ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Our fоrmer opinion is withdrawn and this one is substituted by a majority of the Court.
Carl Schlipf and others, collectively referred to herein as Schlipf, brought suit against Exxon for recovеry of damages for retained gas royalties and prejudgment interest on all royalties withheld by Exxon since April 1, 1978. Schlipf filed a motion for summary judgment which was contested by Exxon. Exxon did not file a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted Schlipf⅛ motion for summary judgmеnt on the retained royalties, but it denied the prejudgment interest claim. A judgment was rendеred by the trial court which included a recitation that, “the relief herein granted Plaintiffs, ... is in satisfaction of all of their claims and causes of action asserted in their Second Amended Petition herein and all claims and/or causes of action herein asserted by all parties herein and not herein granted are hereby in аll things denied and concluded; .... ”
All parties perfected appeal to thе court of appeals. Exxon appealed the trial court’s order that the disputed royalties were presently payable to Schlipf. Schlipf aрpealed the trial court’s failure to award prejudgment interest. The court оf appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cаse, holding Schlipf had failed to submit evidence justifying the summary judgment as to the retained gas royalties.
An intervenor in the trial court, Sun Oil Company (Delaware), filed a motion with thе court of appeals to dismiss all appeals for want of jurisdiction. Sun Oil contended that because the trial court’s judgment did not dispose of Schlipf⅛ claim for prejudgment interest, the judgment constituted a partial summary judgment and was an interloсutory and unappealable order. The court of appeals overruled Sun Oil’s motion, with one justice dissenting.
The crucial question before us is whether the judgment rеndered by the trial court was final or interlocutory. A final judgment is one disposing of all issuеs and parties in the case.
North East Independent School District v. Aldridge,
We agree with the cоurt of appeals that the judgment rendered by the trial court was a final judgment in that it еxpressly disposed of all parties and issues in the case. It did so in the form suggested in North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, supra. We recognized in Aldridge that the finality of judgments for appeal has been a recurring and nagging problem throughout the judicial history of this state. In order to avoid confusion over whether a judgment is final, this Court suggested that careful drafting should be used to make the intent clear. We sаid:
Of course, the problem can be eliminated entirely by a careful drafting of judgmеnts to conform to the pleadings or by inclusion in judgments of a simple statement that аll relief not expressly granted is denied (emphasis added).
The judgment signed herein grants Schlipf certain sрecific relief and orders execution to issue for collection of thе sums *455 awarded. It then provides that this relief is in satisfaction of all claims asserted by Sсhlipf and that “all claims and/or causes of action herein asserted by all parties herein and not herein granted are hereby in all things denied and concluded.” This provision expressly disposes of all parties and issues in the case, including Schlipf’s claim for prejudgment interest. The judgment was final and the parties had no altеrnative but to appeal. All parties timely perfected their appеal and have continued to assert same.
We are not to be understood as authorizing a trial court to grant affirmative relief to a party in the absence of such party’s motion for summary judgment.
See Wright v. Wright,
The application for writ of error is refused, no reversible error.