295 N.W. 910 | Minn. | 1940
Action for money for services by one Schau, a subcontractor, against the general contractor, Buss, and the homeowner, Baden. Baden's liability was based upon promises made to Schau after he stated that he had decided to quit work because of doubts about getting paid. Appellant was added as defendant upon motion of Schau based upon an affidavit of Baden averring that appellant had promised him to satisfy Schau's claim. Appellant at the hearing made its liability issuable by an affidavit in opposition. The trial court felt that a full determination of the controversy required the presence of all parties in the interest of justice.
1. Primarily relied upon by the court below for bringing appellant into the lawsuit was 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 9181, which provides as follows:
"Whenever it shall be made to appear, upon motion of the plaintiff in any pending action, or of any defendant in such action who has alleged a counterclaim or other ground for affirmative relief, that in order to a full determination of such action another should have been made a party defendant or plaintiff therein, the court, upon such terms as may be proper, shall order such additional party to be brought in, and may stay other proceedings in the action for such time as may be necessary for that purpose."
Appellant in challenging the application of this statute to it asserts chiefly that only where its presence is essential to the full determination of the controversy between the original parties, Schau, Baden, and Buss, can it be added as party defendant, citing Clay County Land Co. v. Alcox,
Section 9181 above referred to represents a revised version of two prior laws. R. L. 1905, § 4069. The first, enacted in 1868, L. 1868, c. 79, § 1, permitted additional parties to be brought into pending litigation only on motion of a plaintiff who "shall discover that any party ought, in order to a full and just determination of such action, to have been made defendant therein." Seemingly, this statute made the inclusion of additional defendants depend upon whether they should have been joined originally to facilitate a full determination of the action. The second, enacted in 1895, L. 1895, c. 29, § 1, operated to amend the 1868 law by granting similar privilege to any defendant "in case of a counterclaim or of a demand for affirmative relief." In neither the original nor revised versions is it entirely clear whether the phrase "such action," for a full determination of which other parties ought to be brought in, refers strictly to the particular claim which plaintiff asserts in the complaint against this defendant, or refers rather to all claims arising out of the subject matter now in litigation assertable against all parties, including this defendant. In view of appellant's contentions, decision of this point becomes necessary.
These statutes, by permitting additional parties to be included on motion of present parties, constitute legislative recognition that judicial proceedings are primarily adversary whereby the parties instigate, prosecute, and direct litigation in all respects. The principle that courts are chiefly concerned with the parties immediately before them follows logically from this adversary concept. Decision of the controversy between them should not be unnecessarily impeded by the introduction of extraneous parties and issues not at all germane to the principal controversy. However, the presence of third parties in litigation should not depend entirely upon whether the particular issue between the original parties can be decided without them. The obvious public and judicial interest in the complete administration of justice through economy in litigation, without prejudice to the parties, should not be overlooked. Lambertson v. Westerman,
2. However, appellant insists that the doctrine of Clay County Land Co. v. Alcox,
"That was a case where the defendant sought to bring in a third party and compel him to answer a cause of action set up in the answer which was wholly distinct from the cause of action alleged in the complaint."
Now it is clear that any such effect of a counterclaim should be avoided, particularly where, as there, it operated to deprive the additional party of venue rights.
The limitation thus imposed upon the use of a counterclaim by defendant against third parties where not at all germane to an asserted counterclaim against the plaintiff has been recognized by later cases. Eimon Merc. Co. v. Cassidy,
Narrowly speaking, in the instant case the issue of liability between the original parties, Schau, Baden, and Buss, can be determined without the presence of appellant. More realistically, however, Schau desires, as economically as possible, to assert his claim *104 for services against all persons who have made themselves liable therefor. In this desire courts are sympathetic for reasons that underlie a complete administration of justice. That appellant's liability, if any, is not joint does not matter. Conceivably, if Baden's affidavit is true, he made himself liable on a promise to Schau only because prior to the making of such promise appellant had assumed all his liabilities. Appellant's asserted liability was not known to Schau at the time he brought the original action; otherwise it would have been part of the original complaint. Are we now to say that simply because appellant's presence is not essential to the determination of the liability of Baden and Buss to Schau appellant cannot be joined? We decline so to hold.
In cases involving this problem of additional parties, we think the rule as to allowable joinder should be broad and flexible. Wherever parties not now before the court in a pending action, who should have been joined originally, are so intimately related to the principal claims asserted by and against the principal parties that a complete determination of those claims is dependent to a material degree upon their presence, they should upon adequate showing be included by the court (so as to be bound thereby) in the exercise of its discretion.
3. Exercising its discretion, the court below in effect concluded that appellant's presence would contribute materially to the complete determination of plaintiff's demand. Under the rule concerning third-party contract beneficiaries (La Mourea v. Rhude,
Order affirmed. *105