135 N.Y.S. 47 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1912
On the 14th of September, 1909, the defendant and one Moses Harlam entered into an agreement whereby the former as landlord leased to the latter as tenant certain premises for the term of ten years. Pursuant to certain provisions of the lease and subsequent modifications thereof, the tenant deposited with the landlord the sum of $2,000 to be held as security for the rent and the faithful performance of the covenants of the lease, which, at the termination of the lease, was to be returned to the tenant provided he had complied “with all the covenants and conditions of said lease.” The lease con
It is urged in support of the ruling of the learned trial court that the matters pleaded in defense should have been averred by way of setoff or counterclaim within the rule under our present system of pleading that a crossclaim or demand must he set up as a counterclaim. . (Deeves & Son v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 195 N. Y. 324.) But that rule does not apply where the matter relied upon is strictly a defense in whole or in part to the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant pleaded a breach of the covenant to secure which the deposit was made. He did not rely upon a cross demand arising upon some collateral or independent matter. The money was to he returned only in the event that the terms, covenants and conditions of
It is also asserted that the defense is insufficient for not being complete within itself, by which is meant, if I understand the argument, that the defense should state all of the facts upon which the right of the defendant to retain the deposit depended, e. g., the terms of the lease, its assignment to the Sagamore Garage Company, the latter’s entry into possession thereunder, and the like. But it was not necessary to reallege the facts stated in the complaint. The defense is pleaded to those facts, and the rule is familiar that they are to be taken as admitted in determining the sufficiency of the defense.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Ingraham, P. J., Latjghlin, Scott and Dowling, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.