100 Neb. 101 | Neb. | 1916
This is an action for the construction of the will of Paul Schminke, who died in Otoe county, December 25, 1892. Plaintiff is his widow, and defendants are his heirs. The will provided:
“(1) I devise and bequeath all the estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, both real and personal, to which I may be entitled or which I may have power to dispose of at my decease unto my dear and beloved wife, Anna Schminke, so long as she shall continue my widow and unmarried; and in the event of her marriage or death I devise and bequeath the same to my children, to be divided between them as nearly as may be possible in equal shares, except as follows:
“(2) I devise and bequeath to each of my sons, D. William Schminke. and Charles Schminke, an additional sum of one thousand ($1,000) dollars in cash.
“(3) And to my daughters, Mrs. Dora Sinclair and Augusta Schminke, an additional sum of five hundred ($500) dollars in cash to each of them.”
Prom a judgment of the district court decreeing that plaintiff took a life estate only, she has appealed.
Plaintiff contends that the will vested in her a fee simple estate, subject to remarriage. She invokes the statute providing that every conveyance shall pass all the interest of the grantor therein unless a contrary intent appears. Rev. St. 1913, sec. 6192. She argues that the first clause devised a fee, subject to remarriage, and that the subsequent limitation was void as being repugnant to the fee. Little v. Giles, 25 Neb. 313.
The contention of plaintiff is answered in Loosing v. Loosing, 85 Neb. 66, 74, wherein it is said: “The intent
The intention of the testator as expressed in his will as a whole was to give his widow an estate which should terminate in the event of her marriage or death. In other words, he intended that, upon her death, or sooner in case of her marriage, the estate should be divided equally among all of his children. The intention to give his children a share of his estate is manifest. General and equivocal words in the first part of the will which, standing alone, might vest the fee in plaintiff are to be considered as limited by the subsequent clauses evidencing an intent to devise only a life estate.
The judgment of the district court is therefore
Affirmed.