100 N.Y. 71 | NY | 1885
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *73 This action is based upon a clause in a deed of Hugh Tunney to the defendant which reads as follows: "This conveyance is made subject to two certain mortgages for $4,000 each, and which said party of the second part assumes with interest from the 22d day of August, 1871."
The defendant claims that the word "assumes" is not broad enough to impose a personal liability upon him to pay the mortgage in question. If it had been intended simply to provide that he should take the land subject to the two mortgages, the further language in this clause, in which the word "assumes" appears, would not have been necessary. Unless that word was used to impose a personal liability upon the defendant to pay, it was wholly unnecessary and serves no purpose and adds nothing to the force of the language used. A rule of construction requires us to give force and effect, if possible, to all the language used. That word is frequently used in deeds to impose a liability to pay upon the grantee, and we believe it is generally understood among conveyancers to impose such liability. Such effect has been given to the word when so used in several well-considered cases in other States. *75
(Braman v. Dowse, 12 Cush. 227; Drury v. Tremont Imp.Co., 13 Allen, 168; Locke v. Homer,
It is also claimed on the part of the defendant that as he assumed the mortgage merely which contains no covenant to pay, he did not become liable to pay the bond, and therefore incurred no personal liability. This construction of the language used would also render the latter portion of the clause quoted entirely useless. In that event the defendant simply took the land subject to the mortgages and assumed nothing. In cases of this kind where the grantee has been made personally liable by an assumption of a mortgage upon the granted premises, the liability has generally been imposed by an agreement or covenant to assume or pay the mortgage with no special reference to or designation of the mortgage debt or the bond to which the mortgage was collateral. Force must be given to the language used, and we think that it was the clear intention of the parties that the grantee should assume the payment of the mortgage debt, and not merely take the real estate subject to the mortgage. If the language does not mean that, what was its purpose and why was it used?
We think, upon the evidence, that the defendant was bound by the clause in the deed quoted as if he had consciously and intentionally assented thereto. It is undoubtedly true that he did not know that the clause was in the deed, and that he never specially authorized its insertion therein. And it may be true that he never intended to be bound by such a clause. But it appears that his father had general authority to deal in real estate in his name. He could purchase real estate incumbered or unincumbered; he could take titles affected with conditions and contingencies, perfect or imperfect, and with covenants running therewith, which might bind the grantee; he could take deeds with or without covenants; he could purchase upon credit or pay cash; he could pay after deducting incumbrances *76 which were permitted to remain. It is quite common for the grantee of land to arrange a portion of the purchase-money by assuming an incumbrance, for which the grantor is liable. Such an assumption binds the grantee to pay no more than the purchase-price.
The defendant in this case is bound, just as he would have been if the dealing in real estate had been for his benefit instead of his father. The business was done in his name; he was the ostensible principal, and it matters not that he permitted his father to reap the benefits thereof. It cannot be presumed that a principal would object that his agent, having general authority to purchase real estate for him, should, as part of the purchase-price, assume the payment of mortgages upon such real estate. It cannot be said, therefore, by the defendant that this clause of assumption was unauthorized by him, as he was bound by what his authorized agent did.
Upon the facts found at the Special Term we do not think that the defendant was effectually discharged or released from his liability under the clause referred to.
The agreement of assumption, therefore, contained in the deed was binding and effectual against the defendant, and the judgment should be affirmed.
All concur, except RAPALLO, J., dissenting, and DANFORTH, J., not voting.
Judgment affirmed.