To meet the exigencies growing out of the presence of small-pox, in epidemic form, in several of the towns of Stc aras county, causing wide-spread alarm, the legislature, at its extra session in 1881, passed an act, approved November 4th, entitled “An act to authorize the county commissioners of Stearns county to take meаsures to prevent the spreading of small-pox.” Sp. Laws 1881, (Ex. Sess.) c. 104. Under its provisions the board of county com
The act in question is rеmedial, and is to be largely and beneficially construed to advance and subserve, and not embarrass, the purрose of its enactment. Effective regulations could not be promptly and successfully enforced without the еmployment of medical counsel and assistance and the necessary sanitary and remedial agencies, including supervision and police. These, therefore, the board were authorized to employ, and such necessary and reasonable expenses as should thereby be incurred would be a proper charge agаinst the county; and, within the limitations prescribed by the rules, the expenses so authorized to be incurred by the several commissioners in their respective districts, in the use of proper means reasonably necessary to arrest the disease, would also constitute lawful claims against the county. Labrie v. Manchester, 59 N. H. 120.
Subsequently, however, on the 13th of December, 1881, the board passed the following resolution: “Resolved, that from and after this date, the county will not be responsible for аny claims against the county in small-pox cases, and that all doctors named in the resolution of November 17, 1881, arе hereby dismissed, Dr. A. G.
Subsequently, in the month of Jаnuary following, the disease appears to have again broken out and spread extensively in several tоwns in one of the districts, and the commissioner of such district, who was newly elected and but recently qualified, thereupоn authorized and employed the plaintiff to assist in preventing the spread of the disease, by vaccination аnd other appropriate means, with the knowledge and approval of other members of the board, but withоut any official action on their part; and thereafter plaintiff’s bill for his services and medicines and expenditures was, as appears by the record, acted on, approved, and allowed in part by the board. While the danger lasted, and the necessity for action on the part of the commissioners existed, it would be largely in the discretion of the board to determine what means should be used or authorized, and what expenses might be reasonably incurred in carrying out the regulations. And we are unable to see why, if in any particular case it should be made to аppear that expenses reasonably necessary were incurred by one of the commissioners in endеavoring to arrest the spread of the contagion, the board might not either authorize such expenditures in advance, or thereafter recognize, ratify, and pay the same under the powers given them by the act above referred to. The plaintiff’s claim was thus approved and allowed in part, and he does not complain оf the action of the board. Their ratification would so far validate what they might have authorized. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 463, (385;) People v. Swift, 31 Cal.
We think, therefore, that the court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant, and that there should be a new trial.
Order reversed.