Appellant Mark Scheinfeld, a real estate developer, appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellees June W. Murray and her daughter in Scheinfeld’s suit which sought specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate. We affirm.
In March 1994, the parties executed a document entitled “Land Purchase and Sales Agreement,” whereby Mrs. Murray and her daughter agreed to sell to Scheinfeld and his associates a 32.6-acre tract of land in northwest Cobb County, “less and except for a 25,000 square foot lot, inclusive of Seller’s current residence, said exact lot location to be determined by Purchaser.” An “approximation of the Purchaser’s designation of lots” was attached to the agreement under the designation of a “preliminary proposal.” The contract also provided that any modification of the agreement was not effective unless made in writing and executed by the parties.
In April 1994, Mrs. Murray executed a written amendment to the sales contract in order to provide a zoning contingency. In September 1994, Mrs. Murray executed another written amendment to the sales contract
1. Appellant takes issue with the trial court’s determination that the writing sought to be enforced did not contain a sufficient description of the location of the lot to be retained by Mrs. Murray and its boundaries.
“A court of equity will not decree the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land unless there is a definite and specific statement of the terms of the contract.”
Williams v. Manchester Bldg. Supply Co.,
Appellant maintains that the preliminary designation of lots which placed Mrs. Murray’s home on a hexagonal lot facing a cul de sac and which was referenced in and attached to the sales contract provided a key for designating the parcel to be retained by Mrs. Murray, and thereby provided a key by which the property to be sold could be sufficiently described. However, it is undisputed that the preliminary designation of lots did not accurately reflect the actual site on which Mrs. Murray’s home was located. In light of the inaccuracy of the preliminary designation, it cannot be said that the preliminary designation was “clear on its face as to [the] size, shape, and location” of the lot to be retained by Mrs. Murray. See
Kauka Farms v. Scott,
2. Appellant next asserts that the trial court erroneously concluded that the parties did not enter into a subsequent contract. Appellant points to various documents which he contends comprise a
subsequent contract entered into by the parties when Mrs. Murray signed documentation extending the closing date set in the March 1994 sales agreement. The documents appellant alleges make up the subsequent contract consist of: a letter from appellant to Mrs. Murray which accompanied a proposed contract modification concerning an application for rezoning of the property (which Mrs. Murray signed); an appraisal report; an application for rezoning and the county commissioners’ decision thereon; and Mrs. Murray’s affidavit in which she stated that appellant informed her that the lot configuration would have to be redrawn, that she requested that he give her the best lot he could under the circumstances and she would determine whether it was acceptable, and in which she admitted that she had signed an amendment to the sales contract in September 1994 in order to extend the date for closing. In essence, appellant seeks
Judgment affirmed.