Schick v. SchickSchick v. Schick
Ordered that the order dated August 14, 2009, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed, without costs or disbursements.
The record supports a finding that the divorced parties’ son is
While “[t]he Family Court has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy in matters of custody and visitation, with the paramount concern being the best interests of the child” (Matter of Pignataro v Davis, 8 AD3d 487, 488-489 [2004]; see Matter of Plaza v Plaza, 305 AD2d 607 [2003]), here, the best interests of the child do not require that the existing custody arrangement be modified (see Matter of Charpentier v Rossman, 264 AD2d 393 [1999]; see generally Matter of Bonthu v Bonthu, 67 AD3d 906 [2009]; Matter of Frey v Ketcham, 57 AD3d 543 [2008]). Under these circumstances, it was an improvident exercise of discretion, unsupported by a sound and substantial basis in the record, to change custody to the father at this time, force the son to interact with the father, sever his contact with his mother and siblings for a three-month period, and compel him to undergo intensive therapeutic counseling. In giving due consideration to the wishes, age, and maturity of the son, and upon a review of the proceedings before the Family Court, we conclude that the order of the Family Court must be reversed (see Matter of Charpentier v Rossman, 264 AD2d 393 [1999]; see generally Matter of Bonthu v Bonthu, 67 AD3d 906 [2009]; Matter of Sinnott-Turner v Kolba, 60 AD3d 774, 775 [2009]).
The parties’ remaining contentions have either been rendered academic or are without merit. Fisher, J.P., Leventhal, Belen and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
Fisher, J.P., Leventhal, Belen and Sgroi, JJ., concur.