*1 Rycke at 719-20. Danielson failed to 2. De shall pay $900 costs probation comply with the terms her and disbursements to the pursu- Director and, result, suspended her indefi- we 24(a), RLPR; ant to Rule and Rycke, nitely. Id. 720-21. Like De 3. Before reinstatement to the practice only misconduct was Danielson’s fail- new law, Rycke De provide shall proof of cooperate attorney ure to with the disci- practice fitness to law with complying pline process. See id. the petition and hearing requirements of Here, Rycke’s De in 18(a)-(d), Rule RLPR and the written ex- respond his repeated cluded failure to to amination continuing and legal education the Director’s requests, supply infor requirements 18(e), of Rule RLPR. requested, meetings mation and attend probation. his Each discuss terms of So ordered.
these failures violated terms and condi probation. his Rycke’s
tions of De failure cooperate initially began contin suspended placed
ued he after was and on 21, 1998,
probation April on has per despite
sisted publicly the fact he was for,
reprimanded among in June 2001 oth things, failing cooperate
er pattern Director. This evidence shows SCHMIDGALL, J. Wanda Rycke failing cooperate of De with the Petitioner, Appellant, probation. terms his only While the Rycke’s new misconduct is De failure cooperate communicate and Di with the CORP, Respondent, FILMTEC
rector, original discipline his for client neglect noncommunication, as well as Commissioner of Economic failing file timely state and federal Security, Respondent. individual income taxes and taxes pay failing timely file state and federal em No. C8-01-4. ployer quarterly withholding returns. Furthermore, Rycke’s De disciplinary his Supreme Court of Minnesota. tory is more than extensive present May
either Danielson Hoedeman. De Rycke already suspended been placed public and been on probation facts,
twice. Under these we conclude suspension prac indefinite eligibility apply
tice of law without
reinstatement for a minimum of 6 months
is appropriate.
Accordingly, we order that:
1.Respondent Rycke Eric A.L. De
hereby indefinitely suspended from the 15(a)(2),
practice pursuant law to Rule
RLPR shall ineligible apply months;
reinstatement for a minimum of 6 *2 Hedin, Glidden,
Douglas A. A. Elizabeth P.A., Goldberg, Minneapolis, Hedin & Appellant. Strathman, Marko
Chad W. J. Mrko- nich, Mendelson, P.C., Minneapolis, Littler Respondent, FilmTec. Todd, Byrne, Philip Kent E. Minne- You are assured getting proper B. Security, Department sota of Economic medical attention. Paul, Respondent, Commissioner.
Saint complete 2. A record all accidents
is maintained review and evalua- *3 tion. protected You are by Worker’s Compensation Insurance work re- for
OPINION injuries. lated ANDERSON, A. Justice. RUSSELL (Emphasis original.) Schmidgall re- ceived a copy employee handbook Schmidgall discharged Wanda J. was during orientation, new all do from employment Corpora- with FilmTec new employees. violating for tion FilmTec’s same-shift in- jury reporting policy. was denied 22, 1999, She September On at the end of unemployment by shift, benefits Commis- Schmidgall injured her her shoulder sioner, Department Security, of Economic and back as she was in process for discharged employ- because she was leaving premises. The of appeals ment misconduct. The court next day, report she filed a injury. affirmed. Because we conclude under the Her employer report determined that her Schmidgall’s facts of this case that con- was late impor- and coached her on the misconduct, duct constituted tance of reporting injury supervi- we affirm. sion immediately. May On
Schmidgall injured again her at work. back I. Although approximately there were four shift, and one-half remaining hours on her manufacturing FilmTec is a company she did not the injury until the next a produces composite thin film mem- day. She given warning was a written purifica- brane or “element” used in water violating reporting policy, the same-shift systems. tion Schmidgall employed by which sign, she refused and cautioned 3, 1999, through July FilmTec from June that a failure to abide company 14, 2000, discharged she when could result in employment. termination of violating safety FilmTec’s policy requiring employees report any or in- accident July On Wednesday, Schmidgall jury supervisor safety to their and the site again injured shortly her back at work during coordinator shift in which same before lunch a working cutting while at occurs.1 FilmTec’s handbook pain table. back When her increased fol- sets forth which policy, pro- lowing lunch, stopped she her work at the vides: cutting performed light- table instead and shift,
Any occurring duty work accident must be tasks until end of the which reported your supervisor p.m. the site was at 2:30 When her did not back Safety improve during overnight, Coordinator returned work shift day reported injury incident occurs. First aid be ren- the next you may physician supervisor, dered or to a her who sent sent her home. She injuries, day for treatment. All no matter called sick next the follow- slight, ing hoiv must be so reported Monday that: when she went to see doctor injury reported, 1. After an tion” to accident or an determine the cause of the accident investiga- prevent FilmTec conducts a "root cause or and to recurrence. Bros., Inc., 346 Portage Madden to work on Pine her She returned back. (Minn.1984). 11, 2000, completed a Tuesday, July N.W.2d Whether disqualifying mis- injury. particular her She was act report of constitutes written law, and, question man- this suspended following review conduct is which Ress, discharged violating de agement, she was court reviews novo. N.W.2d On this evidence the reporting policy. at 523. Schmidgall was commissioner determined disqualification pur Misconduct for receipt unemploy- disqualified conduct, “any on poses is intentional employment mis- ment benefits because of job job, disregards off the appeals The court of affirmed. conduct. standards of behavior *4 Schmidgall Corp., FilmTec No. C8-01- v. to the or right expect has the of 800048, 4, (Minn.App. July WL at *1 2001 the and obli disregards employee’s duties 2001). the Minn.Stat. gations employer.” 6(a) 268.095, Employment § subd. II. “negligent is indifferent also or issue before us is whether The conduct, job, that job on the or off the the de supports the record commissioner’s a demonstrates substantial lack of concern Schmidgall that dis termination Id. employment.” general for the As a charged misconduct and rule, refusing by to abide an disqualified receiving therefore from requests policies and amounts reasonable she had unemployment benefits because disqualifying misconduct. See McGow discharged for violations an em been Enters., Transp. an Express v. Executive requiring the ployment policy (Minn.1988). Inc., 420 N.W.2d in any injury during the which it shift Film- Schmidgall argues that occurred. review the commissioner’s We unreason reporting requirement Tec’s is findings light factual in the most favorable able, policies the undermining embedded the not commissioner’s decision will in Act that the Workers’ long as there is evidence disturb them as days a furnish an allow claimant 30 reasonably tends to sustain those injury a employer with notice of work findings. v. Ress Abbott Northwestern Inc., (Minn. temper that also the harshness of a statu Hosp., 448 N.W.2d 1989). tory compensation by recognizing a in bar to employee engaged Whether an in variety delay giving of excuses for a disqualifies the employee conduct (2000);2 § a notice. See 176.141 unemployment from benefits is mixed No. Freyholtz of fact and See v. Blackduck Sch. Dist. question law. Colburn want, defect, provides: inaccuracy, or and then 2. Minnesota Statutes such only prejudice. to the the If the extent of knowledge employer Unless actual given knowledge is notice or the obtained injury occurrence of the or unless the days, if or within 180 worker, injured dependent a or or someone give beneficiary other shows failure either, gives in behalf of written notice prior employee's to the or notice was due employer days thereof to the within after mistake, inadvertence, beneficiary's igno- injury, then occurrence no com- law, inability, to the rance of fact or or or pensation be shall due until notice fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit of the given knowledge If the or obtained. notice employer compensation agent, or then given knowledge allowed, or the obtained within employer prej- shows be unless notice, injury, from occurrence by to receive in udice failure failure, want, inaccuracy no or of a compensation notice case amount of which obtaining compensation fairly shall be a bar be reduced sum which shall represents employer prejudice prejudice unless shown. Unless shows (Minn.2000). Specifi- policy FilmTec’s as articulated within the itself, minor cally, argues that even devia- statement as the poli- well cy’s practical effect of reporting policy assuring workplace tions from the same-shift safety by allowing compel FilmTec effectively employees legiti- immediately identify and address hazardous conditions mate work choose between endangering employees, other we cannot claiming compensation workers’ benefits say that FilmTec’s same-shift maintaining employment. FilmTec policy is facially unreasonable.3 argues reporting policy its is reason- able in that medical proper assures at- time, At the same we understand there tention, provides complete record of all may delay be situations which in fur accidents, and facilitates the assertion of nishing injury notice within the time compensation rights through workers’ ought constraints of the same shift to prompt injury employer. notice to the excused, recognize such as failure to compensation require- The workers’ notice early its latent It stage. is at enabling ment is aimed arguable least that what FilmTec deter furnish immediate medical attention day-late mined to be a notice toas Schmid- minimizing hope of the seriousness of the gall’s injury might first have been excusa *5 injury protecting employer per- the ble. But FilmTec did not terminate mitting investigation an claim of the soon Schmidgall’s employment until after she injury. Kling after the v. St. Barnabas failed to timely report make a of the third 257, 261, Hosp., injury, 291 Minn. 190 N.W.2d following individual instruction and (1971). purposes 677 In view of the of written warning.4 On the limited record Hart, 77, 80-81, Pojanowski knowledge giv- is obtained notice See or written v. 288 Minn. days (1970) ("The en within 180 the occurrence of after 178 916 N.W.2d notice injury compensation the no shall be al- requirement § [of 176.141] Minn.Stat. is de- lowed, except employee that an who is un- signed employer the to enable to furnish im- able, physical incapac- because mental or hope mediate medical attention in the of min- ity, give employer notice to the within imizing injury the seriousness of the as well days give injury 180 from the shall the protect employer by permitting as to the him prescribed days notice within 180 investigate inju- the claim the soon after incapacity time the ceases. Co., ry.”); Rinne v. W.C. 234 Minn. Griffis 146, 150, (1951) ("The 47 N.W.2d 875 3. The asserts dissent that our decision under- purpose requirement of actual knowl- provisions Compen- cuts the of the Workers’ edge permit employer is or notice the Act, inju- that sation FilmTec's same-shift investigation necessary make such as is ry reporting policy effectively eviscerates claim.”); liability gener- decision, however, determine as to a see § Minn.Stat. 176.141. Our Larson, ally Arthur & Lex Larson K. Larson’s compensation is concerned not with workers' § Workers' Law 126.01 unemployment benefits but benefits. requirement A that an an Our should decision not be construed to limit injury practicable injured employee’s right as soon order to an to recover work- compensation employ- workplace safety report- ers' the ensure benefits when and accurate complies requirements ing ee with the of section not be need inconsistent with Indeed, Schmidgall requirements 176.141. in this case re- the notice of Minn.Stat. compensation ceived benefits § workers' cover- 176.141. ing expenses. claimed medical Schmidgall argued has also that did not purpose The also dissent misconstrues 176.141, on three occasions violate the same-shift re- provision of the notice of section porting policy, and she could not therefore stating simply gives employees that it 30 engaged employment have misconduct. report workplace injuries. Section simply period We note that there is evidence in the provides a limitations that protects employer against support record claims too determination old successfully investigated Schmidgall reporting to be and defended. violated the same-shift ** Minn, Tilseth, 374-75, 204 here, at conclude presented we cannot have FilmTec’s same-shift at 646. We said that N.W.2d application.5 in its employer unreasonable can not whether issue is employment choose terminate the rela- Finally, on Tilseth Midwest relying “whether, now tionship, rather but Co., 372, 374-75, 204 Lumber 295 Minn. terminated, there been] [the (1973), Schmidgall argues N.W.2d unemployment compensation, should be reports her failure make immediate the willful- determination which focuses on be was not misconduct requisite culpa [employee’s] Auger have she did not ness behavior.” cause below, (Minn. Co., not raised bility. Although v. Gillette 303 N.W.2d super argues 1981). that Tilseth is commissioner an employ- “Because the nature of 268.095, by subd. seded depending upon vary er’s interest will (2000), which, con says, the commissioner of that in- job, disregard what constitutes templates less restrictive standard terest, misconduct, will also and therefore nature focuses on the conduct vary.” Id. culpability employee, not on single A incident can constitute event, case that in the conduct in this misconduct employee deliberately when an un disqualifying did amount to misconduct chooses a course of conduct that is ad we progeny. der Tilseth and its Because Ress, employer. verse to N.W.2d disqualified for Schmidgall conclude 161). Colburn, (citing at 524 Tilseth, not under we need carry employee’s an refusal to out supersed Tilseth When reach whether has been deliberate, legislation, ed issue de directive of cal subsequent *6 by culated, intentional, the of v. appeals cided court Houston then the is and refusal Corp., McGowan, Data No. Cl-00- Int’l misconduct. 420 at N.W.2d Transfer 856262, 2151, (Minn.App.), *2 2001 WL McGowan, 596. Consistent with em (Minn. 2001). 25, granted Sept. rev. ployee’s knowingly decision to violate a policy employer of the is mis reasonable Tilseth, “is limited to Under See, e.g., Douglas conduct. v. Sandstrom evincing such or wanton dis- conduct wilful (Minn. 89, Corp., Mach. 372 N.W.2d 91 regard employer’s of an interests as App.1985). particularly This is true when disregard found in deliberate violations or multiple there employ- of are violations same standards of behavior which the expect involving warnings er of his rule or dis- right progressive claim, policy following injury, retaliatory discharge the district court second which summary injury, granted judg- dispute, as as the FilmTec's does not well third motion ment, Schmidgall appealed to the court which the basis her termination. appeals. Corp., Schmidgall v. of FilmTec No. CX-01-1722, 655680, (Minn. 2002 WL at *1 policy of The dissent asserts that "FilmTec’s 23, 2002). App. Apr. appeals of The court terminating failing timely employees for improperly concluded that the district court injuries report work-related under its granted summary judgment and remanded. appears to violate 176.82 Id. (2000),” compensation the workers’ retaliato- ry discharge provision. re- A section 176.82 imply poli- We no means that FilmTec’s claim, however, taliatory discharge a com- every cy be would reasonable in circum- purview of Certainly mon law cause action outside the stance. if there were evidence Act, Compensation v. reporting policy being of Workers’ Karnes a were that same-shift Processors, 560, Quality legal Pork N.W.2d 563 532 used circumvent an obli- (Minn.1995), requires proof gations, and it of retalia- we a view would take different tory Schmidgall brought separate policy. of motive. reasonableness
807 Serv., given v. Indus. Parts & If the notice is or cipline. knowledge Gilkeson 448, Inc., days within (Minn.App.1986) N.W.2d 452 obtained 30 from the occur- want, injury, failure, conduct was rence of the no employee’s or (concluding in pattern inaccuracy of of a notice shall engaged misconduct when he bar to policies procedures obtaining compensation follow failing to [under requests); directions and ignoring Act] Workers’ unless the Co., want, Minneapolis prejudice by Star & Trib. shows Campbell v. such defect, inaccuracy, (Minn.App.1984) only N.W.2d then em- extent of (concluding repeated prejudice. violations of ployer’s neglect job rules and re- work essence, In gives section 176.141 employ- sponsibilities demonstrated report workplace injuries. ees 30 Omnetic’s, misconduct); v. Evenson “Rights, and obligations remedies (con- (Minn.App.1984) N.W.2d employers, employees their insurers and cluding continued tardiness after sev- concerning compensation for work-related warnings disqualifying eral miscon- injuries governed by are legislative enact- duct). ment.” McClish v. Baking Pan-O-Gold in- (Minn.1983).
FilmTee has clear and substantial Co., 538, 544 By 336 N.W.2d maintaining workplace. terest a safe requiring employees Morris, shifts, See Wicken 527 N.W.2d their during effectively FilmTee has (“The (Minn.1995) provide duty employ- eviscerated section 176.141. The fact that non-delega- is a workplace ees with a safe FilmTee have a laudable for a reason employer.”) duty ble held Under reporting period permit shorter does not case, presented the facts as this ignore section and establish Schmidgall’s pattern failing comply an inconsistent requirement. re injury reporting policy Karger, evinced a See In Estate 253 Minn. (1958) (“What 137, 142 disregard willful of this interest. In re- ought legislature law to be is for viewing findings the record and * * *.”). commissioner, By today, its decision the court we conclude Schmid- *7 disqualified of condones evisceration.1 gall receipt unemployment compensation for employ- policy short- While behind FilmTec’s ment in with connection viola- reporting in- period ened work-related tions of the same-shift reasonable, juries mhy be neither the em- reporting policy. authority nor have ployer this court change legislature’s or interfere
Affirmed.
enacted
duly
timeframe for
PAGE,
(dissenting).
Justice
injuries.
time-
work-related
Whether that
I
respectfully
Although
policy
dissent.
this
frame should be shortened is
If
question
legislature.
case
best left to the
unemploy-
concerns entitlement
benefits,
legislature
ment
the court’s
un-
shorten the time-
resolution
desires
frame,
provisions
may
it
do
Minne-
certainly
dercuts the
Minnesota
so. See
Act,
Co.,
Creamery
Clover
Workers’
see Minn.
sota v.
U.S.
Leaf
(2000).
469,
715,
§
Stat.
Section
Skrupa, U.S. S.Ct. (1963)). But not. it has 10 L.Ed.2d Respondent. YANG, Steven being In conflict with addition No. C6-01-1362. legislature set out sec- protections Supreme Court of Minnesota. 176.141, policy of terminat- tion FilmTec’s ing failing timely report employees June injuries ap- under its work-related § pears to violate provides:
Section 176.82
Any threatening person discharging seeking discharge employee an compensation benefits or
workers’ intentionally obstmcting manner seeking compen- workers’ in a action
sation benefits is liable civil damages incurred added.) case,
(Emphasis In this Schmid-
gall’s terminated for en- employment was permitted by
gaging expressly in conduct chilling The this
section 176.141. effect exercising employees
decision will have on rights Compen-
their under Workers’
sation Act will substantial. Schmidgall reported
Because her work- employer,
related her consistent
with the timeframe under sec- permitted 176.141, I
tion conclude that she is not from
disqualified receiving unemployment
compensation for misconduct as that term 6(a) 268.095,
is used in Minn.Stat. subd.