23 N.W.2d 26 | N.D. | 1946
This is a supplement to the case between the same parties determined in 1943. See
The record in the case cited shows that on May 10, 1940 plaintiff made application #98593 for compensation because of an accident occurring May 8 wherein he fractured two ribs. On June 21, 1940 the bureau awarded him compensation and in July 1940 gave him a supplemental award. In August 1940 he made application #100792 alleging that between August 1937 and June 1940 he had injured his heart by over-exertion but did not know of the injury until August 1940. The bureau denied that application in September 1940.
In his brief in the case at bar applicant states the injury to his ribs occurred on May 8, 1940 and "on the same day, shortly thereafter" he injured his heart. But there were not two separate and distinct accidents on May 8. In
This rule still holds good. The applicant therefore applied to the bureau to reopen #98593, under the authority of its continuing jurisdiction. The bureau heard the application and decided that the compensation granted in this claim #98593 should not be increased. From such refusal this appeal was taken to the district court.
In Tweten v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau,
In Lillefjeld v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau,
Section 65-0503, revised code, provides: "The bureau shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions within its jurisdiction, and its decision except as otherwiseprovided in chapter 10 of this title, shall be final." (Italics ours.)
This exception as set forth in § 65-1001 allowing an appeal, is: "If the final action of the bureau denies the right of the claimant to participate at all in the fund on the ground that the injury was self-inflicted, or on the ground that the accident did not arise in the course of employment, or upon any other ground *524 going to the basis of the claimant's right, the claimant may appeal. . . ."
This exception is not applicable here. The bureau held the accident arose in the course of the employment and allowed for the injury. The bureau recognized his right and granted him full compensation in claim #98593, according to its judgment and discretion. In Crandall v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau,
The appellant claims however that under a provision of § 28-3215 of the Rev Code in the "Administrative Agency, Uniform Practice Act" he has the right of appeal. This section relied upon provides that:
"Any party to any proceeding heard by an administrative agency,except in cases where the decision of the administrative agencyis declared final by any other statute, may appeal from such decision, etc." (Italics ours.)
Appellant's claim is that the finality attached to the determination of the bureau by § 65-0503 has been nullified by this provision of the Uniform Practice Act; and that the bureau's decision denying compensation for this factor of the injured, alleged to have been unknown when the claim was filed, is not final because it may be set aside by the bureau at any time upon proper showing.
The provisions of this Uniform Practice Act were in effect at the time of the determination of this case in 1943, though no reference was made thereto in the opinion. Its basis is chapter 240 of the session laws of 1941. The provision set forth in § 65-0503 Revised Code to the effect that the decision of the bureau is final except as provided in § 65-1001, and the provision quoted from the Uniform Practice Act were re-enacted and readopted when the code was adopted in 1943. Section 28-3215 *525 does not affect or modify the other sections quoted. The result of appellant's contention would be that because of the continuing jurisdiction every decision of the bureau with reference to increase or decrease of compensation is reviewable on appeal.
The bureau has the sole power to determine the amount of compensation. There is no authority to review this feature. Such a decision, while not final as to the amount so as to prevent the bureau from changing it, is final in the jurisdictional sense of review and is so "declared final" by another statute. The district court was correct in dismissing the appeal and therefore the order is affirmed.
CHRISTIANSON, Ch. J., and MORRIS, BURKE and NUESSLE, JJ., concur.