectment to recover possession of a portion of the Agua Caliente Rancho, which was granted to Lazaro Peña on the 13th day of July, 1840, by the Governor of California. On the 14th of December, 1839, Peña executed to M. G. Vallejo a formal conveyance, purporting to convey to him the rancho; and on the 12th of August, 1846, Vallejo executed and delivered to Andres Hoeppner an instrument in 'writing, which the plaintiff relies upon as a conveyance of the rancho. Hoeppner was then married to Anna Hoeppner, but between 1855 and 1858 he died intestate and without issue. Anna Hoeppner, December 21st, 1858, conveyed all her right, title, and interest in the rancho to Travers; and the plaintiff claims title to the undivided half of the rancho under that deed. Vallejo filed with the Board of Land Commissioners his petition for the confirmation of his claim to the rancho, and such proceedings were had in the matter that the claim was confirmed by the District Court in 1859;
The date of the conveyance of Peña to Vallejo is 1839, while that of the grant is 1840. In confirming the grant the Supreme Court treated the date—1839—as a clerical error for 1840, and that must have been the view also of the District Court, for the claim of a petitioner will not be confirmed "unless he show a prima facie title; and we are of the opinion that it must be regarded as a clerical error, and that 1840 was the true date of the execution of the conveyance.
If, however, we are wrong in this, then the operation of the deed, which was very full and formal, caused the title, when the grant was afterwards made to Peña, to inure to the benefit of Vallejo. Under the Spanish law the vendor was under the implied obligation to make his sale and conveyance effective. He was bound to defend the title, if notified of a suit brought against the purchaser, and if unsuccessful in this he was required to indemnify the purchaser. (See Schmidt, Civ. Law of Spain and Mex., 135; Fuero Juzgo, Law 9, Book 5, Title 4; Partidas, 5, Law 32, Title 5.)
It is insisted by the plaintiff that the grant to Peña con
The plaintiff claims that the confirmation, whether it be regarded as a confirmation of the title granted by the Mexican Government, or only a confirmation of the claim of Vallejo, inured to the benefit of the vendees of Vallejo; and he relies not only upon the terms of the decree of the District Court, but also upon the rule in Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 272; Clark v. Lockwood, 21 Cal. 222; Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 438, and other eases, that the confirmation of a claim under the provisions of the Act of Congress of March 3d, 1851, inures to the benefit of the grantees of the confirmee, so far as the legal title is concerned. In each of the cases referred to, in which that rule was applied, the conveyance was executed intermediate the filing of the petition and the confirmation; and in such case it is immaterial whether the deed conveyed the land or only the right, title, and interest of the confirmee; for in either form it transferred all the rights of the confirmee in or to the land—one of which was the right to have a confirmation of his claim or title, a segregation of the land which had been granted, and a release or
That instrument, as translated from the Spanish language, is as follows:
“ He who subscribes, certifies that having bought lawfully and in due form of the citizen, Lazaro Peña, the land of Agua Caliente, to which the preceding approval of the Departmental Assembly of Alta California refers, I cede and' transfer all the rights which I have to the said land, in favor of Don Andres Hoeppner, who will make the use of it which most suits him. And for the necessary ends and uses I give this in Sonoma, the 12th of August, 1846.
“M. G. VALLEJO.”
“ Witnesses: A. A. Hexdersox, Asst. Surgeon U. S. ship Portsmouth; Jacob Pleese.”
In Mulford v. Le Franc, 26 Cal. 108, it was held that the word “cedo”—here translated “I cede”—was the ordinary word used in Mexican conveyances to pass title to lands; and we see no reason to doubt the correctness of that decision.
It is also objected that the instrument is insufficient as a conveyance, because it does not express a consideration, but we hold, upon the authority of Havens v. Dale, 18 Cal. 366, and Merle v. Matthews, 26 Cal. 455, that it is not essential that the instrument, intended as a conveyance, should express the consideration or the price of the land. This instrument was before the Supreme Court of the United States, in Steinbach v. Stewart, 11 Wal. 566, and the Court pronounced it a conveyance of the title to the rancho. The larger portion of the instruments intended as conveyances, which were executed in California about the date of this instrument, were as devoid of form as this one, and in holding that this instrument amounts to á conveyance, we only follow the current of the authorities in this State.
The decree of confirmation of the District Court contains the following proviso: “Provided that this confirmation of the above laud to the said M. G. Vallejo shall be without prejudice to the legal representative of Lazaro Peña, the original grantee, or whoever may be entitled to said lands
The decree of the Supreme Courtis “that the decree of the said District Court in this cause, in so far as it confirms the original grant, be and the same is hereby affirmed.” In Steinbach v. Stewart, supra, it was argued on the part of the plaintiff" that the proviso in the decree of the District Court was annulled by the decree of the Supreme Court; but it was held that no portion of the decree of the District Court was reversed, and that that decree was left in force to its full extent. The construction given to those decrees in that case is of binding authority here; and we accordingly hold that the confirmation inured to the benefit of those holding title under or through the conveyance executed by Vallejo to Hoeppner, and vested in them the legal title to the rancho.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.