*1
being
Byrd,
with
the false alibi about
including
police,
this,
that there is
I would conclude
him. Based on
inculpated
would have
jury’s
that the
verdict
probability
no reasonable
Crosby’s
refusal
fleeting
had the
reference
been different
State,
v.
Dorsey
occurred. See
a written statement never
give
(1976). Therefore, I
638, 659,
350 A.2d
below.
judgments
would affirm the
No. 2000. Appeals Maryland. Court of
Nov. 2001.
Reconsideration Denied Dec. *3 Skeens, Hill,
Edward John Oxon for petitioner. Thaler, Jr., A. (Harry Wolpoff, Herbert Baltimore K. Ron- Abramson, L.L.P., Rockville, ald S. Canter of & all on Wolpoff brief), respondent. BELL, C.J., ELDRIDGE, RAKER,
Argued before WILNER, CATHELL, BATTAGLIA, HARRELL and JJ.
HARRELL, Judge. 1 May
On was judgment entered the District Court Maryland, sitting Mary’s in St. in favor of County, Prince George’s Hospital (Respondent) in a suit it brought by against (Petitioner) M. Michelle Schmidt to recover for medi- $1756.24 cal provided by services it to her 1997 when she was 16 years age. Petitioner was an adult when the suit was filed in 1999. Petitioner appealed the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County. She contended that she could not have been minor, was, view, sued a Maryland while as there her no statute or common holding law that a minor child is liable for necessaries, and therefore she could not be sued as an adult for the medical services rendered when she was a minor. that a minor be held liable for countered
Respondent under the doctrine of emergency medical treatment merely liability extinguished that such was not necessaries and 2000, the Circuit adulthood. On 6 November upon reaching Respon- in favor of appeal1 judgment Court entered $1756.24, and costs. plus amount of interest dent from Peti- judgment the amount of the Respondent recovered attachments. through wage tioner January certiorari on 9 Petitioner’s writ granted We 2001.2 petition, in the successful modified presented
The questions only stylistically, are: law, Whether, legal a minor under a Maryland
1. under for medical necessaries liable disability personally therefore, suable as an person; her upon rendered promise contractual implied adult under provider? binding promise age May year a 16 old make 18? shall affirm.
We
I. to be in appear facts of this case do The material Petitioner, 16-years-old,3 then On 7 March dispute. time, At she was in a two-vehicle collision. involved Schmidt, Arno a 1997 Ford Escort owned Lewis driving Sr., injury with grandfather, personal her and was insured *4 $2500, Maryland controversy than Code 1. As the amount was less 12-401(f) Art., (1998 Vol.), § Proceedings Repl. Courts and Judicial 7-102(a)(l) proceed Maryland provide appeals such de novo. Rule 359, George’s A.2d 142 Hospital, 362 Md. 2. Schmidt v. Prince (2001). Respondent’s for the date of birth was listed on bill 3. Petitioner’s 1980, dispute. 22 December a fact she did not medical services as (PIP) protection benefits through her father’s insurance com- pany, Erie Group.4 transported Insurance Petitioner was George’s Hospital Shock Trauma Unit at Prince (Respon- dent), Doe,” initially where she was admitted as “Jane without number, an emergency person contact or telephone because she Although was unconscious the time of arrival. Respon- address, dent later was able to identify Petitioner’s name and only it was able to determine that her father was “Mr. telephone Schmidt” and a number for him. Due to the severity injuries collision, of Petitioner’s sustained Respondent provided necessary emergency medical care for a brain concussion and an open scalp wound. As of her dis- 1997, charge on 8 March Petitioner had incurred the amount of $1756.24. Soon after hospital, her release from the Petitioner filed benefits under coverage provided her father’s Erie policy. During claim process, Petitioner and her father provided several documents to Erie regarding her medical expenses. On 16 March Petitioner and her father signed Authorization, a Disclosure authorizing Petitioner’s treating physician to furnish Erie with the records of her post- accident 1 May treatment. On Petitioner and her father signed Assignment and Authorization of benefits under the PIP coverage instructing and directing Erie to directly treating her physician Thereafter, the amount him. owed Court, Court, argument In oral before the Circuit and this Petitioner’s policy counsel indicated that by grandfather, the Erie was held Schmidt, Court, however, A. Lewis Sr. In her brief to this Petitioner asserts that “the father received this exact [the amount amount owed to carrier, Respondent] from his insurance Group, the Erie Insurance April check dated 1997.” See Petitioner's Brief at 8. Several put exhibits into evidence indeed policy indicate that the Erie was held father, Schmidt, by Petitioner’s Lewis A. Jr. On the Disclosure Authori- Schmidt, Jr., zation filed Respondent, Petitioner with Lewis A. policy. Additionally, listed as the named insured on the Erie on the Assignment Erie, and Authorization form Petitioner filed with Petition- (with again policy er’s father is listed as the holder Petitioner herself claimant). Finally, listed as the in a letter 22 March 2000 from dated counsel, Erie to Supervisor Petitioner's an Erie Claims indicated that policy Petitioner’s father held the with Erie and that he was sent the 29 April proceeds 1997 PIP check. *5 was Erie in the amount of also issued check $1756.24 Minor, in reference A. Schmidt for Michelle Schmidt” “Lewis Center, 03-07-1997 Hospital “Prince Service Date George’s the funds negotiated, The check was but to 03-08-1997.” to pay Respondent; or her father not used Petitioner were a rather, purchase replace- used apparently the funds were for ment automobile Petitioner. for made
Following payment unsuccessful demand Court, Petitioner, in the filed suit District Respondent residence, after on 19 county of November Petitioner’s a filed Notice of Inten- majority. attained her Petitioner she Defend, and that the liability she denied explaining tion that Plan, of Prudential Health Care responsibility debt was summary judg- a motion Inc.5 Petitioner thereafter filed on at the the medical age or to dismiss based ment her time was Neither motion denied. provided. services were The District counsel for trial. The Petitioner nor her appeared in the upon granted judgment Respondent affidavit Court treatment. Petitioner’s hospital amount due for Petitioner’s in affirmance effectively to the Circuit Court appeal resulted judgment. explained The Circuit of the District Court’s Court ruling, pertinent part: its is, when plus at the was 16 question [Petitioner]
The time accident, placed she had this she undisputed I evidence that the care was care. think the is affected well-being, possibly for her could have result of the Court that living her as a it----So finds uncontradieted, hospi- she went to the that is that evidence is for rendered. being tal and the amount services sued is services reasonable suggestion There no weren’t fair, ... question under the circumstances. disability she though necessity, even it was her has cannot be liable either or after and therefore held then casually at Although in her brief Health Petitioner Prudential hints Plan, liability, no the record Care Inc.’s she directed us to evidence case, supporting to this other than her claim Prudential's connection hospitalization. the time of that Prudential was her father’s her HMO attaining age of majority. age She attained the majority when she became 18. by [Respon- She was sued for that dent] debt.... who People deal with minors deal with them at peril. their But when a person goes to *6 hospital for medical treatment that is life no possibly saving, one would-—-I can’t think of any higher form of for necessity [Petitioner], a person, and this case for those services. Now, being those services a necessity, and/or child can rеsponsible be held for. if goes And a child out and has to—it goes to the hospital, and at the time it is a minor a parent could be responsible held for that. Parents are responsible for the necessities of their children....
In this case [Petitioner], rendered services to and that debt has not paid. been has [Petitioner] become adult, an [Respondent] such, has sued her as and the Court finds that those pleadings suing her not individually, through litem, a custodian or ad perfectly appropriate. Now right back, evidence, has the [Petitioner] revert that at the incurred, time this debt was as to her minority, which minor, it is undisputed she was a none-the-less the Court finds the law has been well long settled a time and has not changed, that minors responsible are for necessities. course, Of it imputes that responsibility to parents, but this case she herself is responsible for that because it is a necessity. There is no requirement that [Respondent] has time, to sue at this Limitations, within the Statute of sues is, adult, her as an adult. She as an can use the minority had, right she but the does not [C]ourt find that she has a right decline to a debt to a hospital under those circumstances, just because she didn’t execute any agree- ment. There certainly is an implied contract that she should benefit, services for her no one else’s, and the law is well settled that the liability arises from an implied promise to pay.... the emergency [I]f room had turned her down and she had died suffered serious injury nobody because was going to be responsible it, for paying then they would sue the hospital for malprac- an nor a at that time is not excuse disability tice.... [H]er obligations hospital. defense for her that a 16-year- Petitioner asserts We certiorari. granted implied contract making legally capable old is not child for her medical treatment rendered emergency benefit, does not permit the doctrine of necessaries and that money judgment a minor child and obtain hospital to sue legally primary, responsible as the naming without so, Peti- Respondent may sue having Not done person. adulthood, tioner, for the cost of reaching her upon minor. Respondent to her when a provided medical treatment District and the Circuit counters that Court naturally value of judgment its favor correctly Court entered correctly rendered Petitioner emergency treatment solely against initiated Petitioner upheld claim Respondent’s period age her had ended. disability after the defined
II.
A. contrary, prevail a statute to the In the absence of voidable;6 is a minor’s contracts are ing rule modern nevertheless, may that a minor be it also is well established to him or her. liable the value of necessaries furnished doctrine, of to as doctrine eponymously This referred necessaries, law. In Monu recognized Maryland is well Herman, v. 1870 Building mental Association (1870), predecessors explained our some WL 3168 venerable of applicatiоn what breadth and this doctrine. law, twenty-one of
By persons, age common under the contracts, except neces years,[7] are not bound their act, saries, injury their any can to the they nor do See of Petitioner’s assertion that con- 6. Part III.C our discussion initio, opposed are void ab as to voidable. tracts entered into minors Maryland July age majority was reduced 7. Effective 1 Vol.), (1957, years Maryland Repl. 1998 age. from 18 Code 21 to §IArt. avoid, property, they which may when arrived at full age. responsibility Their for crime or dealing, fraudulent depends on their power more discretion and to discriminate right otherwise, from what wrong, just is than on their age. Infants have this indulgence supposed from their want judgment others, in their transactions with and the law takes this care of prevent them to them from being imposed upon, overreached by persons years experi- of more ence. are
They allowed to contract for power their benefit with cases, in most to recede from their contract when it may them, prove prejudicial to but in their contract necessar- ies, board, aid, such as apparel, medical teaching and instruction, necessaries, and other are they absolutely bound, execution; be sued and charged but it appear must that the things were absolutely necessary, and circumstances, suitable their and whoever trusts them does so at peril, said, his or as it is with deals them at arms’ length.
Their power, necessaries, thus to contract for is for their benefit, procurement because the of these things is essential existence, to their and if they were not permitted so to bind they themselves might suffer.
Monumental,
added).
Approximately
years
Overholtzer,
Garay
Md.
(1993),
A.2d 429
that,
the Court held
although a
liable at common law and by statute for the medical
expenses incurred on
behalf,
child,
one’s child’s
when
contractually liable for those
because the
parent is unable or unwilling to pay, may attempt to recover
*8
expenses
those
from the tortfeasor who
injuries
inflicted the
necessitating the medical
374,
treatment.
Garay,
Md. at
631 A.2d at 444.
analysis
The
began
Garay
by noting that
“a minor can very well be responsible for pre-majority medical
expenses not only through emancipation, pre-payment, or
through the death or incompetency, but also under the doc-
trine of
367,
necessaries.” Garay,
doctrine responsible are supported by parents” his because and of their by common law and statute for necessaries at 368-69, 444; at see 332 Md. at A.2d Gamy, children. 5-203(b)(l) of a (stating § Law that the Family Art. severally responsible for jointly child “are minor education”). welfare, care, nurture, We support, child’s noted, however, unable to “where refuses or is parent that necessaries, fur- is liable necessaries furnish infant at Garay, him 631 A.2d nished or her.” applications the various manifestations and considering After that, we jurisdictions, rule other resolved of this in certain to medical right a recover [although we decline vest cases, agree in all we that the doctrine in a minor expenses minor is to hold a child liable necessaries sufficient incurred or her it can be shown by him expenses if truly unable to that his or her will, turn, a right minor the liability give them. This on own behalf. It would claim medical his or her expenses unjust a child liable for medical manifestly be hold opportunity that to recover expenses deny but to child a wrongdoer. those from added). (emphasis at 445 We Garay, 332 Md. at A.2d concluded: unfair a minor
it would to disallow claim patently be subject minor expenses, child for but to then circum- recovery to the lien. Under such a child’s stance, must be ex- the minor allowed recover medical will be such penses to the extent the minor liable for expenses. added).
Id.,
(emphasis
Most
Johns Hopkins Hospital
Pepper,
(1997),
considered,
Md.
is merely an acknowledgment services, that for certain minor should not be heard to disavow a contract which by personal necessity required his or her participation. In a case of catastrophic medical injury, we can certainly con- ceive of a situation where the can afford some but not all of injured child’s past, present, and future medical expenses. Assuming limitations has paren- barred such, tal claims for the doctrine of protects necessaries an injured minor’s right to recover from a tortfeasor medical expenses that his or her parents are ill-able to afford and which he or she ultimately may be liable. ... We cannot countenance a result that would leave only innocent victim such a transaction uncompensated for his injuries her and potentially beholden to the compelled generosity of the taxpayer. Public policy justice de- mand that injured minor’s right to recover medical expenses in his or her own name after has limitations parental barred claims begin where parents’ financial ability to provide for medical necessaries ends.
Pepper,
694-95,
The rationales underlying Garay and Pepper recognize that public policy justice demand injured that an minor right have the to recover incurred from a tortfeasor, are unable or where the child’s third-party the medical expenses, for those because them, during the child’s sue to recover either provider may has after child or within statute limitations minority reasoning, it would majority. By parity age reached the *10 adulthood, may liable child, attaining a be upon seem that such him or provided necessaries to contract to minor, or to if were unable parents her a the while reach a Before we such pay for such necessaries. all, how, however, if at prudent it to examine seems holding, of this regard unwillingness prong aspect our states the sister of the of necessaries. doctrine
B. supplies a user- to be no case elsewhere appears There “unwilling of the term scope friendly, all-purpose definition of necessaries. The in connection with the doctrine pay” they share two common traits: majority vast of these cases “unwilling- of the analysis are of detailed or substantive bereft standard, are fact- varying largely outcomes ness” the cases, Dissent foreign its of the the survey Based on driven. “unwilling” only to cases urges our limiting application 2) 1) child; parent the the parent which: the has abandoned 8) absolutely support; to the the nothing child’s contributes from a tortfeasor and child recovered medical has Dissent, the at 543-544. parent care. refuses entirely although “unwillingness,” These categories inaccurate8, too limiting. are abandonment, category, parental the Dissent regard to its With first Estate, N.W. support In re 231 Mich. 203 cites for Dzwonkiewicz’s (at 564) (1925). to have turned on The Dissent reads this case Although Michigan court mentioned abandonment. father’s abandonment, only stage predicate a set the that was factual father’s court, provider the medical issue addressed whether the real by petition probate against appointed in the court could recover (the mother) guardian Id. at 671. The child’s child’s estate. child, caused the automobile accident estate of the who survived care, physician's was funded injuries his which necessitated the mother, brought by his as next proceeds a tort suit of the settlement of
Regarding category, the Dissent’s second a example, recognized jurisdiction distinction has in at one been least between a his parent always who refuses to child’s bills child, provide any refuses to and a support parent child, generally currently who his supports refusing but Baptist one bill. See North Carolina pay only Hospitals v. Franklin, (1991) N.C.App. (holding S.E.2d 814 child is not when her everything they liable did could bill). in regard to except pay necessaries the latter case category, does not qualify “unwilling” as and the child is theory not held this underlying liable. distinction is that differently to allow give would some little or no incentive to for their expenses. children’s For the rea- sons explained infra, we are not persuaded adopt this distinction.
As to the Dissent’s third category, to be sure there are cases holding a liable for his child or her necessaries where
friend, against
recovery
physician’s
against
the tortfeasor.
Id. The
the
allowed, despite
estate was
the fact
that his claim was based on an
implied
guardian-parent.
contract
child
with the
and not with the
Id.
Therefore,
at 672.
really
case does not
this
buttress
the Dissent's first
category
"unwillingness”
situations.
support
The Dissent cites two cases to
its second definition of "un-
(i.e.
willing”
parent
nothing
when a
contributes
towards
the child’s
Dissent,
support).
however,
interpretation
of those cases
the
Trumbull,
527,
takes them a bit out of context.
In Trainer v.
141 Mass.
(1886),
the child had recovered is not unfair to to be that it in those cases seems rationale where he or for his or her necessaries require a child she will not be damages because he or money she as received v. then tort. See Cole prior put any position worse (1929) (“To 692, 339, allow the 150 S.E. 341 Wagner, 197 N.C. deny theory this and then upon infant to recover defendant right to recover on the action the plaintiff present blowing hot and necessary expenses, would be theory same breath.”). are courts that Similarly, there cold in the same required a child should be seem to conclude that not recovered he or she has his or her necessaries where from tortfeasor.10 damages that, to find a parent states hold order appear
Some
or her
liable for his
necessar-
making
thus
child
“unwilling,”
ies,
fast
of default
proof
hard and
require
a court should
meet
states note
order
parents. Those
be
that a
“unwilling,”
it must
shown
requirement
shall not
pay.11
and still refused
We
was billed
sued
and/or
(1932)
Goss,
424,
(placing
Bitting v.
203 N.C.
There significant are a number of states that interpret then- version of the doctrine of necessaries as placing liability on a child only when his or her parents are financially unable to pay.12These cases involve similar factual situations and com- parable analyses to the other cases infra, except discussed the omission of the “unwilling” prong. categories suggested the Dissent should not be
exclusive. Judge While Raker states that “unless case falls into one of ..., the three categories of cases I would not hold rеsponsible child parents’ choices,” Dissent, for the at 572- 573, we believe that there may be other circumstances that qualify a parent as “unwilling,” even in a singular instance of unwillingness such as presented present case.
To the Dissent, non-exhaustive list fashioned we add the factual case, context of present explicated as in Part III(D) of opinion. this We do this mindful of the distinction made some states that singular episode of a parent’s refusal to pay for a child’s necessaries might not satisfy that state’s view of adequate evidence of “unwillingness” so as to trigger the minor’s liability. Overweighing arguable unfair- ness the minor in the balancing, at least in present case, is the consideration of not placing hospitals and other emer- gency health providers care in a situation where apparently financially-able may individuals avoid paying for necessary medical treatment through a contrivance similar to that dem- on onstrated the record of this case. Wilkinson, 539, 540,
12. See Poole
(Ga.1871)
v.
42 Ga.
III. common law doc- us to repudiate Petitioner next asks “this entirеty in its and to hold that trine of necessaries law.” Maryland as accepted be valid should never principle Petitioner, of creates the doctrine necessaries According "with Maryland judges and provides unfair scenario” “patently law,” specifi- the existing Maryland to “ignore the opportunity 1-202(0, “an individual Rule which includes cally, Maryland of an “Individual age years” of 18 its definition under the disability.” under
A.
is not
from
precluded
that this Court
acknowledge
We
where, “in
of
light
rule in
a common law
situations
altering
...
has
rule
changed
knowledge,
conditions or increased
life, vestige
of
unsound in the circumstances modern
become
Sowell,
our
State v.
people.”
no
suitable to
past,
longer
of
(1999)
713, 723,
712, 717
v.
(quoting
728 A.2d
State
353 Md.
(1998)
585, 604,
841,
(quot
714 A.2d
850
Wiegmann, 350 Md.
Education, 295
Montgomery County
v.
Board
ing Harrison
of
(1983)))
459,
894,
v.
442,
(citing
Md.
456 A.2d
903
Gaver
210,
(1989);
17, 28,
v.
Harrant,
557
216
316 Md.
A.2d
State
1197,
Minster,
240, 245-46, 486 A.2d
1199-1200
302 Md.
31,
291
(1985);
Corporation,
v.
Standard
Md.
Adler American
42-43,
464,
(1981);
Prince George’s
471
Condore v.
432 A.2d
(1981);
516,
1011,
530-31, 425
1018
289 Md.
A.2d
County,
Butler,
182-83,
494,
174,
A.2d
499
Felder
292 Md.
438
v.
1301,
State,
201, 217, 438
(1981);
292 Md.
A.2d
Williams
Ansell,
(1981);
414
A.2d
Kline v.
(1980)). As
in Sowell:
we elucidated
law
considering
long-established
“In
whether a
common
thus reflective
unchanged by
legislature and
rule —
this
unsound
the circumstances
public policy
state’s
—is
life,
always recognized
we have
that declaration
modern
of the
Maryland
normally
the function
public policy
recognized that the General
Assembly.” We have
General
Assembly’s
abrogate
failure to amend or
a common law rule
sometimes reflects its
public policy.
desired
Sowell,
(internal
723-24,
353 Md. at
B. pause We to address Petitioner’s assertion that the reason- ing of Garay, quoted supra, applied should be to the case before us because it is in expressed dicta that should “be rejected.” disavowed and See Petitioner’s Brief at 8. During oral argument, explained Petitioner that language quoted, dictum, supra, which, is obiter using Black’s Law Dictionary reference, as a Petitioner defines as of an opinion “[w]ords entirely unnecessary for the decision of the case.” a question
When
of law is raised properly by the issues
in a case and the Court supplies a deliberate expression of its
opinion upon
question,
such opinion is not
regarded
to be
dictum,
as obiter
although the final judgment in
may
the case
be rooted in
point
another
by
also raised
the record. See
State,
235,
Scott v.
256,
(1983)
297
1126,
Md.
465 A.2d
1137
C.J.,
(Murphy,
Cochran,
dissenting); Carstairs v.
488,
95 Md.
499,
(1902)
52 A.
(citing Monticello Distilling Co. v.
Baltimore,
City
(1900)).
90 Md.
[i]t be difficult to frame a concise definition of an obiter dictum applicable every such expression of opinion, and some Courts incline to the rule that the most deliberate expression opinion, of upon a question distinctly raised record, fully counsel, argued by may nevertheless regarded dictum, be as a unless essential to the actual disposition made of the case. But as Bоuvier well says: “It is difficult to why, see in a philosophic view, point opinion of the Court is not persuasive as on all points duty it that was the so involved the cause
which were them, deliberately passed and which were argue counsel Court, if but one hung upon as had on decision in accord this view. Maryland rule is with point;” and in 471, it “All that is said: Worthington, v. In Alexander Court the decision of the Maryland render decided, is to show any point on Appeals authoritative judicial to the of the mind application that there was an Morey, in Michael adjudged;” and question precise cited, not be there could it said that decision Md. was dictum, directly question obiter “as said be to the the demurrer involved in the issues law raised to, bill, directly of the Court was drawn and the mind distinctly upon subject.” expressed Carstairs, 499, 52 A. at at 601. Md. Garay question, supra
Having language reviewed the (“we 563-564, applica- it agree”) we reflects conclude *15 underlying to one of judicial of this mind tion Court’s Petition- Garay.13 reject therefore presented We questions discussed there. request principles to abandon er’s
C. mantra that a minor does chants the repeatedly Petitioner into a capacity binding promise to enter possess legal any implied asserts Petitioner that Specifically, or contract. receiving by she have entered into express contract in light void ab should be considered initio Respondent’s care this minor time. support as a at the To disability of her l-202(£), contеntion, Rule which Maryland relies on Petitioner 562) (at Garay of that the mind the Court 13. The Dissent concludes ” upon’ specific issue distinctly expressed "was never 'drawn to nor (whether present child is liable when case his/her cost but "inexplicably pay for an fail to isolated child.”). Garay provide support Although did not for and otherwise (because upon assay scope "unwilling” it not called to define the so), clearly regard mind to the expressed its with to do the Court triggers liability subject generally the doctrine. what a minor’s under Thus, inability Garay's parent’s unwillingness that iteration triggers were such is not obiter dicta.
553 “an provides age years” individual under the of 18 shall be disability.” considered “Individual under
“Generally,
regards
the law
contractual
obligations
voidable,
minors as
giving the minor child the choice whether
contract,
to avoid the
or to perform
Garay,
it.”
§ 8:14
In
ed.
Garay,
adopted
we
the rationale of
Supreme
Flowers,
Court of
Tennessee Gardner v.
(Tenn.1975),
S.W.2d 708
which
held
a child was liable for
she
following
incurred
an automobile
Garay,
accident.
atMd.
D. suggests Petitioner that Respondent should have brought against father, the suit Petitioner’s guardian as her friend, next within the applicable limitations, statute three of the of Petitioner. following the treatment years, provision willing, Petitioner is argument, of this purposes For and valid claim would Respondent possessed that assume Although father. judgment against awarded a her have been suit, Respondent brought could have such we agree that we only this doctrine Respondent’s option. was disagree liable for a minor be held of necessaries states that necessaries, or' she necessaries, which he including medical are or unwill- his or either unable afforded when her on the principle, Respondent, with this ing pay. Consistent (a) Petitioner, facts, while she was cоuld have: sued present (b), or, minor, father; done and as was still a her case, age her upon reaching sued Petitioner present majority.14 agree paid that Erie parties note that both
We father, claim to fa from the insurance Petitioner’s proceeds proceeds but the Respondent’s charges, earmarked cially Rather, Respondent.15 record were not forwarded father were applied that the PIP supports proceeds production whether burden of and 14. We need not resolve here regarding willingness ability father to persuasion of Petitioner’s Respondent with as elements its her treatment would rest against to the her as as a defense claim claim or with Petitioner ability willingness or To the extent that her father’s individual. defense, argue plead proven as a she did not as could have been the Circuit Court. in either the District Court or such Moreover, argument Respondent’s goes, suit even as Petitioner's brought years providing against within three Petitioner was and, obviously, years reaching within three of her medical treatment provided on 1997. Petition- adulthood. The treatment was 7-8 March eighteen was filed on 12 on 22 December 1998. Suit er became November 1999. Respondent asserted in the Circuit 15. Petitioner notes in her brief being proceeds "was that the Erie benefits check cashed with the Court 7. kept by See Petitioner's Brief at Petitioner [Petitioner's] father." money from Erie. See apparently concedes that her father received the Respondent at notes in its brief that Petitioner Petitioner’s Brief destroyed totally "[t]he [Petitioner] admits that vehicle driven replaced by Respondent’s See Brief at 10 promptly the father.” 9). (quoting Petitioner’s Brief *17 for Ordinari- a automobile Petitioner.16 purchase replacement required a a parent an automobile is not ly, in a minor child. There is no evidence this record furnish to necessary, a within the mean- having an automobile was necessaries, for The father’s ing of the doctrine of Petitioner. the insurance to the debt owed apply proceeds refusal aware of as it Respondent existence which he was well —the premise applied was the facial for which he and Petitioner in of his place unwilling- Erie the first clear indication —is at a expenses fairly ness to Petitioner’s medical time services, contemporaneous provision with the of the medical i.e., Court, days. agree within 60 We with the Circuit which that, adult, found as an Petitioner is liable for the medical expenses treatment which she incurred while a minor. We no find error the Circuit Court’s conclusions that Petitioner could be held expenditures provided liable those medical necessaries, for her benefit under the doctrine of which trumps her disability defense she was under the minority implied promise when she entered into the to pay Respondent for the needed Lastly, medical treatment. we agree that the supports record that Petitioner’s father was for his then minor daughter’s medical neces- saries, which, turn, left Petitioner primarily liable debt to Respondent.17 Court, attorney,
16. Petitioner’s in the Circuit stated that the “PIP that, money” buy was used “to her a new [Petitioner] car.” Prior to only vaguely proceeds the record hinted how the PIP were utilized Schmidt, Jr., i.e., "provided Mr. to Michelle to use for items not related [Respondent].” See letter of 22 March 2000 from Erie’s claims supervisor attorney. to Petitioner’s record, implead On this Petitioner have been able to her father litigation, parental during minority in this whose duties Petitioner’s necessaries, paying included for her such as the medical able, merely unwilling, issue. If Petitioner’s father was but necessaries, public policy her medical it would not violate for Petition- er, adult, provide as an to sue her for failure to for her necessaries. We note that principal public policy support judicially [t]he of the created parent-child immunity protection family integrity doctrine is “the harmony parental discipline and of discretion in the and care of
E.
following
as
hypothetical
offers us the
Lastly, Petitioner
places
the doctrine of necessaries
demonstrating why
means of
lawsuits.
at risk for future
unreasonably
minors
Bushey
See
reduces the
blunts the Dissent’s criticism
Family
majority
child
exists.
or her
operate to vindicate the
Birsner,
which
business
parent-minor child
parent-minor child
quently,
that the
served.
have
where the foundаtion
view
created
A.2d
may
immunity to bar
doctrine of
does not bar a child’s
cable
in loco
340, 357,
77 A.2d
parent-child
emphasized in the
suit,
normal
contribution from
the child....”
Petitioner’s Brief at 10.
In Garay,
guardian
we cautioned that “whether a
willing
jurisdic-
is able and
necessaries varies from
*19
supply
jurisdiction
tion to
and is
on
facts of
heavily dependent
the
each
Garay,
individual case.”
JUDGMENT PETITIONER. J., BELL, C.J., RAKER, in which
Dissenting Opinion by ELDRIDGE, J., join. BELL, C.J., and RAKER, dissenting, joined by Judge, ELDRIDGE, J.: rule fairly regarding common
Today majority restates where a for the cost of medical necessities: liability a minor’s for a minor child’s is unable at the time of incur- medical treatment necessary emergency child, treatment, reaching age upon sion of the *20 of necessities held liable under the doctrine majority, may be at 542-544. Other Maj. op. care. for the cost of the medical rules, minors liable for finding similar employed courts have unable, are parents treatment where the necessary medical D. refuse, for such treatment. See John provide or fail to Medical, Dental, Hodson, Annotation, Liability Infant’s for (2001). Services, this Applying A.L.R.4th 1249 Hospital us, petitioner finds the majority the to the case before rule while she was a of care rendered for the cost medical liable of petitioner’s that the failure majority The reasons minor. after peti- recovered proceeds to the insurance apply father medical care cost of petitioner’s accident towards the tioner’s to pay at the time unwillingness of his is “a clear indication contemporaneous fairly at a time medical petitioner’s services, i.e., days.” within 60 of medical provision with the at 555.1 Maj. op. holding for two reasons. majority’s
I
with the
disagree
to
First,
unwilling
father
majority
petitioner’s
finds the
constitutes
discussing
bills without
what
for her medical
pay
Indeed,
reasoning is based
majority’s
unwillingness.
meaning
import
not touch on the
on cases that do
largely
Second,
statutory
common law and
unwillingness.
this State’s
child, supported by
support
proposition
law does not
for isolated
responsible
be held
parents,
his or her
should
pay. Despite
fail to
necessary
parents
medical costs that
support
to
their
obligated by
are
statute
the fact
children,
supported by
minors who are
majority
leaves
choices, regardless of
parents’
liable for their
their
actually
choices
reflect
choices are or whether the
what those
care.
unwillingness
pay
medical
because
respondent
finds
liable to
majority
petitioner
unwilling
petitioner’s
her father was
pay.
her
was unable to
As
not because
father
expenses,
above,
that the father’s failure to
majority
stated
believes
daughter’s
for his
insurance
proceeds
use
unwillingness
is a “clear indication”
his
medical bills
at 555.
is
expenses. Maj. op.
There
petitioner’s
entirely
why
sixty
days
passage
clear
or more
matters.
It is not
majority
question
set out
raises the
whether
The time frame
daugh-
majority
petitioner’s
unwilling
for his
would find
father
spent
proceeds sixty-five
expenses if he had
the insurance
ter's medical
days, ninety days
year
Setting out such a time
or a
after the accident.
little,
prospective
anything,
way
providing us or
does
if
in the
frame
litiganls
to determine whether a
with a means
pay for a child's medical bills.
*21
state,
State,
to
us
any
help
in this
or
other
little case law
for his or her child’s
unwilling
when a
decide
is, however,
costs. What little law there
necessary medical
or her
supported by
parents,
that where a child is
his
suggests
single necessary expense
on a
the
failure
default
parents’
expense.2
liable for that
usually
not
render
the child
does
“unwilling,” majority
of
the
relies
support
reading
As
for its
Overholtzer,
v.
reading
Garay
a circular
of two decisions:
on
339,
(1993),
Hopkins Hosp.
and Johns
332 Md.
631 A.2d
(1997).
Garay
Both
and
697 A.2d
Pepper,
from
may
expenses
a minor
recover medical
Pepper held that
injuries.
caused the minor’s
While neither
the tortfeasor who
medical
unpaid
expenses,
case involved a minor sued for
allowing a minor to sue a tortfeasor
justify
order to
following reasoning:
cases
on the
expenses,
medical
both
relied
truly
unable to
for such
unwilling
“when
are
potentially
or his or her estate
expenses, leaving the child
contract,
reciprocity
of
demand
the
principles
bound
those
from
given
opportunity
expenses
child be
the
recover
1365;
at
“The rationales minor injured an justice demand that and public policy that from a expenses to recover incurred right have the tort-feasor, are unable where the child’s third-party the medical because expenses, to for those unwilling of reason- By parity .... sue to recover them provider child, attaining adult- upon that such a it would seem ing, necessar- in to for medical hood, liable contract may be minor, were if the to him or her while a provided ies to for such necessaries.” unwilling unable or Unfortunately, original). in (emphasis at 545-546 Maj. op. case before and the Garay, Pepper between parity there is no above, to attempt did not Garay Pepper and us. As stated meaning “unwilling.”3 of into the delve and Garay Pep- restating unanalyzed assumption By conclusion, no guidance us with majority its leaves per as to for their found parent to a should be as when All are left with is the we expenses. child’s believe, and, I incorrect statement that conclusory majority’s to proceeds insurance father’s failure to turn over unwillingness of the father’s is a “clеar” indication plaintiff unwillingness of no clearer a definition provides This pay. Garay: “Most opaque this statement than did Court’s of this formulation the necessaries recognize courts appear a doctrine, parent guard- of whether but the determination varies from willing supply necessaries ian is able on the heavily dependent is jurisdiction jurisdiction Garay, 332 Md. facts of each individual case.” at 444. A.2d Flowers, S.W.2d 708 Garay rationale v. followed the of Gardner (Tenn.1975), a was unable to which focused on whether minor’s mother pay for the minor’s necessities. that petitioner’s argument also brushes aside majority dictum. willingness constitutes obiter
Garay’s discussion
majority states that when a
of law is
Specifically,
question
supplies
raised
the issues
a case and the Court
such
opinion upon
question,
of its
that
expression
deliberate
appears
not to
as obiter dictum. This
opinion
regarded
is
be
definition,
it,
majority
but in
applying
to be
sensible
Cochran,
from
v.
long quotation
relies on a
Carstairs
(1902).
Carstairs,
this
stated that
Even to sue a a child should be able the conclusion that reach relied, without expenses, medical this Court tortfeasor be liable for medical may on the child analysis, principle not pay. to We did unwilling are care where address, the issue this case: whether tangentially, even inexplicably liable when his or her child be held medical cost but otherwise pay necessary fail to fоr an isolated of this Court was the child. The mind provide support for and subject. upon” this distinctly expressed “drawn to nor never parent in which a could analyze than the situations Rather necessary to for a child’s unwilling unable or be found care, observed that: Garay simply court medical formulation of the recognize “Most courts this appear doctrine, of whether a but the determination necessaries willing supply necessaries parent guardian is able and jurisdiction jurisdiction heavily depen- from and is varies dent on the facts of each individual case.” at 444. This observation Garay, Md. at A.2d explicitly any attempt disclaims to set out the circumstances for a parent may under which a be found Therefore, Garay’s care. reference child’s liability resulting parent’s unwilling- to the of a child from a costs answer the help ness does us, should, argues, as be re- question petitioner before garded as dictum.
Those cases that do to touch on the appear question willingness generally parents unwilling have found first, necessary medical situations: where three child; second, parent has abandoned the where the absolutely nothing support; contributes to the child’s *24 third, parent where the child or has recovered medical ex- penses from the tortfeasor.4 The case before us does not fall cases, important any presented by It is to note that none of these nor majority solely question unwillingness. Certainly, deals with the us, fоund a none of the cases we have confront scenario like before provides inexplicably where a father who otherwise for his child fails to reason, particularly and I see no any categories,
into of these record, liable for medical ex- petitioner to hold the on this a her supported while she was child incurred penses parents. truly a who has abandoned parent
It is sensible to hold that
child, including
for the
unwilling
pay
anything
is
child
Estate,
231 Mich.
medical care.
In re Dzwonkiewicz’s
(1925),
found a
Michigan
Court of
Supreme
It is also reasonable find nothing care where the contributes child’s medical Trumbull, In Trainer v. Mass. support. the child’s (1886), Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts N.E. 761 stated: for in already provided respect infant well who
“[A]n board, other articles suitable for his condition clothing and if one to him other responsible any supplies is not to be held c., such did not know that clothing, although person board & So, hand, on the other already supplied. the infant was well infant, case, father, as in this had a the mere fact that anything whom did to- mother, guardian, no one of prevent being care or does not his bound support, wards his necessary for him when actually for that which was furnished.” care after the cost of the care is for the child’s incurred.
565 omitted). added) (citations Likewise, in (emphasis Id. at 762 Foote, (1875), Supreme 42 203 the Court Strong v. Conn. a child liable for the cost Errors of Connecticut found guardian did not show necessary dental work where the child’s or intention to the child’s teeth. any repair preserve effort Id. at 205. for pay some courts have found
Finally, if their medical care the child recovers child’s for from and the damages medical costs the tortfeasor This of cases nonetheless refuses to for the care. line 692, 150 (1929), 339 Wagner, started with Cole v. 197 N.C. S.E. Supreme where the Court of North Carolina stated: think in regard do not that the fact to his father’s “[W]e support liability, usual can absolve the infant from under the facts and circumstances of this case. The infant was seri- ously injured, fair by immediately and inference was taken hospital and his life and usefulness was saved the hospital, surgical During medical and attention.... period paid hospital, treatment the father for no medical surgical treatment the infant. It seems that he was unable, either he infant.... provide least did estate, The infant now has an it is unthinkable that the guardian of infant expense would not the reasonable for saving the child’s life and usefulness.” Goss, 424, Id. at Similarly, Bitting v. 203 N.C. 166 (1932), 302 controlling S.E. the court found Cole where the tortfeasor, minor had from damages recovered the father damages had recovered for medical and the father expenses, subsequently provider. refused to the medical care Cole, living parents may
The rule
that a child
with his
be
parents’ unexplained
liable
failure to
for the child’s
care,
necessary has
to situa-
generally been limited
tions where the child
from
damages
recovered
the tortfeasor
Haack,
Hosp.
medical costs.
Madison
v.
Gen.
(1985),
Supreme
Wis.2d
Cole where a minor has recovered dam- conclusion that defensible care, provider cost of medical the care for the ages pay minor. As the those costs from the should be able to recover Cole, damages to allow a child to recover court found deny the care by incurred the child and then expenses medical child, “would right to recover its costs from the provider the Cole, 150 in the same breath.” S.E. blowing be hot and cold at 341. hold a child liable for readings “unwilling” three
These if it that the only relatively costs is certain necessary medical if the child has expenses cannot for the parents pay very provid- costs the medical care damages recovered for the not hold the liable where the seeking. The cases do child er child, fail to support pay who otherwise their parents, Moreover, cases, other than medical expenses. isolated unwillingness the issue of progeny, Cole and its determine child medi- required on the conduct parent’s based before basing finding because cal care. This makes sense expenses conduct medical unwillingness parents’ on the after otherwise support are incurred would enable who selectively paying avoid for costs their children expenses. Cole, following unwillingness In is determined those cases apply incurred. Cole does not after medical costs are First, not petitioner did case before us for two reasons. tortfeasor. any recover from the personally Therefore, liable, if will not petitioner is found she be able recovery the costs out of her from the tortfeasor. The apply second reason Cole does not herе is that courts follow- Cole have looked ing proof parents’ unwilling- clear of the Bitting, ness to contacted the pay. plaintiff affirmatively pay. who refused to The court observed that the has from T.R. “plaintiff payment demanded said services father], part Goss but no of the said reasonable value of [the T.R. all paid, the services has been and the said Goss has at any times and still refuses to the same or thereof.” part Here, contrast, Bitting, at 302. it by appear S.E. does from the record that the father was contacted daughter majority until the time his had reached and was sued record, far as I can hospital.5 So tell from the father affirmatively hospital. never refused to Since supporting daughter, the father was otherwise his without proof, concluding further there is no basis for that his failure proceeds to use insurance for her medical care reflects unwillingness pay. *27 above,
In contrast to majori- all the cases discussed ty’s petitioner’s spend result would enable father to the insur- proceeds pleased, ance on whatever he his leaving daughter hospital. liable to the fact that Despite sup- the father childhood, ported petitioner have, during her the father could instance, in this used the funds for his own purposes rather grandfather 5. The record is unclear whether the father or the received petitioner's expenses proceeds bills for medical and the insurance out, majority points petitioner's from the insurance carrier. As the petitioner’s grandfa- counsel was not clear as to whether father or proceeds. Maj. op. ther received the insurance at 539 n. 4. The facts on confusing by this issue are made more the fact that the check from the company any insurance was made out to Lewis Schmidt without father, money indication whether was directed to the Lewis Schmidt, Jr., Schmidt, grandfather, or the Lewis Sr. A letter from Erie Schmidt, Group petitioner's Insurance to counsel states that the Lewis Jr., Insured,” Schmidt, Sr., was the "Erie while Lewis was counsel’s Finally, petitioner’s lawyer argued client. before the Circuit Court that petitioner’s all petitioner’s the bills for medical were sent grandfather rather than her father. bills, thereby rendering her daughter’s his medical than this cost. responsible for by the fact holding troubling is made more majority’s The to the father’s anything but clear as the record costs. The for his medical daughter’s unwillingness recovering money the father’s actions majority recounts as daughter’s injuries his follows: filed for hospital, petitioner from the “Soon after her release in her father’s Erie coverage provided benefits under father petitioner claim and her During process, policy. regarding to Erie her several documents provided her father petitioner March and On 16 expenses. Authorization, authorizing petitioner’s signed a Disclosure of her post- to furnish Erie with records treating physician her May petitioner and treatment. On accidеnt Authorization of benefits Assignment and signed father instructing directing Erie coverage the PIP under the amount owed treating physician to her pay directly him.” of these majority’s reading to the
Maj. Contrary at 539. op. the father facts, reasonable to conclude that equally it seems was, fact, daughter’s expenses. for his willing daugh- the benefits to his assigned would he have Why else father, at all clear that who doctor? It is not ter’s youth assigned daughter during his her supported unwilling daughter’s physicians, to his insurance benefits necessary medical costs. daughter’s for his that, mentioned acknowledge fails to as majority also until suit was above, failed to contact the father hospital hand knowl- case. The had no first brought this respon- pay. Despite father was edge that the *28 for not there is no reasonable excuse protestations, dent’s that it had of the father. The admits having inquired before the District Court phone the father’s name and number phone usually a name and number day age, trial. In this and I no person. Again, to contact a see enough information basis, one, father’s claiming not a clear for that the certainly
569 for his medi- unwillingness daughter’s actions indicate cal bills. Court, Karwacki,
In
Garay, Judge
writing
pointed
Franklin,
Baptist Hospitals
N.C.App.
North Carolina
446,
(N.C.991),
example
provide merеly care for the costs of medical liability escape allowed to rendered, decided, the care was he because after is This provider. to the care proceeds transfer insurance hospital indicates that the where the record true particularly he was whether the father to determine contacted never the altogether ignores majority The willing pay. statute, this that under argument at oral agreed respondent care for medical truly unwilling are parents if the even child, sued child, not the should be the parents, their given of irrespective statutory responsibility, a liability is because unwillingness. of majority’s application the to note that important
It is also Mary- meaning disability. of distorts the Pepper Garay “an 202(0 disability as a under person defines land Rule 1— incompe- or an years of 18 individual age under the individual ac- majority the incapacity.” As reason of mental tent and their contracts disability are under a minors knowledges, A at 542. minor under Maj. op. are therefore voidable. of age from suit until the merely shielded
disability is not on basis of always defend the He or she eighteen. age majority. the of reaching after disability, even Garay, of application majority’s of the erroneous As a result hospital inexplicably fail parents in a case where birth, is now hospital with their child’s fees associated of notify parents the child’s any responsibility relieved Instead, wait hospital may intent to sue. hоspital’s majority. age reaches the until the child eighteen years than the the child rather Thereafter, may sue until the child supported if the raised and even necessary all costs. paid other age majority The meaning disability. fundamentally changes This disability longer is no on regarding inquiry focus of the relationship parents, with his or her state of the child’s overall a single on decision to parents’ but the cost is incurred. cost after child, majority’s reasoning,
Under the upon turning age eighteen, may become liable for any necessary medical cost parents neglected that the child’s to pay. The child is liable whether not the claimant ever asks if they are willing pay. child liable even where the parent inexplicably single chooses occasion on which they will not *30 their child’s needs. This of piercing manner the shield of disability stands stark contrast to the cases discussed above, where there strong evidence that no one than other the child was or willing would be to for the medical care. cases, In those it was almost certain that the medical care provider would not be able to recover from anyone if the child was not forced to pay. majority’s The reasoning transforms disability from a protecting shield those too to young be bound to starting gate, contracts into a after which medical care providers are to free sue children for even the most isolated cost that the child’s parents inexpliсably fail to pay. I closing, believe that the majority should have exercised
greater caution in finding petitioner’s father was unwill- ing pay for his daughter’s medical bills. In Pepper, we question confronted the whether a family with a combined $21,000, children, income of two and pre-majority medical expenses $1,100,000 for one child in of excess was able to for their child’s medical expenses. Although inability of parents their child’s medical bills may have been more obvious than Pepper the father’s unwillingness to pay case, in this we did not decide whether parents were in Instead, fact unable to pay. we wrote: “Whether or not parents are able to afford necessary medi- cal care for their negligently injured minor child will vary from case to case according the circumstances of the involved, parties including, to, but not limited parental income, existing financial assets obligations, and the number of children the family, available coverage, insurance rate, cost of living and inflation whether or not both work, or are even of capable working in light of the child’s
injuries, and other economic and non-economic factors too
course,
numerous to list.
It will
vary,
also
on the nature
and manner of treatment.
and the duration
injury
line rule
preclude
bright
infinitely
These
variable factors
affordability
which the
determi-
the standard
concerning
not, juries will have
More often than
nation can be made.
when
lay testimony
aid of
and
expert
to decide
with
child’s
injured
extent
necessary,
and
what
whether
par-
financial
of the
ability
exceed the
necessaries
ents.”
Likewise,
A.2d at
in Greenville
Smith,
(1977),
269 S.C.
Hosp. Sys. v. faced with a case where Carolina was Supreme Court South their son’s any payment minor’s failed to make on this was bill the record not indicate whether hospital did court found inability unwillingness pay. to their due that: action have their pursued right
“Mr. and Smith Mrs. for Ken- they of the incurred recovery to seek for their Except treatment. neth’s the record indicates pay, nothing continued failure *31 bill. Ab- pay hospital Kenneth’s are unable to must look Mr. and Mrs. showing, respondent sent such a for payment.” Smith probate The court therefore remanded to the
Id. 658-59. discharge if were court to Kenneth’s able determine 659. The obligation expenses. his Id. at their Smith, extraordinarily this Pepper, court like court parents’ a child liable his or her failure finding careful necessary medical costs. herein, I To respectfully For all stated dissent. the reasons majority’s reading I of this Court’s recap, find that Pepper provide fails to a workable Garay and opinions on of a unwillingness part definition majority’s I believe that expenses. also statutory common law analysis step with our out duty care for and the children regarding parental future, unless a falls into meaning disability. case where have found categories one of the cases courts three child’s parents unwilling to the child’s necessary care, I would not responsible hold the child for the parents’ choices.
Chief BELL Judge and Judge join ELDRIDGE in this dissenting opinion.