231 Wis. 324 | Wis. | 1939
The appellant, William M. Schlicht, is the sole beneficiary under a trust created by his father’s will, which was probated in September, 1914. At that time he was twelve years old. Under the will the trustee was to^ use the income of the trust estate for the maintenance and education of the beneficiary until he was twenty-one years of age, and thereafter pay all the income to him. Five thousand dollars of the corpus were to be paid to him when he was twenty-five years old, and he was to' receive the remainder when he reached the age of thirty. Adolph Pfister was appointed trustee in 1916, and upon his death in April, 1928, the Bank
Upon those facts the court concluded that any right on the part of Schlicht to question the eligibility of any of the securities for trust-fund investment was barred by his acquiescence and laches; and that his application to' compel the bank to account for the losses sustained must be denied. Those conclusions were warranted by the facts that until April, 1938, Schlicht did not make any claim or demand on the bank, or take any action to .rescind or hold it responsible for loss sustained by reason of -the ineligible securities, although he knew, or with the exercise of but ordinary care or diligence, could and would have known since December, 1928, — when he consented to the court’s allowance of the bank’s account, as the executor of Pfister’s will, — that all of the securities, excepting the International Match Corporation bond were being held as trust investments; and, in respect to the latter, knew or likewise would have known since May 21, 1932, — when he receipted for the listed assets and intrusted them to the bank to manage, as his agent, — that it
§ 219 (1) “The beneficiary cannot hold the trustee liable for a breach of trust if he fails to sue the trustee for the breach of trust for so long a time and under such circumstances that it would be inequitable to permit him to hold the trustee liable.”
§ 219 (1) b “The length of time necessary to bar the beneficiary from holding the trustee liable for breach of trust depends upon the circumstances. In the absence of special circumstances the beneficiary is barred if the period of the*331 statute of limitations applicable to actions at law in analogous situations has run.”
§ 219 (1) † "... If witnesses or parties have died between the time when the breach of trust was committed and the time of suit, the suit may be barred by laches in a less time than it would otherwise be barred, since under such circumstances it may have become difficult as a result of the delay of the beneficiary in suing to 'ascertain the facts and to do justice.”
Those principles were applied in Estate of Grotenrath, 217 Wis. 109, 112, 258 N. W. 453, when we said,—
“if Edward [the cestui que tru^t] concurred or acquiesced in the carrying of the stocks and securities by the trustees with knowledge of the manner of the form in which they were held, he was barred from relief for the breach of the trust in so holding them. . . . While there is here no finding of knowledge on his part, the facts clearly show that he had knowledge as to the holding oí the machinery company stock, and the finding in view of the admitted facts barred him from relief as to that stock.”
See also 65 C. J. p. 818, § 699; Ross v. Savings Investment & Trust Co. 120 N. J. Eq. 87, 184 Atl. 183; In re Macfarlane’s Estate, 317 Pa. 377, 177 Atl. 12. It follows that the order must be affirmed.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.