120 Mo. App. 611 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1906
(after stating the facts).
First. She cannot recover for the reason the contract of October 22, 1897, was not made for her benefit.
Second. Because Albert G. Scheele himself caused the policy to lapse and could not successfully prosecute a suit against the appellant for its failure to pay mortuary dues.
, Third. Because at the date of the institution of the suit, less than ninety days from the date of the death of Albert G. Scheele, respondent could not have recovered anything of the life association, had the policy been in full force and effect, and hence, if entitled to recover at all, her recovery can be for no more than nominal damages.
As we understand, it is not contended by appellant, that if respondent, for a valuable consideration, was made a beneficiary in the contract of October 22, 1897, she cannot sue in her own name, but that the contract Avas. not, in fact, entered into for her benefit, but for the benefit of Albert G. Scheele. Appellant admits, however, that if the covenant to pay future mortuary calls was for the benefit of respondent, she can sue in her OAvn name on a breach of that covenant. Its contention is, that the covenant was only for the benefit of Albert G. Scheele, the insured, and the Life Association, the insurer. In making the contract Albert Scheele had two objects in view: First, to settle the indebtedness of the Scheele Livery & Undertaking Co., to the bank, and thereby prevent a suit by the bank to test the validity of the Scheele Livery & Undertaking Co’s, deed of assignment for the benefit of its creditors, and in which Mary Scheele had been given a preference. Second, to make provision for his daughter, the respondent. The
In Howsmon v. Trenton Water Co., 119 Mo. l.c. 308, 24 S. W. 784, it is said: “The rule (permitting a third party, for whose benefit a contract is made,-to sue on the contract in his own name) is not so far extended as to give a third person, who is only indirectly and incidentally benefited by the contract, a right to sue upon it.” In that case it was held: “A water company which agrees with a toAvn to be liable for damages caused by its failure to supply water sufficient to extinguish all fires cannot be sued on such agreement by a citizen though he and others pay a special tax to the company under the contract.”
Other cases in which it was held, that the party suing could only receive an incidental benefit from a performance of the contract sued on and for that reason
In Markel v. Western Union Tel. Co., 19 Mo. App. l. c. 85, the court said:
“It is settled law in this State that an action lies upon a contract made by a defendant for the benefit of a plaintiff, although the plaintiff was not privy to the consideration. [Rogers et al. v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 590, and cases cited.] But to give a plaintiff the right to sue for the breach of a contract, the contract itself must be made for his benefit. Where the benefit to the plaintiff would be incidental to carrying out the contract, but was not the cause of malting the contract, the plaintiff cannot maintain an action for its breach.”
In Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. l. c. 283-4, the court said: “To give a third party who may derive a benefit from the performance of the promise, an action, there must be, first, an intent by the promisee to secure some benefit to the third party, and second, some privity between the two, the promisee and the party to be benefited, and some obligation or duty owing from the former to the latter which Avould give him a legal or an equitable claim to the benefit of the promise, or an equivalent from him personally.” This case was approvingly cited in Armstrong v. School District, 28 Mo. App. l. c. 181.
Where an agreement is made to “save harmless” another against the claims óf a third person, the latter cannot sue on the agreement as it was not made for his benefit. [State v. Railway, 125 Mo. 596, 28 S. W. 1074.]
The intention of Albert G. Scheele and the bank can only be ascertained by taking into view both the contract of October 22, 1897, and the reissued policy. The contention of appellant is, that the contract of October twenty-second was completed Avhen it was executed, and as the policy was not delivered until something like two
It is finally contended that the damages are excessive, that respondent’s recovery should be restricted to nominal damages only. It is the general rule for the measure of damages arising out of a breach of contract, that the injured party is entitled to recover such losses as were reasonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the contract, and that he shall be put in as good condition as if the contract had been performed. [Shouse v. Neiswaanger, 18 Mo. App. l. c. 244.] Had the bank performed its contract, on the death of her father, respondent would have received one-sixth of five thousand dollars or $833.331-3. This amount plus interest, the learned trial judge awarded her.
In Bailey v. Am. Deposit & Loan Co., 52 N. Y. App. Div. 402, a suit by the beneficiary in a life insurance policy against the defendant, to whom the policy had been pledged to sucure a debt and who had wrongfully
In Toplitz v. Baur, 161 N. Y. 325, a policy of insurance, in which the insured’s daughters were beneficiaries, was pledged as security for the payment of a note. Defendant permitted the policy to be cancelled by the insurance company, in violation of his contract. On the measure of damages, the court said the beneficiaries were entitled to complete indemnity for the loss sustained, which was the face value (the insured having died) less what it would have cost to carry the policy to the date of the death of the insured.
No offset was pleaded and there is no evidence or stipulation in the record as to the amount of premiums that would have become due up to the time of the death of Albert Scheele, and hence they cannot be taken into consideration to diminish the damages. We think the finding of the learned trial judge is eminently just, and affirm the judgment.