James Dennis SCHLOTE and Nancy Schlote, Appellees, v. Douglas E. DAWSON, Appellant.
No. 02-1143.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Jan. 22, 2004.
Rehearing Denied March 23, 2004.
676 N.W.2d 187
Because we conclude reimbursement alimony was not warranted in this case, we vacate the court of appeals decision and reverse the district court judgment on this issue. We modify the judgment of the district court by allowing Ralane to keep as rehabilitative alimony any payment Craig has made on that award.
We affirm the decision of the court of appeals on all of the remaining issues raised in the appeal and the judgment of the district court on those issues. We also affirm the decision of the court of appeals rejecting Ralane‘s request for appellate attorney fees.
We remand to allow the district court to modify its decree consistent with this opinion.
COURT OF APPEALS DECISION AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND MODIFIED; CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Martin A. Diaz, Iowa City, for appellees.
LAVORATO, Chief Justice.
In this medical malpractice case, the district court denied the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment. The defendant contended
I. Scope of review.
We review a summary judgment ruling for correction of errors at law.
II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A family doctor referred James Dennis Schlote to Dr. Douglas E. Dawson for a sore throat. Schlote‘s first contact with Dr. Dawson was May 2, 1996. On that date Dr. Dawson told Schlote he had cancer of the throat, and the cancer was lying on top of his voice box. Dr. Dawson also told Schlote that he needed an operation to remove his voice box and without the operation he would die. Dr. Dawson did not tell Schlote that radiation treatment rather than surgery might be an option. Nor did he tell Schlote about a more conservative surgery that might avoid a complete removal of his voice box. Schlote agreed to the surgery to remove his voice box.
On May 21 Dr. Dawson surgically removed Schlote‘s voice box. Because of the surgery, Schlote lost his voice. Before the surgery, Dr. Dawson told Schlote this would happen.
In August 1998, Schlote‘s daughter visited him from California. She suggested that Schlote get his medical records, which he did. Schlote took the records to Dr. Guy McFarland, one of Dr. Dawson‘s former partners. In August 1997 the partners had removed Dr. Dawson as a partner after they learned that Dr. Dawson had become addicted to a narcotic. Dr. McFarland told Schlote to submit the records to the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners, which Schlote did.
In December 1999, the Iowa Board of Medical Examiners suspended Dr. Dawson‘s medical license for, among other things, excessive surgery. Two months later on February 17, 2000, Schlote and his wife sued Dr. Dawson. The Schlotes claimed Dr. Dawson was negligent because the surgery he performed was unnecessary and excessive. Schlote‘s wife claimed Dr. Dawson‘s negligence caused her a loss of consortium.
Later, Dr. Dawson moved for summary judgment, contending that
Dr. Dawson contended that the “injury” for purposes of
In contrast, the Schlotes maintained that the “injury” for purposes of
The Schlotes had a fallback position. They contended the doctrine of fraudulent concealment applied to prevent the statute of limitations from running until Schlote discovered the medical malpractice claim. The Schlotes argued the doctrine applied because Dr. Dawson did not tell Schlote that removal of his voice box was unnecessary and that he—Dr. Dawson—had a drug problem.
The district court denied Dr. Dawson‘s motion for summary judgment. The court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether Schlote was aware of the injury and about whether thе fraudulent concealment doctrine applied.
Dr. Dawson filed an application for interlocutory appeal, which we granted.
III. Issues.
Dr. Dawson raises the following issues: (1) whether the district court erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether Schlote was aware of the injury more than two years before the Schlotes filed suit, and (2) whether the district court erred in finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact about whether the fraudulent concealment doctrine applied in this case.
IV. Discovery of Injury.
A. Background. Before beginning оur analysis, we think it would be helpful to review the case law about statute of limitations for private-party medical malpractice actions before and after the legislature passed
Several years before Schnebly, this court adopted the discovery rule for negligence actions generally in Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 463, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967) (plaintiff unaware of defective design until water dripped through ceiling). In Chrischilles, the court noted the general rule is that a cause of action accrues when the aggrieved party has a right to initiate and maintain a suit. 260 Iowa at 461, 150 N.W.2d at 99. A cause of action for negligence does not accrue until there is an injury resulting from the negligence. Id. The statutе of limitations does not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. Id. at 461, 150 N.W.2d at 100.
In Chrischilles, the court, in adopting the discovery rule as an exception to the statute of limitations, expressed the discovery rule this way: “[A] cause of action based on negligence does not accrue until plaintiff has in fact discovered that he has suffered injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it....” Id. at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 100. By “injury,” the court meant “injury to [the plaintiff‘s] interest.” Id. at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 101; see also 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions § 148, at 546 (2000) (“The test to determine when a cause of action arises or accrues is whеn the plaintiff has suffered a legal injury, that is, when he or she has the right to maintain an action....“)
In applying
In Baines, the court noted that in Chrischilles, the court had approved the following statement from Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785, 791 (1963), a medical malpractice case: “The limitation statute or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to run until the date of discovery, or the date when, by the exercise of reasonable care, plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act.” 223 N.W.2d at 201.
Significantly, in Baines, the court rejected the defendant‘s contention that perception of physical harm equates with imputed knowledge of its origin in malpractice. In response, the court stated: “Knowledge of an injury may or may not be sufficient to alert a reаsonably diligent person to the basis of his claim, depending on the circumstances of the case.” Id.
Baines interpreted the discovery rule to mean that the statute of limitations “does not begin to run until the injured person knows or can be charged with knowledge of the existence of his cause of action.” Id. The court continued:
[I]t is not necessary to prove the plaintiff knew the specific negligence of the defendant nor that he knew the details of the evidence by which to prove the cause of action. It is enough that he knew or may be reasonably charged with knowledge of sufficient facts to be aware he had a cause of action more than two years before it was brought.
Finally, the court noted that it would be unjust to require a plaintiff to seek a remedy before he knows of his rights. Id. at 202-03. Such a requirement would force a patient to submit to physical examinations “by a series of independent physicians after every operation or treatment he received from the physician of his first choice. The unreasonableness of such a result is self-evident.” Id. at 203.
In 1975—one year following Baines—the Iowa legislature amendеd statutory provisions dealing with medical malpractice. The new legislation was based on a finding “that a critical situation exists because of the high cost and impending unavailability of medical malpractice insurance.” 1975 Iowa Acts ch. 239, § 1. Within the same chapter of the Iowa Acts, the legislature added a new subsection for the statute of limitations to specifically control medical malpractice cases. Id. § 26 (codified at
Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, еxcept when otherwise specially declared:
....
9. Malpractice.
... [T]hose founded on injuries to the person or wrongful death against any physician ... arising out of patient care, within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of, the injury or death for
which damages are sought in the action, whichever of the dates occurs first....
Shortly after the legislature passed
With this background in mind, we turn to the question whether the discovery rule applies in this case. For reasons that follow, we conclude it does not.
B. Analysis. The critical language in
Thе Schlotes counter as they did in the district court that the “injury” for purposes of
The fighting issue boils down to the meaning of “injury” in the phrase “injury or death for which damages are sought” in
The dictionary also gives what it describes as a legal meaning: “any wrong or violation of the rights, property, reputation of another for which legal action to recover damages may be made.” Id. This is the meaning the Schlotes implicitly give to the word “injury” in
The Restatement describes “injury” as “the invasion of any legally protected interest of another.” Restаtement (Second) of Torts § 7(1), at 12 (1965). This meaning is also the meaning Chrischilles gave to the word “injury” in its definition of the discovery rule. Chrischilles, 260 Iowa at 463, 150 N.W.2d at 101 (“We conclude that plaintiff‘s cause of action did not accrue until he discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury to his interest ....“) (emphasis added).
In contrast, the Restatement describes “physical harm” as “the physical impairment of the human body....” Restatement § 7(3). This is the meaning that Dr. Dawson gives to the word “injury” in
We think Schultze is strong support for Dr. Dawson‘s position. The question in Schultze was whether the statute of limitations under
... [T]hose founded on injuries to the person or wrongful death against any physician ... arising out of patient care, within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of, the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action....
The plaintiff argued that the words “injury” and “death” in the italicized language must be preceded by the modifiers “personal” and “wrongfully” so that the language reads: “within two years after the date on which the claimant knew ... of the [personal] injury or [wrongful] death....” Schultze, 463 N.W.2d at 48-49. The plaintiff argued that this construction was necessary “to effect the intent of the legislature thereby giving meaning to the discovery rule.” Id. at 49. In Schultze, the plaintiff, like the Schlotes here, argued that the plaintiff should be able to use the discovery rule because the plaintiff was not immediately aware of the doctor‘s wrongful conduct that caused the death. Id.
We rejected the plaintiff‘s argument. We reasoned that “the common usage [of] the word ‘death’ refers to the end of life, a time certain.” Id. We also said subsection 9 “standing alone is intelligible and the meaning is clear.” Id. We therefore concluded that the statute of limitations on medical malpractice actions for wrongful death begins to run on the date of discovery of death, and not on date of discovery of the wrongful act that caused the death. Id. at 48.
We also said that subsection 9 provides its own modified discovery rule by commencing the two-year limitation period from “the date on which [plaintiff] knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, оr received notice ... of, the ... death....” There is no suggestion or hint in this language that the legislature intended that we impose a different commencement date for the limitation period by imposing an additional condition that plaintiff knew the death was wrongful. To further extend the limitation period would be contrary to the plain language of the subsection and the legislature‘s intent to restrict the length of time for commencing malpractice actions. Additionally, it would create a discovery rule that supersedes a statutorily imposed discоvery rule. This is contrary to the legislative intent. Id. at 50.
Moreover, we rejected the plaintiff‘s arguments that “the discovery rule should apply to
Given the legislature‘s use of the conjunction “or” between the words “injury” and “death” in the above italicized languаge in
The legislative history we discussed and the policy considerations underlying
In Luem v. Johnson, the Georgia Court of Appeals interpreted a medical malpractice statute of limitations similar to Iowa Code section 614.1(9). 258 Ga.App. 530, 574 S.E.2d 835, 838 (2002). The Georgia statute provided that “an action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.” Id. (emphasis added). The court, reaching the same result as we have reached here, concluded:
Georgia‘s current medical malpractice statute of limitation begins to run upon occurrence or discovery of the injury even where, as here, plaintiff‘s lack of awareness of the causal relationship between the injury and defendant‘s breach of duty effectively precludes her from bringing suit at that time.
Here, as Dr. Dawson argues, the injury was the removal of the voice box on May 21, 1996. The statute of limitations began to run on that date because Schlote knew at the time that the surgery would result in removal of his voice box. The Schlotes did not file this lawsuit until February 17, 2000. This was more than two years after the surgery. Therefore the malpractice action is time-barred unless the fraudulent concealment doctrine applies.
We recognize that our interpretation of
“[Statutes of limitation] are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminаte between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate....”
Schulte v. Wageman, 465 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Iowa 1991) (citation omitted).
Finally, the conclusion we reach requires us to overrule Lawse v. University of Iowa Hospitals, 434 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Iowa Ct.App.1988) (relying on Baines, the court of appeals concluded “injury” in
That brings us to the fraudulent concealment issue.
V. Fraudulent Concealment.
As mentioned, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is the second exception to the general rule that the statute of limitations begins to run when the tort is committed. This court adopted the doctrine in District Township of Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa 601, 603-04 (1875). The doctrine as expressed in District Township of Boomer provides that
where the party against whom a cause of action existed in favor of another, by fraud or actual fraudulent concealment prevented such other from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute would only commence to run from the time the right of action was discovered, or might, by the use of diligence, have been discovered.
40 Iowa at 603. In Koppes, we held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment survived adoption of
In applying the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, we have insisted several conditions must exist. To establish the doctrine, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant did some affirmative act to conceal the cause оf action, and (2) the plaintiff exercised diligence to discover the cause of action. Van Overbeke v. Youberg, 540 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995). Given our interpretation of
“Despite this ‘special relationship,’ which cаlls for a reduced level of proof of fraudulent concealment in certain cases, the acts of concealment must nevertheless be independent of the alleged acts relied on to establish liability.” Van Overbeke, 540 N.W.2d at 276. To recognize fraudulent concealment without the independent requirement would “wipe out the statute of limitations” on medical malpractice claims. Id.
Finally, there must be a “temporal separation of the acts of negligence and the acts of alleged concealment; the concealmеnt must take place after the alleged acts of negligence occurred.” Id.
Here, the Schlotes contend that Dr. Dawson did not tell Schlote that the removal of his voice box was an unnecessary or excessive procedure and that another less radical surgery could have been performed. Dr. Dawson‘s failure to make those disclosures lies at the heart of the Schlotes’ claims; such failure was not an independent, subsequent act of concealment. Failure to make those disclosures as a ground of liability сannot be the basis for fraudulent concealment. Otherwise “there would effectively be no statute of limitations for negligent failure to inform a patient.” Id. at 277.
The Schlotes also contend that Dr. Dawson did not tell Schlote that he—Dr. Dawson—had a drug addiction when he performed surgery on Schlote. Apart from the fact that the record may not support such a contention, we think even if the contention were true, that fact does not establish a basis for fraudulent concealment. Dr. Dawson‘s failure to make such a disclosure is likewise a part of the Schlotes’ claims and is not an independent subsequent act of concealment.
VI. Disposition.
Contrary to the district court ruling, we conclude there is no genuine issue of material fact as to application of the discovery rule or as to the application of the fraudu-
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
All justicеs concur except CADY, J., who dissents and STREIT, J., who joins the dissent.
CADY, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority believes it is compelled to reach its result in this case because of the legislative amendment to the governing statute following our decision in Baines, 223 N.W.2d 199, and our post-amendment decision in Schultze, 463 N.W.2d 47. However, the legislative amendment and Schultze simply clarified that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims begins to run on the date the injury or death is discovered, not the date the wrongful act that caused the injury or death is discovered. See Schultze, 463 N.W.2d at 48-50. This legislative approach is based on the idea that knowledge of injury or death in the course of medical treatment should be enough to alert a person of the need to investigate the possibility of a cause of action based on negligence. This is a sound principle. Yet, this approach does not absolutely preclude the use of the date on which the plaintiff in this case discovered that his surgery was unnecessary as the date the statute of limitations began to run. While the statute establishes knowledge of injury, not knowledge of the wrongful act causing the injury, as the date the limitations period begins to run, it does not preclude using knowledge of the wrongful act as the basis for discovery of the injury in those cases where understanding the wrongfulness of the act is a necessary component to acquiring knowledge of the underlying injury.
There is a clear difference between using the discovery of the wrongful act as the date to commence the statute of limitations as precluded by the amendment and Schultze and using the wrongful act to discover the injury. Our failure to recognize this difference will only lead to unjust results, as it does in this case. By precluding a patient from using the discovery оf the wrongful act as evidence of discovery of the injury, the majority has essentially written the concept of knowledge out of the discovery statute. Moreover, this opinion means every patient must now obtain a second—or third—opinion when surgery or another medical procedure is performed to protect against the statute of limitations running on some unknown injury. This, I submit, is an unnecessary judicial alteration to the statute and an unsound approach. We should not interpret statutes to provide absurd results, and construing this statute in a way that fosters overprotection of potential causes of action creates an absurd result. See State v. Booth, 670 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 2003).
In Schultze, the death that occurred from the medical treatment performed in the case was unintended, as any death from corrective medical treatment would be. See Schultze, 463 N.W.2d at 48. This unintended result, although not understood as resulting from negligence at the time, nevertheless commenced the statute of limitations because knowledge of death, unlike injury, is necessarily acquired by death itself. See id. at 50. Nothing more is needed. An injury, on the other hand, may or may not be known at the time it occurs. Of course, when the injury, as with death, is an unintended result of medical treatment, knowledge is acquired. Thus, although not necessarily understood
In this case, the medical condition at issue was an intended result of the surgery. The removal of the voice box, as the intended result, cannot, by itself, be viewed by the patient to be an injury. More needs to be known. The plaintiff cannot be charged with knowledge that the condition is an injury without the later-acquired, additional information that the surgery was unnecessary. If the physical condition at issue—here, the removal of the voice box—was an injury at the time the medical procedure was performed, it was only because the procedure was unnecessary. Yet, the patient does not know he has been injured until suсh time as the patient discovers the procedure may have been unnecessary. The fact that this information also provides knowledge of a wrongful act does not take away its value as evidence of knowledge of injury.
A case such as this one is confusing because the plaintiff‘s discovery of the injurious nature of the surgery coincides with his discovery of his doctor‘s wrongful act. However, using the discovery of a wrongful act as the means of discovering an injury is consistent with our prior cases and the concept behind the discovery rule, and conforms to the intent and language of
STREIT, J., joins this dissent.
STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Steven Eugene TAGUE, Appellee.
No. 02-1802.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Feb. 25, 2004.
Rehearing Denied March 19, 2004.